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Abstract
Outlawry is a legal penalty that banishes wrongdoers from the community; it refers to a
refusal to obey the law and a withdrawal of legal rights. Although outlawry is obsolete in
western criminal law, Giorgio Agamben links it to modern biopolitics. As outlawry is
appropriated to preserve the law, and as the law takes life as its object, the subject of
politics disappears. Yet biopolitics also occurs alongside a threat to sovereignty posed by
outlawry, and a shift away from the subject as a site of emancipatory politics, toward a
politics of difference. Taking a post-structural approach, this project examines outlawry
as a deconstructive concept. Outlawry exposes the law’s inability to be at one with itself,
its undecidability, and its dependence on fiction and force to come into being and to
maintain itself. Staging outlawry in the terms of Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, and
Jacques Derrida, the first chapter develops outlawry as deconstructive concept with an
undecidable relationship to justice. Chapter two looks to Judith Butler’s performative
subject and Louis Althusser’s theory of subject interpellation to re-think the relations
between subject and law in light of outlawry. Chapter three examines the overlap
between sovereignty, outlawry and the beast (la bête) discussed by Agamben and
Derrida, and considers political concepts that might deter the conserving power of
outlawry in favor of its deconstructive force. Finally, I turn to Levinasian ethics and
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-minoritarian to sketch a politics of outlawry
that revises the law according to an ethical responsibility to the Other, the political
agency of those who are excluded from the law, and their demand that structures of
power be altered. Outlawry need not result in sheer abjection; for both the subject, and
the anarchic demos, it can be a source of political vitality and social transformation. Yet
as the atrocities of modernity bear witness, from the Shoah to Guantanamo Bay, outlawry
can lead to ‘the worst.’ Outlawry marks the fault line between justice and injustice; if we
are to achieve an ethical future, we must remain politically vigilant, self-critical and open
to alterity.

Keywords
Outlawry, law, deconstruction, performativity, biopolitics, identity politics, democracy,
totalitarianism, multiplicity, becoming animal, becoming minoritarian, Derrida,
Agamben, Benjamin, Schmitt, Butler, Althusser, Levinas, Deleuze, Guattari
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Introduction
Outlawry has long disappeared from the codes of criminal and common law in the
western world. Yet outlaws have a lasting popular currency – we either demonize and
fear them as threats to our security and to our ‘way of life,’ or we idealize them as heroes.
Walter Benjamin noted that even when their deeds are heinous the general public tends to
side with outlaws in sympathy against the law (CV 281), which tells us as much about
our relation to the law as it does about our view of outlaws. Indeed, Marxist historian Eric
Hobsbawm, well known for his studies of Primitive Rebels (1959) and Bandits (1969),
viewed the popular idealization of outlawry as a mode of feudal social protest and a
precursor to revolution. Yet while outlawry can be linked to revolutionary tendencies and
social unrest, it also has affiliations with more politically conservative trends, even
among liberal democracies: for instance, today we hear much about the emergence of
‘rogue states’ that disregard the rule of law in order to preserve existing orders, and
government actions that render certain subjects ‘outside’ of the law by denying legal
protections and rights to some categories of people in the name of national security.
Outlaws might be romanticized, revered, or reviled: the difference is sometimes merely a
matter of ideological or historical perspective, as in the distinction between a freedom
fighter and a terrorist, or a successful revolution and a failed one.
However, it is not the relative ethics of outlawry that I am interested in here, but
something that penetrates more deeply into the ontologies of law, sovereignty, and the
subject, in light of the philosophical ambiguities of outlawry, and its current role in the
political sphere. Outlawry, as it is commonly understood, is a refusal to obey or recognize
the law, and the withdrawal of legal rights and protections; it is a legal mechanism
deployed to enforce subjection to hegemonic rule, and it is a form of protest of that rule.
It literally enforces the law by withdrawing the law; it ensures the law’s presence by
proclaiming its absence.
Outlawry was one of the harshest, and widely applied legal penalties in archaic and
medieval Europe.1 It operated as a kind of social and civic death through banishment
from the community. The sentence took the form of a performative proclamation – caput
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gerat lupinum ("may he bear a wolf’s head") in English Common Law, or wargus esto
(“become a wolf”) in the Frankish version – that stripped the lawbreaker of human status
and deprived the person of legal rights.2 An outlaw was distinct from an ordinary
criminal. The latter stayed within the community and paid retribution for the
transgression, whereas the former was expelled from the community on either a
permanent or temporary basis. The outlaw literally became a wolf in the eyes of the law.
Not only was it prohibited to aid or shelter outlaws, anyone could harm them without
penalty. Indeed, outlawry was a walking death sentence: community members were duty
bound to slay such persons, as Pollock and Maitland write in their 1885 History of
English Law Before the Time of Edward I: “To pursue the outlaw and knock him on the
head as though he were a wild beast is the right and duty of every law-abiding man”
(476). As state power in European societies increased, and as the weapons and
infrastructure for law enforcement became more sophisticated, a sentence of outlawry
became less a punishment, and more a process levied against accused persons who
refused to respect the law’s authority over them by breaking bail or fleeing from justice
(476). In other words, outlawry transformed from its role as a substantive force of law (in
a law that lacked enforcement), to a supplement of law enforcement, and from there it
gradually dwindled from use in criminal law in western nations.
Yet while outlawry may be ancient, its logic has continued relevance in modern political
theory, albeit in ways that are particular to our era and its dominant political forms, from
the revolutionary impulse to the totalitarian one and from democracy to biopolitics. The
existence of a space, or force, outside of the law presents dilemmas and opportunities for
re-thinking western political concepts in light of our epistemological and historical
context: in the case of this study, a specifically Euro-North American one, but one that is
also inescapably global. In particular, a focus on outlawry as a deconstructive force
opens new questions with respect to biopolitics, which is generally treated as a dehumanizing politicization of life. Attention to the ambiguities of outlawry, which
suggests both a vulnerability and a threat to the law, allows us to consider biopolitics in
new ways, disrupting the very binary between political life and biological life on which
biopolitics is based. Moreover, a consideration of the politicization of life outside of the
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law informs new political concepts, and new conceptualizations of older concepts such as
revolution or democracy.

A Modern History of The Outside of the Law
While philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau do not address the concept of
outlawry per se, such concepts as the state of nature, the right to revolution, the social
contract, sovereignty and democracy that emerged as part of Enlightenment political
philosophy have implications with respect to the relationship between the law and its
outside. The revolutionary tradition derives its transformative political force from the
power to destroy the law and to found new laws; these powers cannot be drawn from
within the limits of the law, but only from what is outside of it. Some of the greatest
democracies and struggles for justice of modernity are founded in this power to destroy
the law, and found a new order. Illegitimate force is a measure through which
communities that lack legal status or political power can resist injustice, since legal routes
tend to be denied to them. I might cite the French and American revolutions, the slave
revolts of Haiti, the African National Congress…the list of extralegal forces establishing
new governments on the basis of the political concepts of the Enlightenment (i.e. human
rights, liberty, equality) is long. John Locke makes explicit the right of subjects to revolt
against an unjust sovereign in Two Treatises of Government. He writes that:
whenever the Legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the Property of the
People, or to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves
into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any farther
Obedience, and are left to the common Refuge, which God hath provided for all
Men, against Force and Violence. (S. 222)
If the regime is unjust, the people have a right to revolution, in which they not only act
outside of the law, but by their actions they may dissolve the law so that they can
establish a new, and more just regime. Together with Rousseau’s social contract theory,
ideas such as Locke’s informed both the American and French revolutions, setting the
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basis for the rights-based liberal democracies that today prevail in the West. The
American Declaration of Independence (1776) as well as France’s revolutionary
constitution, the Declaration on the Rights of Man (1789), form the theoretical basis for
contemporary human rights instruments. These documents assert principles of popular
sovereignty, the unalienable rights of man, and the right to revolution.
What is interesting about these instruments with respect to the outside of the law is that
they express a legal confirmation of rights that extend beyond the law. Article 3 of the
French Declaration stipulates that equality is a natural right: “All men are equal by
nature and before the law.” Equality is a fact that is guaranteed not by law, but by
something that exceeds the law: men are born equal. Should the law fail to reflect this
fact of nature, the people have a right to overthrow it: “Resistance to oppression is the
consequence of the other rights of man” (Article 33). The Declaration of Independence
expresses this right to revolution as follows: The people, “endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights,” can overthrow a government that fails to uphold these rights:
“That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” Sovereignty, which “resides in
the people” (Article 25 of the Declaration on the Rights of Man), exceeds the law and
grounds the right to revolution.
The extralegal character of the natural right of the people’s sovereignty is based on a
view of the state of nature – which in this perspective is loosely analogous to the outside
of the law – in which man persists in a state of animal-like natural goodness. In his
Discourse on Inequality (1754) Rousseau writes that:
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying
This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of
civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and
misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or
filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows, ‘Beware of listening to this impostor;
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you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the
earth itself to nobody.’ (N.pag.)
For Rousseau, where the law is artificial, and creates inequality, greed and other such
problems, the outside of the law, while not perfectly idyllic, is in a certain sense pure – it
is prior to such concepts as wickedness, justice, and morality.
Looking for a way to bring the simple equality of the state of nature back into politics
without falling into a crisis of absolute lawlessness, Rousseau determines that subjects
are only free when all members of a sovereign nation submit equally to law (2). This is
possible only in democracy, which, as he elaborates in the Social Contract, is a political
form in which all citizens share sovereignty. Indeed, he determines that forms of
sovereignty that place the ruler above the law can lead to grave injustice. Rousseau is
thus very clear that democracies are not lawless regimes, but ones in which laws are just
because they apply equally to all men. Rousseau himself distrusted the lasting integrity of
revolutionary factions, and doubted the stability of newly founded governments. Yet, his
ideas did inspire revolutions, for the sovereignty of the people depends, and least in the
founding moment, on the extralegal power of the people to make law. Indeed, it is this
archic power that grants sovereignty to the people; the government merely implements
and enforces the people’s will. In such a democratic republic people are rendered free by
their very subjection to law, since the law is of their own making.
The right to revolution is implicit even in Hobbes, a monarchist and proponent of
absolute sovereignty, but Hobbes’ view of the state of nature, and of the social contract,
vastly differed from Rousseau’s (indeed, Rousseau was in part responding to Hobbes,
whose viewpoint he disapproved of). The view of the outside of the law that is implicit in
Hobbes’ writing is quite cynical in comparison to Rousseau’s idealized state of nature.
The premise of the Leviathan is that humans live in a natural state of brutal lawlessness, a
“war of all against all” in which life is “poor, solitary, brutish and short” (86). We
transcend this natural state by entering a social contract in which natural rights are ceded
to a sovereign authority that protects and governs us. Hobbes’ social contract theory is
not a revolutionary theory – the social body must accept the sovereign’s authority, which

6

is indivisible and absolute, even if power is to a certain extent abused. Yet the finitude of
sovereignty might still be wrought through the evil of civil war, with its haunting traces
of the state of nature, to which humans might return should the sovereign fail to live up to
his side of the contract. Hobbes writes:
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no
longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them. For the right men
have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no
covenant be relinquished…The end of obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a
man seeth it, either in his own or in another’s sword, nature applieth his obedience to
it, and his endeavor to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in the intention of them
that make it, be immortal; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death
by foreign war, but also through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it, from
the very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by intenstine discord. (92)
The contract between the sovereign and the subjects in the Leviathan involves the
exchange of protection by law for submission to the law. While Hobbes’ social contract
theory is about the formation of a political body under the umbrella of law, it is implicit
that if the contract is broken, a resort to illegitimate violence becomes the right of the
other party. If the sovereign fails in the obligation to protect subjects, then it follows that
the subjects are no longer bound to recognize the law, and might overthrow the regime.
Likewise, it is implicit that if a subject does not obey the law, he or she forfeits the rights
and protections that the contract guarantees. Such are the conditions under which a
community member might be outlawed. Indeed, although Hobbes does not speculate
about the relationship between social banishment and the social contract, when he
published Leviathan in 1651, outlawry was still employed to punish lawbreakers,
especially those who failed to appear for trial.
For Hobbes, rebellion against the sovereign is expected only in severe cases of abuse of
power, or loss of might on the part of the sovereign (i.e. a failure to protect). The general
spirit of Leviathan looks to avoid a return to a state of nature wherever possible. Indeed,
in Hobbes’ cynical view of human nature, the illegitimate violence of the people, who are
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naturally selfish and violent, is never to be desired. To avoid such a brutal reality,
Hobbes hinges violence, as a natural right, to the sovereign, who is outside of the law.
Here the outside of the law begins to emerge as somewhat more complex than initially
might appear: that is, for Hobbes the outside of the law is not simply analogous to a state
of nature, as a pure absence of law. Instead, the power drawn by the sovereign from
natural violence is included in the law as what preserves the permanence, absoluteness
and indivisibility of sovereignty. Everyone, except the sovereign, lays down the natural
right to act outside of the law. This is why those who do act outside of the law are
rendered outlaws. The Hobbesian position of the sovereign above the law, which so
offended Rousseau, is in keeping with Jean Bodin’s definition of sovereignty. Bodin
posits that the sovereign must be outside of the law in order to create law. The sovereign
thus maintains an exceptional relationship to the social contract: he guarantees the law by
excluding himself from it. In this sense, the outside of the law is analogous to both the
absence of sovereignty in the state of nature, and the ‘total’ sovereignty of an absolute
authority that is above the law.

The Political Stakes
By placing the sovereign above the law, Hobbes and Bodin create a relationship between
sovereignty and extralegal decision-making. The idea that the law must be suspended in
its relation to the sovereign in order to create and enforce law proved to have a significant
influence on the Weimar writings of Carl Schmitt, influencing Nazism, which became the
paradigm of an outlaw state in the twentieth century. Schmitt, who became a prominent
Nazi jurist, develops his political theory as a critique of parliamentary liberalism, which
he sees as a weak and ineffective dissolution of sovereignty precisely because it excludes
the outside of the law from sovereignty (7). Schmitt proposes a totalitarian approach to
save the decaying modern state from liberalism: invest the sovereign with a total
authority that exceeds the law. His definition of sovereignty as the power to decide on the
state of exception (5) encloses what is outside on the inside: that is, it captures the outside
of the law in the law. The outside of the law thus maintains a special relationship to
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fascism as what the state both encloses and embodies. In fascism there is no outside of
the law except the lawlessness of the state. Such an enclosure of the outside of the law is
certainly implied in Mussolini’s famous slogan: “Everything in the State, nothing outside
the State, nothing against the State” and is echoed in Lenin’s definition of dictatorship:
“power without limit, resting directly upon force, restrained by no laws, absolutely
unrestricted by rules.”3
That totalitarian states derive their sovereignty from outside of the law was central to
Hannah Arendt’s critique of totalitarianism. She argues that the totalitarian regimes of
the twentieth century produced a “total state of lawlessness” that merged all aspects of
society under one mediating ideal. For the National Socialists, the activities of both the
Führer (whose word was law) and the secret police did not need to be covered by public
legal decrees because valid law was seen to ‘spring’ naturally from the consciousness of
the people as a reflection of a common ethics (394). Yet for Arendt, lawlessness not only
permeates the activities of the totalitarian government, which maintains an ongoing state
of exception; under such rule, the subjects of the state are transformed. She writes:
“Totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means, namely, through the state and
a machinery of violence; thanks to its peculiar ideology and the role assigned to it in this
apparatus of coercion, totalitarianism has discovered a means of dominating and
terrorizing human beings from within” (325). New kinds of citizens are produced through
a mode of politics that infiltrates the interior of the individual.
In addition to producing total citizen-subjects, totalitarian states also create a population
of denationalized ‘undesirables’ whose exclusion from the state constitutes an exclusion
from the category of human subject worthy of rights. The task of the Nuremburg Laws
was to effectively outlaw the Jewish population in this sense. But unlike the archaic
outlaw who enjoys a risky freedom from the law, the undesireables of totalitarian regimes
do not escape from the confines of the totalized system. Relegated either to internment
camps or exile and illegal residence in other countries as refugees, they are exposed in
full vulnerability to state violence as outlaws within the system. Those in the camps are
literally exposed to death and extermination, while refugees take flight as a different kind
of outlaw. According to Arendt: “The stateless person, without right to residence and

9

without the right to work, has of course constantly to transgress the law. He was liable to
jail sentences without ever committing a crime” (287). In fact, as Arendt presents it,
from a human rights perspective it is preferable to be a criminal than an outlaw, since
criminals are at least guaranteed the status of subject worthy of basic rights.4 Criminals
are enclosed within legal systems and are, in a certain way, still protected by the law.
Although they have transgressed the law, restitution can be made through payment of a
penalty, in the form of a fine or time incarcerated. An outlaw, in the sense intended by
Arendt (she uses the phrase “outside the pale of the law” instead of ‘outlaw’) is someone,
such as an exile or refugee, who is not recognized by the law; an outlaw lacks legal status
unless brought into the law, either through citizenship or criminalization. In Arendt’s
view, those who find themselves beyond the pale (287)5 possess a certain kind of
freedom of movement if they are stateless, and freedom of thought if they are interned as
a refugee in a democratic country (as opposed to being a full citizen of a despotic
regime). However this freedom fails to change their fundamental experience of
“rightlessness.” Even when they are not deprived of freedom, consequently, these
modern outlaws are deprived of the ‘right to action” (296).

Biopolitics and Totalitarianism
The exceptional politics advocated by Schmitt and critiqued by Arendt are not restricted
to these totalitarian regimes, but lead also to a more general trend linked to the
totalization of the political domain in liberal democracies. The ideal vision of Rousseau
and his revolutionary contemporaries – equality, fraternity and liberty for all men – was
premised on the omission of certain categories of people from legal rights from the
outset. Slaves, colonized peoples, and to some extent, women, were excluded not only
from legal rights and protections, but from humanity itself, and some of these exclusions
were legally instituted well into the twentieth century.6 While from the perspective of
those who are excluded, the illegitimacy of sovereign force and the suspension of legal
rights has defined their relation to the state, the outside of the law has a new significance
in contemporary politics that exceeds its role in Enlightenment politics and in colonial
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rule. Today, the suspension of law is a defining force in everybody’s relation to states,
including those who traditionally benefit from full inclusion in the law. In State of
Exception Giorgio Agamben argues that a suspension of law – he calls it the ‘state of
exception’ with reference to Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty – brings totalitarianism
into even ‘so-called’ democratic regimes. He makes an important point in showing some
emerging similarities between certain forms of democracy and totalitarianism. He
defines totalitarianism as “the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a
legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries
but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the
political system” (2). The Nazi state, which operated for 12 years under a suspended
constitution, is the prototype, but since then, in “what has been called a ‘global civil
war’” “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency … has become one of
the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones” (2).
The normalization of the state of exception is visible in the prevalence of security
measures in western countries as a response to international terrorism, the paradigm of
which is Guantánamo Bay. The result is a catastrophe on a global scale (SE 56). Where
for Schmitt the exception suspended the law to guarantee the distinction between law and
outlawry, inside and outside, for Agamben these distinctions are blurred to a point of
“absolute indeterminacy” in the modern context, so that “the sphere of creatures and the
juridical order are caught up in a single catastrophe” (SE 57).
In addition to the constitutive exclusions of western societies, a totalizing impulse
infiltrates even the domain of citizenship and inclusion. This calls into question the
efficacy of concepts like democracy, human rights, and popular sovereignty. The
totalizing impulse seems to be inherent to western metaphysics, and is transferred from
the philosophical to the political domain. Jean Luc Nancy suggests the west’s totalizing
impetus has its roots in Platonic Idealism; it is tightly linked to conceptions of
subjectivity, and the need to ground propositions in ‘truth,’ including the self-certainty of
an individual ego. The consequences in western democracies are twofold, as David
Ingram elaborates. First, models of the political that prioritize public debate among
equals are increasingly precluded through a “total infusion of scientific strategies of
prediction and control in economy, polity, society, and culture.” Secondly, Ingram
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continues, “dialogic pluralism” is suppressed “by the totalitarian logic of a political
practice aimed at strategically realizing some unquestioned global ideology” (95).
Western democracies are thus structured according to a totalizing logic, this time in the
form of bureaucracy instead of the tradition and authority emphasized in totalitarian
regimes (96). The effects are insidious; what is taken to be the democracy and pluralism
that Arendt once celebrated as non-totalitarian are revoked as masking the coercive
manipulation of the population by the state; a variation on the infiltration of the interior
of the individual by totalitarian political tactics. The implication is that the public
consensus that is so fundamental to democracy is false; it has been orchestrated through
limiting the real political choices available, controlling and oversimplifying the
information on which the public bases its decisions, and reducing elections to the
spectacle of personality (96).
The problem is often cast in terms of biopolitics, a term coined by Foucault in History of
Sexuality to refer to a trend that grows from Enlightenment rationality. In effect, by
making life itself the object of the law, biopolitics objectifies its subjects through
calculations bent not on relations between the sovereign and his subjects, nor on
retributions against enemies, but on “distributions around the norm” (144). Biopolitics
has everything to do with outlaws, in Agamben’s view. In Homo Sacer he draws an
explicit geneology between the outlaw and a figure he calls the sacred man (Homo sacer)
that represents the new biopolitical citizen. Agamben argues that sovereignty has always
been conceptualized as power over life. He intends this thesis to “correct or complete”
Foucault’s biopolitical conceptualization of modern politics as the inclusion of zoë (bare
life) in the polis. Where for Foucault the “growing inclusion of natural life in the
mechanisms and calculations of power” (HS 119) is a modern phenomenon, for
Agamben sovereignty has rested on a continuous state of exception in which bare life is
indistinguishable from politics. His investigation circulates around the political function
of homo sacer, the sacred man “who may be killed but not sacrificed” (8). This sacred
figure has, for Agamben, its origin in archaic legal structures banning lawbreakers,
placing them in an ambivalent position both inside and outside of the law.
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To make his point, Agamben indicates the liminal status of the outlaw as a figure poised
at the boundary between nature and culture: “The life of the bandit…is not a piece of
animal nature without a relation to law and the city. It is rather, a threshold of
indistinction and of passage between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and
inclusion: the life of the bandit is the life of the loup garou, the werewolf, who is
precisely neither man nor beast, and who dwells paradoxically within both while
belonging to neither” (105). By making biological life political, outlawry, for Agamben,
survives today as the logic by which people are stripped of subjectivity and exposed to
political power, for the politics of life in western sovereignty revolves around this
inclusive exclusion. Although the roots of biopolitics are thus ancient, biopolitics, for
Agamben, is a specifically modern phenomenon. What was once properly contained in its
authorizing function as an exception, he contends, is today the rule. This has horrific
consequences that for Agamben can only be described vis a vis the analogy of the
concentration camp, the model according to which the bare life of the citizen constitutes
the new “biopolitical body of humanity” (9).
My discussion of outlawry takes as its point of departure these discourses of biopolitics
that are, for good reason, enjoying so much currency. Who can deny that over the last
century, life and death are administrated in ultra-rationalized ways that were not seen
before? Yet I would like to move past the seemingly all-encompassing infiltration of the
techniques of power in our lives and the administration of our exposure to death.
Moreover, I would like to do so without losing sight of the fact that some people are
simply more exposed to biopolitical harm than others, even if we are all negatively
effected by the logic of biopolitics as Foucault and Agamben stipulate. Biopolitics
represents a failure of political concepts such as democracy and human rights that
developed during the Enlightenment to be what they promised to be. How do we proceed
from here? Foucault writes that where for Aristotle “man…remained a living animal with
the capacity for political existence,” in biopolitics “modern man is an animal whose
politics call his existence as a living being into question” (HoS143). To deconstruct
biopolitics vis a vis outlawry urgently calls our politics into question on account of the
fact that our continued existence, indeed, the continued existence of all life, is now at
stake in politics.
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These theorists of biopolitics forget that outlawry has another side, one that puts the
legitimacy and unified presence of the law into question. Outlawry does not merely
separate out human life from subjectivity and make it an object of law; outlawry also has
an undecidably archic and anarchic relationship to law: one in which the opposition
between arkhe and anarchy becomes indistinguishable. Walter Benjamin’s work is
important in this regard. In “Critique of Violence” he argues that this indistinction
accounts for the public’s admiration of the outlaw. Like Schmitt, Benjamin takes issue
with the impotent banality of liberal democracy as it played out during the Weimar years.
However, his response is not a conservative enclosure of outlawry in a total system of
absolute sovereignty, but instead a revolutionary transformation of concepts through a
violence derived from outside the law that destroys, rather than conserves, the law. It is
also Benjamin who points out, in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” that what
later theorists attribute to modernity is by no means new from the perspective of outlaws:
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we
live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is
in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring
about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle
against Fascism.” (257)
Agamben, with reference to this thesis, argues that what is new in modernity is that the
state of exception is today the rule. He contends, moreover, that the resulting
indistinguishability between bare life and political life structures biopolitics. Benjamin,
however, demands that we view history from the point of view of those who have been
excluded from the law, a perspective that reveals that life has always been political. The
politicization of the life of the oppressed, moreover, underscores not merely their
biopolitical helplessness, but the necessity that the law be disrupted. When we begin to
deconstruct biopolitics in this way, the political focus begins to shift from an inclusive
conservation of right and law to strategies to re-invest political life through a
deconstructive criticism of the law. This demands a revolution, not necessarily in the
sense of a transfer of power from one class or one ideology to another, but a revolution in
political concepts such as sovereignty, the subject, biopolitics and democracy.
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Outlawry as Deconstruction
To deconstruct outlawry, we begin with the task of deconstruction itself. In Ethics and
Deconstruction Simon Critchley specifies that this involves questioning the tendency in
western philosophy to reduce alterity to identity and plurality to unity: it entails critiquing
attempts in western thought to comprehend the Other by mastering and domesticating
otherness (29). The goal of deconstruction is to reverse this reductionism and open
metaphysics to alterity. As Critchely writes, what deconstruction aims to do is “to locate
a point of otherness within philosophical or logocentric conceptuality and then to
deconstruct this conceptuality from that position of alterity” (26). This is a decidedly
ethical task in the Levinasian framework, in which ethical peace, or a recognition of the
Other, overrides and guides political reason (222). As such, political rationality is not the
only, nor the best response to political questions. Critchley suggests that this mode of
ethics aims for a “new conception of the organization of political space,” one that will
repeatedly interrupt all claims at totalization, including those secreted in liberal concepts
of freedom and autonomy (223).
How are we to be ethically political subjects under the contradictions of outlawry?
Although he is not referring to outlawry, Foucault frames the stakes of the present
investigation clearly in his preface to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus:
“How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to
be a revolutionary militant?” (xv). The question is central not just to deconstruction, but
to the politics of post-structuralism more generally, which provides the theoretical
underpinnings for this dissertation. This branch of thought has its own particular
relationship to outlawry in its antinomian critique of structuralism and of the foundations
of western thought. Post-structuralism provides a framework for a shift of focus from law
to outlawry in its difference from the law. The difference between outlawry and the law
is not as straightforward as it initially appears. The law has an identity that can be
measured, defined, and categorized. It entails enforced commensurability, it regulates the
relations of the people and things that are contained within it. The outside of the law has
no such identity, no rules, acts, or enforcing authorities. Its identity is established solely
through its difference from the law, not through the commensurability of its elements or
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some identifiable agents or qualities inherent to it. Yet it would be overly simple to
resort to the Platonic theory of negation in order to define the outside of the law. The
theory of negation would see outlawry as what is other to the law, with the implication
that the outside occupies the space of a lack. It lacks its own identity, and it lacks the
elements that establish the law’s identity – legislated rules, enforcement, and authority.
Yet an outlaw does not precisely signify a lack of identity. To be sure, an outlaw is not a
subject. Yet outlawry is itself an identity of sorts, an identity of difference from the law.
Moreover, outlawry supplements both the law and sovereignty, both of which contain the
other in their attempts to foreclose what is outside. If the law requires supplementation,
then it is the law that is lacking. As Jacques Derrida argues in Of Grammatology,
difference is not lacking in its non-identity to the identical. Rather, difference is what
makes identity possible. Derrida writes: “difference makes the opposition of presence and
absence possible. Without the possibility of difference, the desire of presence as such
would not find its breathing-space (143).” Thus outlawry is the difference that founds the
identity of the law, that marks the boundary that allows the law’s presence to unfold. The
law lacks an immediate and unified presence, and depends on something else to be fully
itself. It depends on its own limits, and the possibility of an outside; it depends on
outlawry.
The post-structural shift from law to outlawry coincides with a movement away from
conceptions of subjectivity based on identity or sameness toward multiple, fluid, or
fragmented forms of difference, in other words, the death of the humanist subject. But if
the subject is dead, then what kind of entity takes its place? A biopolitical view suggests
that the subject is replaced by a figure of abjection and objectification. Deprived of the
law, humans become like animals, available to be counted like sheep, and vulnerable to
being killed without culpability, like wolves. This bestialization apparently suppresses the
trace of natural ipseity that is also associated with animals, such as what Hobbes infers in
his citation of Plautus when he writes lupus est homo homini (man is a wolf to man).
However, there is another way we might conceptualize the post-human subject through a
post-structural reading of outlawry. This approach provides the conceptual tools to
mobilize difference as a site of politics, without necessarily entailing abjection and
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further exclusion. Some neo liberals, neo-Marxists and American feminists would not
necessarily agree that the post-structural approach has a material emancipatory
significance.’7 As Philip Wood points out in his discussion of “‘Democracy’ and
‘Totalitarianism’ in Contemporary French Thought,” these critics see post-structuralists
as theoretical outlaws in a negative sense, indeed, in a specifically totalitarian one, citing
a number of problems that undermine the political ethics of post-structuralism: an
affiliation with the thought of Heidegger, who was associated with Nazism; the
eradication of the modern humanist subject, which serves as the foundation of liberal
democracy; and the deprivation of women of the status of subject just as we achieve it,
via the ‘death of the subject’ (76-77). Yet Wood shows that post-structuralists themselves
often position their thought as a mode of resistance to fascism, dismissing these
accusations as absurd misunderstandings of their claims: for instance, questions about
what grounds being in a critique of humanism are mistaken by critics as a denial of
human self-consciousness and agency (76, 79). Indeed, linking it to subjugated
knowledges such as feminist, queer and post-colonial thought, in Society Must Be
Defended Foucault casts post-structural thought as an emancipatory revolutionary project.
He describes the disruptive quality of:
the immense and proliferating criticizability of things, institutions, practices, and
discourses; a sort of general feeling that the ground was crumbling beneath our feet,
especially in places where it seemed most familiar, most solid, and closest to us, to
our bodies, to our everyday gestures. But... beneath this whole thematic, through it
and even within it, we have seen what might be called the insurrection of subjugated
knowledges. (6-7)
Post-structuralism might thus be seen as a revolt against the totalizing tendencies of
western metaphysics and politics and the associated failure of Enlightenment ideals (the
evidence of this failure ranges from genocide to the pseudo-individualism of
consumerism as has been argued by thinkers from Zygmunt Bauman to Theodore
Adorno).
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For Wood, it is the survival of this very revolutionary (or what I term outlaw) tendency in
post-structuralism that motivates the assault against it. In France, Wood argues, the
revolutionary tradition has been neutralized in the consumer culture that took hold
following May 1968. The subject stars as a key player in this ethos, which is based on the
capitalist promotion of individual “desire,” “imagination” and “self-expression” (78).
Post-structuralism and its “challenge to a philosophy of the subject,” thus undermines
alignment with “the transnational capitalist order of the European Union” in the context
of global capitalism (78).
I take an interest in post-structuralism precisely at the site where its grandest promises
and greatest critiques intersect. Like outlawry, post-structuralism is affiliated with both
openness toward alterity, and the eradication of the subject. As such, outlawry draws
attention to the deconstructability of post-structuralism itself: it blurs the distinctions
between the polarized sides of the debate, because with outlawry, the risks and threats are
integral to the concept, so it is less likely to be idealized. Poststructualism offers a useful
approach to sorting through the ethical and political dilemmas of outlawry precisely
because it embodies those dilemmas and treads the precarious threshold between risk and
promise. Outlawry is necessary to the very presence of the law: this paradox is definitive
of post-structuralism. Its dangers are very real, as the spectres of genocide in the
twentieth century can attest. Yet we cannot rid ourselves of outlawry without realizing
the very worst of our fears. Post-structuralism allows us to see the fault line, and opens a
path toward justice, if we are vigilant and self-critical.

Overview
What began simply with the query ‘is outlawry relevant to the political today?’, opens up
questions about some of the key concepts in political theory, pertaining to subjectivity, to
sovereignty, and to ethics. This dissertation looks to provide some insight into how
outlawry interacts within each of these spheres, and to offer a sketch of how outlawry
might deconstructively contribute to a transformation of these concepts.
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The first chapter, “Deconstructing Outlawry,” stages the problem in the terms set out by
Schmitt and Benjamin, who address the extralegal forces shaping the political sphere
from the extremes of the radical right and left. Where Schmitt harnesses the outside of the
law to preserve state power, Benjamin looks to the extralegal forces of justice to
overthrow the political order. To address the question of how we ensure that outlawry
opens toward justice instead of closing back into totalitarianism, I turn to Derrida’s
“Force of Law” and Limited Inc. I show that as a performative force the law is
persistently haunted by its outside with the threat or promise of a new law. A
deconstructive ethics of outlawry is possible through a continual re-founding of law and
politics based on a self-critical and responsible relationship to alterity.
Chapter Two: “The (Un)Becoming Subject of Outlawry” takes outlawry as a starting
place to re-think the complex relations between the subject and the law. I take up Judith
Butler’s theory of the performative subject and Louis Althusser’s Interpellation scenario
in order to discover what the outlaw is to the subject if outlawry persists as a
deconstructive force in relation to the law. I propose that outlawry takes form as the
alterity that slips in at the threshold of law and subject, both of which are performative,
and thus transformative concepts. As such, the subject is a placeholder in a relationship
with the law that is under constant negotiation.
Despite such potential for transformation, it seems as if in modernity, subjects are far
more likely to be outlawed in vulnerable forms than transformative ones. Indeed,
Agamben contends that today everybody has been reduced from subject to bare life, as
states harness outlawry to conserve themselves. In chapter Three: “Sovereignty, Outlawry
and the Wolf,” I consider Agamben’s claim that everyone is homo sacer, along with
recent works by Derrida that examine the overlap between the concepts of sovereignty,
outlawry and the beast (la bête). Since ancient times, outlawry has had a simultaneous
archic and anarchic function, an ambiguity that serves a politically deconstructive
purpose. However, in today’s political context, the connection between sovereignty,
beastliness, and outlawry takes new and more dangerous forms that are at odds with
revolutionary democracy, which relies on the force of the people (as the masses, not as
subjects) to rise above the law. I take up Derrida’s concepts of the passive decision,
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voyoucracy and democracy-to-come to consider political concepts that might reinvest the
anarchic, deconstructive powers of outlawry, and divest sovereignty of conserving
powers of outlawry that tread dangerously close to totalitarianism.
Chapter Four “Becoming-Outlaw” explores what an ethical politics of outlawry might
look like. How do we strive for justice today? How do we open ourselves to alterity
without appropriating it? What of those who are already abjected to a point of silence, if
not disappearance? My aim here is to discover how we might engage in an ethical politics
of outlawry, that is, a politics that allows for alterity and revises the law in accordance
with a responsibility to the Other. I turn to Levinas’ definition of ethics as responsibility
to the Other in the face-to-face encounter, Derrida’s resolution of the rift between ethics
and politics in Levinas’ thought, and Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming
minoritarian in A Thousand Plateaus. Where Derrida proposes that ethical politics is
possible in an out-of-joint experience of time, the latter authors’ forward an implicit
critique of identity politics, arguing instead for a minoritarian politics. The ‘subject’ of
politics is constituted by difference itself: it is a multiplicity that is political not on the
basis of sameness, or identifications with the majority, but insofar as we, in our diversity,
mobilize the outside.
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Chapter I: Outlawry as Deconstruction
The concept of outlawry is implicit in the writing of two thinkers who admired each
other, but had notably opposing ethical and political positions with respect to the greatest
atrocity of the twentieth century. For Walter Benjamin, a German-Jewish intellectual who
took his own life at the Spanish border while fleeing the Nazis, outlawry has
transformative revolutionary powers bordering on the divine. For Carl Schmitt, the
outside of the law, in the form of a sovereign decision, is what guarantees state power and
preserves the existing order. Schmitt, a German political philosopher, is renowned for his
turn toward the Nazi party, for whom he became chief jurist in 1933. There is much to
learn about the nature of outlawry itself, and its role in the political, when we consider it
in the anarchic terms established by Benjamin, the archic ones set by Schmitt, and in the
translations between the two. How are we to negotiate such ethical and political extremes
in the same concept? Is it possible to achieve an ethical politics that leads to justice vis a
vis outlawry, when to embrace and to foreclose outlawry both seem to land us on the
precipice of totalitarian politics? The Benjamin-Schmitt dialogue brings us to this
threshold, establishing the stakes of the ancient concept of outlawry in the terms of the
twentieth century; but it is deconstruction that provides some insight into how we might
strive for an ethics of the outside of the law.
The dialogue between Benjamin and Schmitt was one of the greatest intellectual scandals
of its time. Theodore Adorno deleted all reference to Schmitt from the Origins of German
Tragic Drama, and excluded a letter of admiration from Benjamin to Schmitt from the
first edition of Benjamin’s correspondence.8 Taubes called the letter “a mine” that
“explodes our conception of the intellectual history of the Weimar period” (cited in
Bredekamp, 250). Derrida treats Benjamin’s correspondence with Schmitt with mistrust
and cautions that Benjamin’s theory of messianic violence risks “the worst” through its
affiliation with discourses that are complicit with the Shoah.
Indeed, despite their vastly different perspectives, the theorists share some intellectual
terrain: both were responding to the political and economic crises of the Weimar
Republic and critiquing parliamentary liberalism, albeit from the opposing margins of the
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radical left and right. And both were theorists of the extreme who “subscribed to a form
of decisionism” (Muller 461). In addition, they shared some common intellectual
influences. For instance, both were contributors to the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften
und Sozialpolitik. Moreover, they were reading and engaging with each other’s work.
Benjamin acknowledged Schmitt’s influence on his concept of baroque sovereignty, and
Schmitt claims that his publication on Hobbes (1938) was an implicit response to this
work.9 Moreover, Schmitt’s theory of the state of exception may have been a response to
Benjamin’s contention that there is a sphere of human action that takes place outside of
the law (Agamben 54). “Critique of Violence,” as Giorgio Agamben points out in State of
Exception, was published a year prior to Political Theology in a journal (the Archiv) that
Schmitt read avidly (52-53).
The concept of outlawry takes shape in the troubling overlap between Benjamin and
Schmitt, but not on account of any political or intellectual complicity between them. On
the contrary, while there is no doubt they influenced each other, Schmitt is less
Benjamin’s ally than his nemesis. Where Schmitt’s ‘state of exception’ harnesses
outlawry to preserve state power, Benjamin’s critique looks to outlaw forces to overthrow
the political order. It is precisely the capacity of outlawry to encompass these ethical and
political extremes that defines it. The common definition of the term is suggestive of this
duality: outlawry is a refusal to obey or recognize the law, and the withdrawal of legal
rights and protections. But how do we move on from here without merely collapsing or
securing the familiar distinctions between left and right, nature and culture, force and
fiction, inside and outside? From the outset, outlawry denies us these familiar polemics; it
deconstructs its own opposition to the law. In the work of Schmitt and Benjamin,
outlawry haunts the political as the condition of law and/or its undoing; it makes the law
possible and impossible, and keeps it revolving, transforming, moving back and forth
between presence and absence.
Together, the work of both of these authors in taking up the outside of the law hints at a
kind of avant la lettre deconstruction of the law that later appears in the work of Jacques
Derrida, whom, by no coincidence, finds himself caught in the web of the BenjaminSchmitt scandal. In “Force of Law” he engages substantively with “Critique of
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Violence,” cautioning readers to be aware of a possible complicity between Benjamin’s
thought and the Shoah (via Schmitt and Heidegger); yet he is also accused of a
Schmittian form of decisionism, which implicates Derrida himself in the very difficulties
he critiques in Benjamin. Derrida negotiates this tricky terrain by elaborating Benjamin’s
thesis in conjunction with an ethical imperative of responsibility to the Other, intended to
deter the totalitarian dangers. His concept of ‘the mystical foundation of authority’ hints
at outlawry’s part in the performative enunciation of the law, as what is continually, but
secretly, deconstructing the law. However, Derrida does not address outlawry explicitly,
and he softens the political edge of Benjamin’s ‘revolutionary’ theory to a merely
‘transformative’ one. A focus on outlawry reinvests the mystical foundation of authority
– the law’s deconstruction – with this revolutionary force. But does this render outlawry
exceptional, as Schmitt contents, or the rule, as Benjamin insists? Will the whole project
to deconstruct the law collapse back into a Schmittian exceptionism, a path of pure
authority and danger? Or can we put outlawry to the service of a revolution of the type
that Benjamin envisages, a poetic revolution involving complete annihilation of the
political and the arrival of new political concepts, ones that are not built of the wreckage
of the old ones? And yet, in keeping with Derrida’s ethical prerogative, and without
turning away from outlawry as it plays out in the hardest lessons of history, how might
we conceive of a place for ethics in this outlaw revolution?
The aim of this chapter is to develop a deconstructive theory of outlawry as a political
concept that will provide a framework for the chapters that follow, a framework that lays
claim to an ethics of outlawry. I begin by drawing out the parameters of outlawry as it is
taken up by Benjamin and Schmitt from their opposing ethical and political positions: as
a sphere of political action that takes place outside the law in order to overthrow, or to
preserve, the existing order. I turn to Derrida, in particular his deconstruction of the law
and his theory of performativity, to show how outlawry operates as deconstructive
concept. To some extent, my approach stays close to Derrida’s argument in “Force of
Law;” however, the focus on outlawry along with a more pronounced emphasis on
performativity subtly shifts the transformative implications of the mystical foundation of
authority, to revolutionary ones, in Benjamin’s messianic sense. Drawing also on Homi
Bhabha’s theory of mimicry I argue that the mimetic force of outlawry menaces the law
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through a disavowal in imitation. It is the tension of this identity cut of difference in
itself, of iterability, that produces the possibility of justice as Derrida defines it, as what is
to-come, as a response to the call of the other.

Benjamin’s ‘Outlaw’ Philosophy
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” is an apt starting place for this investigation of
outlawry, as his approach questions law and violence from the critical perspective of
those whom the law excludes. This sets outlawry in relation to ethics and justice from the
outset. Robert Sinnerbrink refers to the approach as “a revolutionary philosophy
committed to the infinite task of redeeming past suffering” (491). We might also call it
an ‘outlaw philosophy’ since Benjamin theorizes law from outside of the juridical, and
history from outside of representation, and he does this as a political and intellectual exile
working outside of the academy. Benjamin addresses the relation between law and justice
as it hinges on violence from an incongruous position that balances Marxist revolutionary
violence with neomessianical Jewish mysticism. For Benjamin, justice is a theological
concept that belongs fundamentally outside of the law. The connection he makes between
outlawry and justice, and the severing of justice from law, is possible only by
approaching the relationship between force, law and justice from outside of the traditions
of natural and positive law. He thus asks us to think about the law, and its relationship to
violence, from outside the standard conceptual models.
Departing from the tautological dogmas of natural and positive law – “just ends can be
attained by justified means, justified means used for just ends” (278) – Benjamin argues
that violence is constituted as legal or illegal by a fictional justice or ‘justification’ that is
established retrospectively (278). Because it awaits a retrospective sanctioning, the law’s
legitimacy is never assured, but rather depends on fate, that is, on what happens in a
future that will inevitably look back and create a justifying narrative of its past. He calls
this kind of lawmaking violence mythical, and associates it with power, for violence is
the means by which the victor of a struggle for power determines “what is to be
established as law” and preserves their right to violence (295). Mythical violence, which
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makes and then preserves the law, is not just, but it has been historically sanctioned;
indeed, that is what is mythical about it. Mythical law, in Benjamin’s view, is thus
retroactive, it operates via a backward glance, borrowing its authority and legitimacy
from past events. But what the myth legitimizes is already in ruins, as we can see through
the backward glance of the angel of history that Benjamin invokes in his “Theses on the
Philosophy of History.” He writes: “His face is turned toward the past. Where we
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage
and hurls it in front of his feet” (257). There is consequently something “rotten” in law, a
point that Drucilla Cornell elaborates in her treatment of Derrida’s reading of Benjamin
in “The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as Justice.” She writes: “[W]hat is
‘rotten’ in a legal system is precisely the erasure of its own mystical foundation of
authority so that the system can dress itself up as justice” (90). Cornell draws on the
analogy of the Emperor who has no clothes to illustrate this: the fiction works to erase
any acknowledgement that it is a fiction. The law’s foundation is thus doubly fragile: it is
a decayed and crumbling artifact (the wreckage of history), and a fabrication (the
emperor’s new clothes), but it pretends to be both solid and authentic.
The forces that fall outside of the law are, in contrast, ‘pure’ in Benjamin’s approach.
Divine violence, which is beyond the law and untainted by human rationalization and
invention, moves forward, toward the future. For God, in Benjamin’s mystical Judaic
schema is a messianic god who is yet to arrive. Yet this movement forward is not a
teleological one. Divine violence is pure precisely because it contains no instrumental
relation between means and ends; the significance of the event is constituted in the event
itself, not some other purpose. Where mythical violence establishes and preserves law,
divine violence annihilates it, bringing time and history to a stop. Justice, “the principle
of all divine end-making” (CV 295), thus belongs to a sphere of pure immanence that is
both outside of the law and inaccessible to humans.
The concepts of messianic justice and divine violence shape Benjamin’s anarchic-Marxist
impulse, not to found a new order, but to destroy the old one. For Benjamin a
revolutionary action is distinguished from a political action on the basis of its capacity to
eradicate the current state and system of law, in a manner similar to divine violence. The
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difference, in other words, is the relationship of the action to the law: a political action
works within, or through, the law, but a revolutionary action is outside of the law; it is a
mode of outlawry. Drawing from Sorel’s treatise on violence, Benjamin differentiates
between a political strike that is lawmaking because it merely modifies the system, and
the proletarian strike, which aims at overturning the state and its laws. For Benjamin, as
for Sorel, “the revolution appears as a clear, simple revolt” (CV 292). Revolutionary
outlawry, in this perspective, does not simply transfer power from one group to another,
reproducing the old system in an altered form. On the contrary, the revolution demands
entirely new political concepts.
But Benjamin’s affiliation of revolutionary violence with the divine, and mythical law
with “something rotten,” might be dangerously romanticizing anarchic outlawry while
denigrating all forms of government. Dominick LaCapra argues that Benjamin
homogenizes the concepts of state and myth, designating all states as fundamentally
“rotten” because they are based on mythical violence, without considering differences
between political regimes. Benjamin, he contends, validates revolution at any cost or
consequence: “Benjamin’s mode of address may seem acceptable if one believes one may
justifiably subvert or even destroy the state, ignore consequences, and leave one’s
objective a blank or an act of faith” (1071). Derrida is likewise concerned that the
connection Benjamin establishes between justice and his theological concept of violence
might be interpreted as justifying even the Shoah, as “an expiation and an indecipherable
signature of the just and violent anger of God” (FL 298). He suggests that Benjamin
perpetuates the very injustice he criticizes in the state, because he is unable to maintain
the distinctions he sets up between positing and preserving violence, founding (mythic)
and annihilating (divine) violence, and between justice and power.
Although Derrida draws significantly from Benjamin’s “destruction” of the law in his
own deconstruction of law, his critique is haunted by the uncanny correspondence
between the gas chambers and cremation ovens of the Shoah and Benjamin’s “bloodless”
and “expiatory” divine violence. Derrida worries that Benjamin inadvertently colludes
with discourses such as Schmitt’s and Heidegger’s that are complicit with the Final
Solution, including, “the critique of Aufklärung, the theory of the fall and of originary
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authenticity, the polarity between originary language and fallen language, the critique of
representation and of parliamentary democracy; etc.” (FL 298). He cautions that if there
is a lesson to be drawn from the Shoah, it is “that we must think, know, represent for
ourselves, formalize, judge the possible complicity among all these discourses and the
worst (here the ‘final solution’)” (298). In the final analysis, Benjamin’s “Critique” thus
resembles for Derrida “the very thing against which one must act and think, do and
speak” (298). But what is this “very thing?” In a sweeping collapse of meaning we are
told that this “thing” involves being too Heideggerian, too messianico-Marxist, and too
archeo-eschatalogical. But do critiques of Enlightenment philosophy and parliamentary
democracy necessarily suggest complicity with the Nazis? Do Messianism, Marxism, and
religiosity really align one with totalitarianism? By these criteria, Derrida would himself
be in deep ethical trouble. Moreover, in Benjamin’s terms, there is something fateful
about Derrida’s reading of “Critique of Violence,” with the Shoah placed temporally
between these authors. Derrida reads Benjamin with the Shoah in retrospect, which
makes his critique somewhat mythic, whereas for Benjamin, the Shoah is unfathomable
and yet to arrive; the future is open, which means that another future, not the Shoah, is
still possible. And as we shall shortly see, when Benjamin does address the Shoah in due
historical time, this event in no way resembles revolutionary violence, but rather is
absolutely positioned as the culmination of the mythic law of the Aufklärung. For
Benjamin, the Shoah demands a critique of the history that led to it; it calls for a
revolution in concepts.

The Revolutionary and the ‘Great Criminal’
LaCapra and Derrida are correct to caution that we not idealize revolutionary violence,
and that we remain vigilantly self-critical in order to forestall a repeat of history.
However, Benjamin is not so naïve in his approach to the ambiguities of the archic and
anarchic functions of outlawry. To be sure, in 1921 Benjamin could not have foreseen
how a totalitarian version of outlawry would play out in National Socialism, nor in
Stalinist Russia. Yet it seems that Benjamin is nevertheless concerned with the blurring
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of the distinctions between the archic and the anarchic, which puts him right on track for
a critique of totalitarianism. How do we achieve change and maintain the pure justice of
the revolution, when what is in one instant outlawry, in the next becomes the very law
that the revolution has overthrown? What do we make of the paradox that what appear as
polar opposites – the law and outlawry – in fact overlap: the law holds within itself
something of the outlawry that founded it, and outlawry contains its own kernel of law
(the law that it might found).
The problematic is clear in the collapse between the figures of the outlaw and the
revolutionary, which accentuates the undecidability between annihilating and founding
violence that structures Benjamin’s text. Benjamin associates the revolutionary with a
figure he terms the “great criminal” who shares the capacity to eradicate the law, and
sever the present from its history. His references to the great criminal establish that
Benjamin is fully cognizant of the ethical dilemmas presented by revolutionary violence,
and the absence of any guarantee that revolutionary violence will lead to justice. For the
great criminal is an unethical figure whose ends are “repellent,” but who has nonetheless
“aroused the secret admiration of the public” (CV 281). Quite simply, he is admired
because he is an outlaw: in his actions violence is freed from the law. Benjamin stipulates
that the public’s admiration of the outlaw “cannot result from his deed, but only from the
violence to which it bears witness” (281). He is quite clear that the great criminal is not
deserving of our unreserved admiration: his intentions may be evil, his actions corrupt.
Yet the criminal nevertheless serves a critical function in relation to the law: he compels
our awareness that law can be broken; by so doing he unveils the artificial legitimacy of
the law’s claim to violence.
The great criminal is split between being an ethical and an unethical being. He is a
dangerous and ill-intentioned lawbreaker, but he is also an outlaw whose means are pure
in the sense of a “clear and simple revolt.” This is why, for Benjamin, the system
establishes a monopoly on violence (280). Extralegal violence is a danger that might
eradicate the law itself: “violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it, not by
the ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law” (281). Whatever
ends may arise, the testament to the mythology of the law cannot be undone; through the
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great criminal the people have glimpsed what is “rotten” in law. In the purity of this
revelation, the revolutionary/outlaw is again divided: from the law’s destroyer, this figure
is transformed into the law’s founder. For as Benjamin continues, the promise of the
law’s annihilation is swiftly replaced by the new fiction that awaits on the horizon, the
new history that might be written, the new law that will be imposed should the outlaw
succeed at vanquishing the current powers: “In the great criminal this violence confronts
the law with the threat of declaring a new law… The state … fears this violence simply
for its lawmaking character” (283-284). In this sense, he implies that in the human realm
it is impossible for revolutionary violence to actually lead to justice, since it is
transformed into lawmaking and law-preserving violence in the end. Since there is
something inherently unjust about all human governance, he strives to imagine a
revolution that stops short of its archic function, and that transcends the realm of human
politics: he calls this ‘divine violence.’ He is thus not writing about revolution as a
transfer of power, but is calling instead for a poetic revolution, a revolution of our
theorizations and imaginings, one in which instead of looking back to justify what we
have done, looks forward to something absolutely new.
Outlawry competes with the law for a legitimate presence, and as such is both a
revolutionary force, in Benjamin’s sense of revolt and annihilation of law, and a
lawmaking force. The violence of the great criminal is equated with revolutionary
founding violence, a violence that “belongs in advance to the order of a law that remains
to be transformed or founded,” as Derrida phrases it (FL 269). Since this violence founds
a new order of law and right, it is justified retrospectively. The revolutionary/outlaw is
thus caught in a collision between mythical and divine violence and the double
movement of time that this implies. Benjamin does not simply polarize these forms of
violence, nor separate their archic from their anarchic powers. Here he anticipates
deconstruction by putting such polarizations into question, and by undermining the purity
of the founding moment, which is authentic only in retrospect. Revolutionary violence,
an act of faith in the justice of the future, looks forward toward an end that has been
eclipsed by the horizon. Yet the revolutionary/outlaw acts in mythical time – his violence
becomes history the moment it is past. What was in one instant law-destroying becomes
law-making in the next. Such powers are not equivalent with divinity, nor with justice;
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they are merely a shock through which we can glimpse the messianic promise for justice
here on earth – but also the mythical denial of justice through justification. The demand
of outlaw justice, in Benjamin’s sense of revolution, is that the archic continue in its
revolutions with the anarchic, that ‘after the revolution’ we do not cease to critique the
law that has been founded, that our revolution never end.

Outlawry as Exception
Where for Benjamin outlawry operates as a dismantling criticism of the law, Schmitt
subverts outlawry by putting it to the service of the law as force of conservation. His
political writing during the Weimar period places him firmly on the path to later embrace
National Socialism—indeed, the Nazi state, which operated for 12 years under a
suspended constitution, became a realization of Schmitt’s ‘state of exception.’ Schmitt
draws on the outside of the law to address what for him was the root of the problems of
the Weimar Republic – the replacement of true sovereignty by liberal democracy. As
George Schwab explains in the translator’s introduction to Political Theology, where
constitutional liberalism fragments political power, under the premise that “power must
be checked by power” Schmitt wants to “reinstate the personal element in sovereignty
and make it indivisible once more” (xvi). For, as Schmitt remarks, “[a]ll tendencies in
modern constitutional development point toward eliminating the sovereign in this sense
[of the decision]” (7). Such a move is equivalent to eliminating the law’s access to the
power of outlawry. For Schmitt the rationalism of the Enlightenment, with its democratic
concepts and faith in the inherent virtue of the people’s will, produces a state that
operates like a “machine [that] runs by itself” (48). As he sees it, state unity, in such a
system, is a stale prize marked by compromise instead of decisive action. Schmitt
proposes that the way to save the decaying modern state from liberalism – that “crust of a
mechanism that has become torpid by repetition” (15) – is to invest the sovereign with
total authority that exceeds the law. He defines sovereignty as the power to decide on the
state of exception (5), a temporary suspension of law intended to preserve the law in
times of crises. This is quite different from Benjamin’s critique of parliamentary
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liberalism, which is sometimes conflated with Schmitt’s. Benjamin finds liberalism to be
corrupt not because it precludes the violence of the sovereign decision, but because it
masks it. It is not a rejection of democratic principles at play for Benjamin, but a charge
that these principles have not been realized in so-called democracies. As Derrida writes,
for Benjamin: “In absolute monarchy, police violence, terrible as it may be, shows itself
as what it is and what it ought to be in its spirit, whereas the police violence of
democracies denies its own principle, making laws surreptitiously, clandestinely” (FL
281). The result is twofold: first, democracy represents an erosion of the law’s power and
violence, and second “there is not yet any democracy worthy of its name” (281).
Where Benjamin’s outlaw wants to restore the possibility of true (that is revolutionary)
democracy by exposing and destroying the violence of the law, Schmitt’s sovereign
wants to restore order with the extralegal violence of his authoritative decision. Schmitt’s
concept of sovereignty is thus a borderline concept pertaining to outlawry, but in a very
different sense than we find in Benjamin. On the one hand, the decision on the exception
must be independent of all law (PT 6). Yet it is not entirely outside the law, because it
exists only as it relates to the norm. “After all,” writes Schmitt, “every legal order is
based on a decision, and also the concept of the legal order … contains within it the
contrast of the two distinct elements of the juristic – norm and decision. Like every other
order, the legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm” (10). For Schmitt the
decision marks the relation between the law and outlawry, and in doing so, allows the
norm to come into existence or to remain in existence. This is the opposite of Benjamin’s
prescription for justice, which involves the banishment of all norms.
Schmitt views the powers of the sovereign as analogous to the divine. He argues that
modern political theory, at least with respect to the state, is comprised of secularized
theological concepts, such as omnipotence. He offers two explanations for this. The first
involves the transfer of theological concepts from God to the sovereign in the historical
development of state theory. The second recognizes the systemic structure of
jurisprudence – which takes form as the state of exception – as “analogous to the miracle
in theology” (36). These place the power of the sovereign, as a divine power, outside of,
or more precisely, above the law. Schmitt’s description of the sovereign decision as a
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pure, uncodifiable power that is above the law, comparable to a miracle, is, on the
surface, strikingly similar to Benjamin’s concept of divine violence, but in the final
analysis the two concepts differ radically. In the first place, where Schmitt attributes
‘divine’ powers to the sovereign, Benjamin denies them to representatives of the state in
favour of a more anarchic outlaw (who replaces this divinity with myth the instant the
law is founded). Where for Benjamin outlaw forces completely annihilate existing
structures, making way for a new world order, for Schmitt the law is merely suspended
temporarily, with the aim to preserve the existing order.
In “Myth, Law and Order: Schmitt and Benjamin Read Reflections on Violence” JanWerner Muller proposes that the difference between Benjamin and Schmitt’s theories of
sovereignty is derived from their respective political theologies. For Schmitt, the divinity
of sovereign outlawry is derived from an authoritarian Catholic urge to “restrain… the
anti-christ” by stabilizing the current order and/or supporting whatever regime is capable
of establishing order – an approach that led to his “demonic entanglement with the Third
Reich” (473).10 Benjamin, on the other hand, arrives at his conclusions via his particular
brand of Judaic anarcho-Messianism. This approach, as Muller specifies, “resulted in an
endorsement of revolutionary violence from the perspective of a total transformation of a
fallen world into a literally lawless, utopian state” (473). In direct contrast to Schmitt,
who sees the sovereign as preserving the divine justice already established by the
Messiah, Benjamin sees divine justice as something that has not yet arrived. For Schmitt,
justice comes from outside of the law in order to preserve the law, but for Benjamin,
justice is incompatible to law, and cannot be represented by the state.
Even where Benjamin appears closest to Schmitt, what appear as slight shifts in analysis
grow into fissures that radically alter the implications of the concept of outlawry. Both
Samuel Weber and Agamben show that in the Origins of German Tragic Drama
Benjamin closely follows Schmitt in a theory that ties sovereignty to the decision on the
exception. However, where for Schmitt the decision on the exception preserves
sovereignty, for Benjamin sovereignty is radically undermined (Weber 15). Benjamin’s
sovereign is incapable of making a decision because the exception overwhelms him:
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The antithesis between the power of the ruler and his capacity to rule led to a
feature peculiar to the Trauerspiel, which is, however, only apparently a generic
feature and which can be illuminated only against the background of the theory of
sovereignty. This is the indecisiveness of the tyrant. The prince, who is
responsible for making the decision to proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at
the first opportunity, that he is almost incapable of making a decision. (Benjamin
70-71)
Baroque history is comprised of “perennial interruptions,” as Weber explains, and this
leaves no room for further interruption: “a decision in the strict sense, is not possible in a
world that leaves no place for heterogeneity” (15). Instead of marking the point of
decisive rule by transcending the law, the sovereign “opens up a gap which no decision is
capable of filling” according to Agamben, an irreparable “fracture” dividing the body of
the law (56). Thus for Benjamin, the function of the sovereign is not to decide on the
exception, but to exclude it because he is unable to decide. He writes: “Whereas the
modern concept of sovereignty amounts to a supreme executive power on the part of the
prince, the baroque concept emerges from a discussion of the state of emergency, and
makes it the most important function of the prince to avert this. The ruler is designated
from the outset as the holder of dictatorial power if war, revolt, or other catastrophes
should lead to a state of emergency” (65). Where Schmitt’s sovereign includes the
exception through its very exclusion, Benjamin’s sovereign excludes it entirely, for he is
too weak to allow for a space of transcendence in the sovereign sphere, which is why he
has, in his desire for power, become a tyrant. Yet as Weber points out, this is precisely
what compromises sovereignty. By excluding the exception (trancendence, outlawry),
Benjamin’s baroque sovereign is defined by his difference from god, in direct opposition
to the Schmittian analogy between sovereignty and divinity (14).
It is for this reason that the state of exception is for Benjamin a paradigm for a
catastrophe rather than a miracle as it is for Schmitt: “In antithesis to the historical idea of
restoration, [the baroque] is faced with the idea of catastrophe, and it is in response to this
antithesis that the theory of the state of exception is devised” (66). Benjamin’s theory of
the state of exception as catastrophe was further developed in the eighth fragment of the
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“Theses on the Philosophy of History.” History, Benjamin argues, is comprised of a
perpetual state of exception, that is to say, a perpetual catastrophe. In this view, the Shoah
is not extraordinary; it is merely the culmination of the crises that precede it. The eight
thesis states:
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which
we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history
that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task
to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the
struggle against Fascism. (257)
We find in this short fragment reference to two separate concepts of the state of exception
that once again distinguish the way outlawry is deployed by Benjamin as compared to
Schmitt. In Schmitt’s state of exception, which is the ‘rule,’ outlawry is harnessed by the
state to preserve itself. In Benjamin’s ‘real’ state of exception outlawry is a revolutionary
force that ends history and overturns state power. For Benjamin, what Schmitt sees as an
interruption that precedes a return to the normal situation is instead a permanent
catastrophe. Benjamin continues: “One reason fascism has a chance is that in the name of
progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm” (257). Thus where Benjamin
references Schmitt’s state of exception, he turns it against Schmitt’s entire thesis: the very
concept of sovereignty that Schmitt works with is a catastrophe that led inevitably to
fascism. As Horst Bredekamp puts it, “Benjamin's conception of the shock like liberation
acquires the character of a last judgment of fascism” (264). However, Benjamin’s critique
extends beyond fascism to sovereignty itself, even in democratic forms. For it has always
been the case that the rule is an exception if viewed from the outside of the law, that is,
from the perspective of the powerless and disenfranchised.
Where for Schmitt, the exception is what proves and preserves the rule from the crisis,
for Benjamin rule is itself the crisis. He invokes as a response to this catastrophe what he
terms a “real” state of emergency, that pure violence proper to the outside of the law to
which the state has no access: revolutionary violence, an ethical interruption of state
violence that he relates to the divine. In “Critique of Violence” he writes: “If the rule of
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myth is broken occasionally in the present age, the coming age is not so unimaginably
remote that an attack on law is altogether futile. But if the existence of violence outside
the law, as pure immediate violence, is assured, this furnishes the proof that revolutionary
violence, the highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by man, is possible, and by
what means” (300). The true revolution sees an end to ‘progress’ and the wreckage it
leaves in its wake; time must come to a standstill and worldly law be abolished. Yet this
does not signify apocalyptic despair on Benjamin’s part, for the emphasis is not just the
annihilation of the old: it is the introduction of something so new that it is as
inconceivable as God. As Werner Hamacher argues: “Benjamin's notions of annihilation
and destruction … have nothing to do with the corresponding propaganda terms of the socalled conservative revolution, or with the ‘revolution of nihilism’ (134). Sinnerbrink
agrees that assimilation of Benjamin to fascist discourse is “controversial to say the least”
(494), adding that the further equivalence drawn between Benjamin’s “messianicrevolutionary rhetoric” and Schmitt’s overt complicity with the Shoah forgets or ignores
Benjamin’s critique of Schmitt (496).

The Mystical Foundation of the Law
The difficulty and the scandal emerge because the distinctions we so desperately want to
maintain between Benjamin and Schmitt, especially their ethical positions vis a vis the
Shoah, cannot be properly maintained. What is rotten in law – we might call it outlawry –
is also what is pure in law. But this does not mean that their ideas collapse into
similitude; instead, this indistinguishability brings deconstruction to bear on outlawry.
Indeed, where the law is deconstructible, outlawry is the absence that is always present in
the law. Outlawry thus is deconstruction, just as deconstruction is justice: “Justice in
itself … outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction
itself… Deconstruction is justice” (FL 243). On the one hand, outlawry as deconstruction
casts the ethics of deconstruction into question, for while justice enjoys the ethical purity
of its own impossibility (it is always to-come, for Derrida), outlawry, as we have seen,
can lead to justice, but also to ‘the worst.’ However, if deconstruction is outlawry in
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Benjamin’s sense of divine violence – as a critique of the present – then its ethical
position is once again redeemed.
For Derrida, the deconstructability of law is to be desired, and is absolutely in line with
emancipatory ideals, even if it comes with some risk. He writes that “[t]he fact that the
law is deconstructable is not bad news. One may even find in this the political chance of
all historical progress” (243). Nevertheless, the risks are very real. Responsibility,
freedom and decision are possible only under the conditions where evil, perjury and
absolute crime are also possible (Sokoloff 343). As Derrida asserts: “Abandoned to itself,
the incalculable and giving [donatrice] idea of justice is always very close to the bad,
even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation …
An absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate or suture the opening of the call
to justice, a call that is always wounded” (257). In other words, outlawry as
deconstruction holds both risk and promise. The very structure that illegimately imposes
the law, illegimately deposes it; it is the outlawry contained within the law, that cannot be
contained by the law. This outlawry guarantees nothing but change; its ethics is decided
in the difference between justice and justification, which is also the difference between
what is to come and what has been.
There is an implicit presence of outlawry (as absence) in Derrida’s critique of Benjamin
and deconstruction of law. His concept of the ‘mystical foundation of authority’
elaborates what, according to Benjamin, is rotten in law: the fiction of its legitimacy. Yet
in Derrida’s analysis, in addition to legitimizing the law’s violence, the mystical keeps
open a space for transformation and movement toward justice. He shifts the Benjaminian
approach by explicitly uniting divine and mythical violence in a single, undecidable
concept, with the aim to resolve any potential affinity with fascism he finds in
Benjamin’s text. As Derrida writes, the mystical “is in law, what suspends law. It
interrupts the established law to found another. This moment of suspense, this epokhe,
this founding or revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instance of non-law…But it is
also the whole history of law” (FL 269). Staying close to Benjamin’s argument, Derrida
defines this floating, fictional force as fundamental to the structure of law itself. What
this means, with respect to the outside of the law, is that the law is hinged to outlawry so
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that as it constructs itself, it continually deconstructs itself. This implies that outlawry is
part of what shapes our experience of the political and our striving for justice, and implies
that outlawry plays a role in the founding and eradicating of political power.
Derrida draws his concept of the mystical foundation of authority from Michel de
Montaigne, who writes: “Laws are now maintained in credit, not because they are just,
but because they are laws. It is the mystical foundation of their authority; they have none
other…Whosoever obeyeth them because they are just, obeys them not justly the way as
he ought” (cited in FL 239-240). Like Benjamin, Montaigne thus distinguishes the law
from justice. The mystical signifies an emptiness, in the form of a fiction or myth at the
heart of authority, that permeates the law as an integral aspect of its structure. The law’s
only ‘real’ legitimacy is the authority established by its violence and the fiction that
accepts and sanctions that violence as legal. This means that outlawry lies secretly at the
heart of law, on the one hand. But on the other hand, outlawry exposes this violence. It
thereby interrupts the law, which continues within the ever-present suspension that is its
history, a suspension that lingers like a doubt, wound tight with suspense in anticipation
of something else. In this suspension, the destruction of the law is indecipherable from
the inauguration of a new law, and so the myth, or mystical element, continues in a new
form. In a sense the law never exists in itself and never ceases to exist because it
emerges only in that deferred space of its simultaneous possibility and impossibility – a
space of undecidability between law and outlawry. Since law is born of the generative
powers of outlawry, it has, at its heart, a contradiction; thus its deconstructibility.
Despite his cautions with respect to Benjamin and “the worst,” Derrida draws
significantly from Benjamin’s ideas to deconstruct law in “Force of Law.” In fact, as
John McCormack argues, Derrida’s criticism of Benjamin’s conservatism may be less
than genuine; the critique may constitute a purely performative gesture. By exaggerating
Benjamin’s affinity with Schmitt and downplaying Schmitt’s fascism, Derrida is “forcing
an identification that itself demonstrates a dissociation” and modeling “how
deconstruction discusses justice” (410). In a sense, my project to tease out the emphasis
on outlawry in the work of Benjamin and Schmitt renders explicit what for Derrida is
implicitly deconstructive.
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Yet some critics, such as LaCapra, have expressed concern that Derrida fails to
adequately guard against a misreading of Benjamin that would equate might with right
(1067), and he fails to address the dangerous implications of the undecideability of
mythical and divine violence (1071). Moreover, adding to concerns that deconstruction is
generally apolitical and ethically impotent, Derrida has himself been charged with
sharing an intellectual alliance with Schmitt on the basis of a decisionism implicit to his
work, in particular in “Force in Law.” Such decisionism is held to justify arbitrary force
because it severs human action from reason and leaves it groundless (McCormack 396).
Derrida’s approach has consequently been labeled by some as “nihilistic, relativistic, and
potentially authoritarian” as well as being “a reactive ideology willing to lend a hand to
political evil,” according to William Sokoloff (341). Thus while Derrida finds that
Benjamin’s text is haunted by the very mythic violence he critiques, his own essay is
shadowed by similar controversies.
Indeed, in his discussion Derrida uses language that is reminiscent of Schmitt: like the
state of exception, the mystical is “what suspends law.” But where for Schmitt this is
what decides the law, Derrida suggests that the suspension that includes outlawry in the
law signifies a fundamental undecidability in the concept of the law. Derrida, no more
than Benjamin, corroborates Schmitt, but rather counters him. For Schmitt ‘to suspend’
simply suggests an interruption, withdrawal or delay in law that is temporary and based
in political necessity (PT 12). It specifies a situation when the law is still in force, but its
application is interrupted to allow the state extralegal powers to deal with a situation of
war or civil unrest. When he refers to the suspension of the law, Derrida retains the idea
of withdrawal from a prior law but adds an additional meaning. For him the suspension
occurs in the moment (and in the potentiality of a coming moment) where one law is
destroyed and another founded. This may be anterior and posterior to specific epochs of
law, but it is also simultaneous to the law as a possibility that hangs threateningly over
whatever law is currently in force. While situations of internal conflict may heighten this
threat to the law and make us aware of it, it is nonetheless present even in “normal”
circumstances. Indeed, it is the very condition of the law’s becoming. This is Cornell’s
argument in her rebuttal of LaCapra’s critique of Derrida: neither the law, nor any other
system can fill social reality as Schmitt demands. The law is unable to establish itself as
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the only social reality (87). Schmitt’s totalizing argument depends on the myth of full
presence. Derrida’s task, the task of deconstruction, is of course, the debunking of this
very myth, the political consequences of which are very real, and that counter fascism.
Cornell writes: “The deconstructability of law…is a theoretical conception that does have
practical consequences; the practical consequences are precisely that law cannot
inevitably shut out its challengers and prevent transformation, at least not on the basis
that the law itself demands that it do so” (88). Thus where Schmittian exceptionality
allows the law to continue, even when suspended, the mystical demands attention to the
impermanence and arbitrariness of law. Unlike the exception, the mystical is not
reserved for emergencies (perpetual or not). It always includes, as a potentiality,
outlawry as a part of law, the result of which is as suspenseful as it is suspended. For this
suspense imbues the concept of law with the uncertainty, doubt, anxiety and excitement
of the promise and threat of a new law.
Moreover, Derrida’s treatment of decision and undecidability in its relation to law and
outlawry is marked by a departure from Schmittian decisionism. In “Between Justice and
Legality: Derrida on Decision” Sokoloff argues that rather than restoring order, for
Derrida decision aggravates the experience of anxiety and insecurity, because in order to
be justified a decision depends on a ground, which, in Derrida’s analysis, is necessarily
arbitrary. Every effort to resolve crisis through a decision produces crisis, since there is
no rule to guide it (344). However, Sokoloff counters critics who conclude that Derrida’s
apparent advocacy of decisionism breaks with legality in an ethically impotent or laissezfaire doctrine in which ‘everything is permitted,’ or in a proto fascist politics of pure will
(346). On the contrary, decision-making is problematic for Derrida, precisely because it
is legal (lawpreserving) at the same time as it is extra-legal (law-destroying) (344). For
Derrida this binds decision-making to a profound ethical responsibility. He establishes
ethical standards that are lacking in Schmitt’s more Machiavellian approach, primary of
which is respect for others (346). Moreover, for Derrida, Benjamin’s divine violence
“never attacks—for the purpose of destroying it—the soul of the living [die Seele des
Lebendigen].” “Consequently,” he continues:
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one has no right [on n’a pas le droit] to conclude from this that divine violence
leaves the field open for all human crimes … The individual or the community
must keep the “responsibility” (the condition of which being the absence of
general criteria and automatic rules), must assume their decision in exceptional
situations, in extraordinary or unheard of case [in ungerheuren Fällen]” (FL 288).
In other words, when called upon to do so by conditions that demand justice, one must be
prepared to break the law. This is one’s responsibility to the other, but also to the law,
which comes closest to justice when it transforms in response to the exceptional. Derrida
does not, like Schmitt, call for the absolute decision-making authority of a sovereign who
is above the law in order to resolve the paradoxes of decision-making, but instead
demands that the “law … be more flexible in the name of the other” (Sokoloff 347). If it
is to be ethical, outlawry is thus not called upon to restore order through a sovereign
decision for Derrida, nor is it a means to maintain the balance of dominant power
relations. Rather, outlawry is injected into the law through decision-making as a check to
those relations of power, and an assurance of responsibility to the other.
This is not without risk, for justice would not be possible without risk. As Derrida writes:
“there is no justesse, no justice, no responsibility except in exposing oneself to all risks,
beyond certainty and good conscience” (287). This is not to suggest that the exposure of
justice to risk is a ‘free for all,’ as some critics fear. Derrida makes explicit an ethical
imperative that is only implicit in Benjamin’s text. This imperative of responsibility to
the other ensures that Divine violence is incompatible with totalitarianism, which does
not hesitate to annihilate the other.
Faulting Benjamin for failing to grasp and follow the contradictions that emerge when he
polarizes mythic and divine violence, justice and power, Derrida deconstructs these
concepts, or rather, allows them to “deconstruct themselves” in an argument that is, as he
asserts, “anything but conservative and antirevolutionary” (272). He argues that divine
violence is bound tightly to mythic violence through the iterability inscribed in the
promise of the founding gesture. “Thus there can be no rigourous opposition between
positing and preserving,” he argues, “only what I will call … a differential contamination
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between the two, with all the paradoxes that this may lead to” (272). Yet such a
“differential contamination” is precisely what Benjamin identifies as “something rotten,”
that, as Derrida elaborates, “condemns” and “ruins” the law in advance. As I earlier
demonstrated through the revolutionary figure of the ‘great criminal’ Benjamin was not
as unaware of the ambiguities infiltrating his distinctions as Derrida implies. That
Benjamin is unable to maintain these distinctions does not signify complicity with
fascism, but instead serves as a warning of the dangers of outlawry – even though
outlawry is also a necessary precurser to justice. As Cornell explains it: “Revolutionary
violence cannot be rationalized by an appeal to what ‘is’ for what ‘is’ is exactly to be
overturned. In this sense, each one of us is put on the line in a revolutionary situation. Of
course, the inability to know whether or not the situation actually demands violence, also
means that there can be no justification for not acting. This kind of undecidability is truly
frightening” (91-92). This is what Derrida explicitly draws out of “Critique of Violence.”
Indeed, where the distinction between mythic and divine violence is undecidable, instead
of finding a justification for totalitarianism, and the application of outlawry to the
conservation of the law, there emerges for Derrida the possibility of legal and political
transformation that is more than simply evolution, and this demands the utmost
responsibility.

The Creative Force of Performativity
If outlawry is the deconstructibility of law, then what Derrida and Cornell posit as the
‘transformation’ of the law exceeds the ordinary sense of transformation as an identity in
metamorphosis. For deconstruction shatters the concept of the identity of law, in the
sense of the law’s being identical with itself. Outlawry involves the complete
annihilation of law that we find in Benjamin’s divine violence; what replaces the law is
not an alteration of law, but alterity itself. The law to come is comprised of the law’s very
difference from itself.
This re-creation of the law is a result of the law’s performative structure. Performativity
is an aspect of speech act theory advanced by J.L Austin (1965) that Derrida develops in
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Limited Inc. In Austin’s speech act theory, the performative is a category of utterance
that, instead of possessing a descriptive truth-value, acts upon the world. Epitomized in
the form of vows and promises, the performative utterance linguistically creates reality; it
is a way of "doing things with words." Although Derrida makes only brief reference to it
in “Force of Law,” performativity fundamentally underlies his deconstruction of the law.
If we look more closely at the law in relation to his analysis of performatives in Limited
Inc. it becomes clear that performativity provides the structure for a concept of law that is
constituted of difference with itself; it binds outlawry to the law not as its opposite, but as
its other side, and makes possible a switching, usurping structure that constantly re-makes
reality. By more closely exploring the performative aspects of the law, with a focus on
outlawry, we can access a more ‘revolutionary’ and less merely transformative
deconstruction of the law, as well as a more disruptive understanding of the ‘mystical
foundation of authority.’
Derrida specifies that his use of the term ‘mystical’ is different from Montaigne’s
insinuation of artificiality and faith in the place of justice. For Derrida, the mystical is the
“very performative power” by which “discourse… meets its limit – in itself” (FL 242). It
is not merely the supplements of faith and artifice that endow the law with a fictional
quality; fictionality is embedded in the very structure of the speech act that founds the
law. And bound to this fictionality, in the “walled in” silence of the violence that founds
the law (242), lies outlawry. The silence of outlawry challenges the very limits of the
discourse of the law: it is a creative, violent, or forceful silence. For Derrida, “[t]he very
emergence of justice and law, the instituting, founding, and justifying moment of law,
implies a performative force, that is to say always an interpretive force and a call to faith
[un appel à la croyance]” (241-242). In this remark we find the two elements of the
performative that constitute the law in its relation to outlawry. The first is force, the
violence that destroys, institutes, and justifies; and the second is fiction, the interpretive
aspect of this violence, its duplicity and its deceptions, but also its creative powers. This
combination of force and fiction is not merely an attribute of the law; it constitutes the
law through its internal structure as a performative utterance. Speech and force work in
tandem in the law; they are equally essential to its concept, so we should not suppose, for
instance, that violence is put to service as a supplement to “enforce” the law as pure
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nomos (convention). Rather the law is the “exercise of force in language itself” (FL 237).
Outlawry disrupts a pure conceptualization of the law from the outset, for, as Derrida
continues, the exercise of force in language occurs in “the most intimate of [the law’s]
essence, as in the movement by which it would absolutely disarm itself from itself” (238).
This disarming intersection of force and fiction is an internal movement of the law; the
law constitutes and is constituted by what it would forbid, exclude and deny, and this is
outlawry.
Force is a fundamental element of law, which would not be obeyed without the threat of
violence. Derrida reminds us, citing Kant, “No law without force” (233), and Pascal,
“justice without force is powerless” (238). However, while it includes violence, force is
not simply equivalent to violence. Violence (Gewalt) is complex with respect to the
inside and the outside of the law, for Gewalt (the term Benjamin used in “Critique of
Violence”) connotes both illegitimate power and “justified authority” (FL 234).11 Yet
how can the law possess creative forces, if, as Benjamin argued, legal violence is merely
a preserving force? Force, which might take violent form, is also pure energy, power or
capacity. In Visions of Excess Bataille defines force as a shock that “presents itself as a
charge, as a value, passing from one object to another” (143). Force thus involves a
creative power, which is emphasized in the effect that performatives have on a given
event or situation. Performativity is distinguished from other speech acts by the elemental
inclusion of such creative force in its structural integrity as a speech act, by virtue of
which the performative utterance has the power to produce and transform reality.12
It is very difficult, if not impossible to extricate such creative force from fiction. It is this
emphasis on fiction as a creative force that distinguishes Derrida’s approach from speech
act theorists such as Austin. Where Austin excludes deceitful or insincere utterances and
literary or theatrical fictions from the performative category, Derrida includes such
exceptions as necessary elements of any successful performative. Every performative is
always already impure, because iterability, the possibility of repetition, is indispensable
to performativity. Every utterance, performative or constative, might be repeated, or cited
and is thus torn from its immanent context – disrupting its original intention (17). In
ordinary situations this repetition re-creates the legal-political sphere through subtle
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replacement-changes; the law’s ontology as something that is constantly speaking itself
into existence is one of becoming rather than static being. Iterability thus involves more
than simple repeatability; it also involves alteration and thus entails a remainder. Alterity
haunts every mark. In the case of the performativity of the law, this alterity calls forth
what is other to the law, that is, outlawry. Derrida writes:
Iteration in its “purest” form — and it is always impure — contains in
itself the discrepancy of a difference that constitutes it as iteration … It is
because this iterability is differential, within each individual “element” as
well as between the ‘elements,” because it splits each element while
constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the
remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling
presence: it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence or the
(simple or dialectical) opposition of presence and absence, upon which
opposition the idea of permanence depends. (LI 53)
What might constitute such a “discrepancy of difference” that evades the “logic of
presence” when it is the law that is reiterated? As what is other to the law, this
‘absence’ is outlawry. Iterability thus includes outlawry in the law by creating
conditions in which the law is constituted through its own difference.
Iterability compels a discrepancy that is both internal to the law and excluded
from it. It does this through what Derrida refers to as a force of rupture [force de
rupture]. This is the breaking force by which a sign splits from its context
(citation), allowing it to signify even when the reader or listener has no
knowledge of the author’s or original speaker’s circumstances or intention. The
force of this rupture, this breaking point, spacing and deferral is not the simple
negativity of a lack, but instead the shock or charge of an emergence (LI 9-10)
that does not permit the law to be identical to itself. This quality, in which the
law is not identical to itself, does not deny the law’s ties to reality, but guarantees
it; as a performative force the law produces reality.
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The difference between the law and outlawry gives the identity of the law its potentiality,
for difference produces the opposition between presence and absence (the ‘to-be’ of law
and the ‘not-to-be’ of law), giving the desire of presence its “breathing space” (OG 143).
Yet outlawry is not other to the law as a lack, even though it is a non-presence. On the
contrary, the outside of the law is imbued with the plentitude of a suspended presence of
its own. This plentitude marks the first order of significance of the supplement: “The
supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plentitude enriching another plentitude, the fullest
measure of presence. It cumulates and accumulates presence…” (144). Outlawry is the
force that founds the identity of the law; its difference marks the boundary that allows the
law’s presence to unfold. Outlawry is always present in its non-presence through
suspense/suspension. Yet at the same time, both the law and its outside are lacking.
Neither can exist without the other. This is the second significance of the supplement, as
Derrida continues: “But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes
or insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void…” (144-145). The
difference of outlawry reveals the incompleteness of the law, the impossibility of the
law’s full presence wrought through its very desire to present itself. As Derrida frames it
in Of Grammatology, “this desire [the desire of presence] carries in itself the destiny of
its non-satisfaction. Difference produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing
that it makes impossible” (143). For the law is itself lacking a pure and total identity. It
includes the possibility of its outside as a break or rupture of its purity. Moreover, it
lacks the stability of unalterable repeatability, the successful and fully realized telos of its
intention, which depends on the immanent moment of an original context that has no
anchor (LI 12).
The law’s presence is thus conditional on the possibility of the law’s own limits, its
failure to fulfill itself, since it can only exist in relation to what is other to it. The law
begins its presencing, and so does the possibility of its outside. By establishing an
immediate relation with the other it produces along with itself when it becomes present
(the outside of the law), the law’s ontological unity is unraveled. Identity, in the classical
sense, demands sameness, yet in iteration the law is not the same as itself. For iteration
includes outlawry, as a perpetual deconstruction of the law. Iterability, the mutually
constituting hinge that unites the interior and the exterior of the law through the violence
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of the performative, results in a kind of dispossession from the identical for the inside of
the law. The law is different from its other, but what is different from it constitutes it. The
law is thus different from itself.
This relationship to alterity establishes the criterion that for Derrida determines the law’s
relationship to ethics. When the law remains open to its difference with itself, an ethical
relation is possible, for ethics demands such openness to the other. But where the law
attempts to harness the violence of outlawry in order to preclude transformation, denying
openness to what is other to it, as in Schmittian sovereignty, then its ethics is shut down.
Yet Derrida suggests that the law is by nature performative: its very ontology is that of a
continuous founding and disruption by what is other to it. Yet does such incidental
change not fall short of what Benjamin demands in the name of justice? Performative law
transforms by building on and retaining traces of the past, which is precisely what
Benjamin takes issue with in “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” He shows the Angel
gazing with sorrow and disgust on the refuse of history, and argues that fascism arose as
a result of the normalization of the ongoing crisis in law. What is needed, he demands, is
a “real state of emergency,” that is, a revolution in concepts, a fully disruptive critique of
the present, and an annihilation of the current law. Does the theory of performativity
include this potential?

The Imposter
When we consider performativity in light of outlawry rather than simply difference, such
revolutionary potential emerges more clearly. In iterability the outside inhabits the law as
a promise and a threat, the possibility of something else, something other than the law
that has been performed as calculable and predictable. Outlawry is a remainder of the
law’s own illegitimacy, and alternative to the law’s actuality. It has not been brought into
the realm of calculation and enclosed within borders that define the manner of its being,
as the law has. By breaking through the dualism between presence and absence, the
outside of the law casts an uncertainty on the law, since the concept of permanence
depends on such a certainty. The law’s permanence is what becomes uncertain, and this is
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the threat and promise of outlawry that inescapably lurks in the law’s very internal
structure. This is why Benjamin contends that the public views the outlaw with both
horror and admiration, for “the great criminal … confronts the law with the threat of
declaring a new law” (CV 284). When the new law is declared, outlawry is transformed
into the law, with its own discrepant shadow.
Moreover, the performative, iterable structure of outlawry generates more than the
ongoing alteration or transformation of the law, because performativity re-creates reality
itself. The law borrows its force from outlawry, both the force that institutes it as law
(law-making violence) and the force that produces reality (the performative shock).
Outlawry resides within and outside of the law as the secret source of its power and as a
threat to its power. As a function of performativity, the force of law, which is borrowed
from outlawry, begins to become indistinguishable from the law’s fiction. Outlawry both
exposes this mysticism and guarantees the successful fiction of the law. For the law
remains mystical, even when exposed, because for every exposed fiction a new fiction
takes its place. The new law is an outlaw, a different law, that deposes the old one and
becomes its imposter-replacement.
Indeed, the law and the outside of the law relate to each other by impersonating
themselves and each other, and becoming what they impersonate. In the normal situation
this is expressed through constant small changes, but in a crisis (and recall that from the
perspective of the oppressed, or those excluded from the law, the normal situation is a
crisis) it has revolutionary implications. The form this takes is somewhat like Bhabha’s
concept of Mimicry in Location of Culture. Bhabha is writing of the ambivalence of a
colonial discourse that conditions imitation by the Other, who in turn becomes a menace
to colonial power. “Mimicry” he writes, “represents an ironic compromise” in the
dichotomy between identity and difference in colonial domination (86). The concept
depends on the alterity in repetition that structures iterability:
[C]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed recognizable other as the subject
of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say that the
discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be
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effective mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its
difference…mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a
process of disavowal. (86)
Outlawry and the law mimic each other in a similar fashion, with the slippage of that
differential contamination producing both the difference and the similarity between them.
Mimicry operates like the split image of a reflection, on the one hand, and the mottled
background of camouflage, on the other. The spectral effect is one of reversal, the
reversal of the place-switching when the law is exposed as illegitimate and the outlaw
becomes sovereign. But it also involves the reversal of the very operation of
performativity/iterability and the differential contamination that blurs the boundaries
between law and outlawry. For the law, as we have seen, includes what it forbids – the
outside of the law – in its structure through iterability. The outside of the law exists
within the law, as the altered remainders of repetition, as what differs and defers,
traverses and transforms. Outlawry emphatically differs, it repeatedly disavows the law,
contests it, exposes and denies it. But when it is successful what is unmasked is not the
alterity it promises, but the displacement of identity. In the founding gesture outlawry
becomes the law; it takes on the mantle of the law’s very identity, even as what was the
law enters the space of alterity left open.
For Benjamin the repetition of this switching movement is difficult to see as time propels
forward the storm of progress in which the angel of history is caught. Law and outlawry
exchange places with such momentum they leave nothing behind but the ruins of time.
Thus for Benjamin time must stop for justice to be realized; justice comes with the end of
the world as we know it. As I have argued, this involves not a literal apocalypse, and
certainly not a Shoah, but a poetic revolution, and perhaps a political one. What makes
the revolution just, moreover, is the purity of the revolt, the sheer outlawry of it, and its
absolute difference from present political concepts and structures. But what guarantees
that this pure revolt will not found a horrific new law? There is no guarantee. Yet Derrida
does offer some ethical criteria that might improve our chances for an ethical outlawry,
and a future justice.
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For Derrida, every instance of law contains the possibility of Benjamin’s pure revolt. The
mystical foundation of authority suspends time in a perpetual immanence that freezes the
rotating temporal movement that blurs the distinction between the archic and the anarchic
implied by Benjamin. In this frozen image the law and outlawry are difficult to
distinguish from each other because the difference between them is exposed as
undecidable – in their mimicry the difference is “mottled” like camouflage. However,
from within the mottled background, a figure emerges, only to be replaced an instant later
by another – that is ‘almost the same, but not quite.’ This mimicry of law and outlawry
occurs like an optical illusion. Like the well-known reversible figure/vase illusion, the
image switches from one figure to another as the viewer shifts focus between positive and
negative space: law to outlawry to law to outlawry.
It is no wonder that the debate between Benjamin and Schmitt raises such controversy.
Mimicry was the very strategy with which they critiqued the other’s treatise on outlawry,
constructing opposing concepts linked by that ‘almost, but not quite’ mimetic structure.
The strategy, according to Bhabha, “is the sign of a double articulation” (86). On the one
hand, the law appropriates otherness through disciplinary measures, assimilating the other
as an expression of its power. Yet on the other hand, mimicry signifies the
“inappropriate,” an insurgent difference that disavows and threatens the law (86). This is
the promise and threat of outlawry. Outlawry frees violence from the law and opens up a
space for something new – something that might lead to justice. Yet outlawry leaves us
open to the worst. It can be harnessed by the law to preserve itself in an attempt to avert a
crisis or preclude transformation. Never just, in such a scenario, outlawry might be
justifiable in some cases (such as the suspension of law during a natural disaster) but it
can also achieve the extremes of injustice, such as we saw in the legacy of the totalitarian
regimes of the last century.

Outlawry and Justice
If outlawry can be just or unjust does this render the difference between justice and
injustice undecidable or relative? Does it therefore abdicate our responsibility to strive for
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justice as Benjamin’s and Derrida’s critics suggest? Not in the least. What is at stake in
the relation between the law, the outside of the law and justice is more subtle than a
polemics between the law and outlawry, a naïve glorification of violence, a cynical
renunciation of the possibility of justice, or a disavowal of responsibility. On the
contrary, the undecidability between the law and outlawry portends an urgent call for
responsibility in the exposure of injustice, and striving for a justice that never arrives but
remains perpetually on the horizon.
The capacity of the law and outlawry to switch places, transforming themselves and
reality, demands a responsibility to justice. For only in destroying the law (Benjamin) or
transforming it (Derrida) through outlawry can justice be approached. In “Critique of
Violence” Benjamin not only severs the connection between law and justice; he
associates outlawry with justice through the immediate, boundless violence that destroys
the law – a violence that he nominates ‘divine.’ In this gesture he maintains the divine
character of justice but he transforms it from the law of the Father to a messianic mode of
justice, a justice of devastation and transformation. This is not to say that outlawry
guarantees justice; on the contrary, risk is essential to the concept, and not only in terms
of the extreme case of radical political evil. Even in the most benign of political regimes,
the law destroying powers of outlawry are followed by nothing less than its law-making
powers and the inauguration of a new law in which the hope for justice is suspended,
once again.
Benjamin advocates for the struggle against what is pernicious in the state – any state –
and this is state violence and its historical justification. This struggle, he is clear, cannot
come through the law but must be derived from outside of it. The justice of the outlaw
does not lie in his or her illegitimate violence, but rather in the great criminal’s exposure
of the law’s violence and fraudulent tie to justice. The source of this justice is the wholly
other: ethics, and not politics. What Benjamin calls for is not exactly a revolution, but
the interruption of the political with a revolutionary ethic, a moment in which we step
outside of the wreckage of linear time and open the door for justice. The revolutionary is
less a political figure than an outlaw who, viewing history from the perspective of the
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other, exposes the mythology of the political, eradicates the law and heralds the coming
of a new age.
Benjamin’s theorization of expiating and messianic Divine violence informs Derrida’s
concept of justice to-come (à venir). This concept oversees the suspension between
outlawry and law not as a synthesizing agent but as a compelling force of
action/disruption directed at the future. Because of the mimetic-imposter relation of the
law and outlawry, justice is not altogether barred from the law, as long as the law leaves
its relationship with outlawry exposed in the double sense of exposure – it allows its own
illegitimate origins to remain in the open, and it leaves itself open to transformation. For
outlawry can serve as a barrier to justice when it is appropriated to preserve the law, in
the Schmittian sense. Outlawry is in this sense a paradoxical concept; it swallows itself,
cancels itself out, without ever actually disappearing. This is the same cannibalistic
gesture by which power (realized in the form of the law) exercises a constant erasure of
justice, but never succeeds in expunging justice, for Divine justice remains always out of
reach.
For Derrida, justice is only possible when the generalities of law are suspended in favor
of the “fresh judgment” of a decision that has passed the test of the undecidable. Derrida
writes: “for a decision to be just and responsible, it must [il faut] …be both regulated and
without regulation, it must preserve the law [loi], and also destroy or suspend it enough to
have [pour devoir] to reinvent it in each case” (251). The suspension of the law occurs at
the threshold between the law and outlawry. Without actually possessing justice (for
justice is impossible), outlawry somehow cracks open the aporia that divides the law and
justice, opening up the possibility of the experience of the impossible. Outlawry opens
up this possiblity, because justice depends on the undecidable, which characterizes
outlawry, and the associated movement of reinvention, usurpation, and mimicry that
traverses the space between the suspension of law and its maintenance. In a moment of
crisis outlawry calls for a decision that is undecidable, which is to say it “calls for a
decision in the order of ethical-political responsibility” (116).13 Outlawry is the shock, the
ghost of illegitimacy and the promise of something other that wrenches our attention
from the mythicism and mysticism of our narratives with the urgency of the immediate. It
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is the rupture in the law, the insertion of something new that keeps it revolving, rolling
onward toward the future, toward justice. This involves an open relationship with alterity,
for justice also involves, in Derrida’s schema, a responsibility toward the Other.
As the possibility of otherness embedded in the performative utterance, the outside of the
law is that structurally (non)present possibility that demands the law’s responsibility to a
justice that is strived for but never realized (248-249). As what differs and defers, repeats,
traverses and transforms, outlawry is that very “moment of suspense,” that “interval of
spacing” that constitutes an epokhe. It is that moment of usurpation when it is not clear
which is the law and which is outlawry, the camouflage that mottles the distinction
between them. Outlawry emerges in the split image of a reflection that has no original
figure, a mimetic reflection of a reflection that is constituted of identity and difference.
To paraphrase Derrida, outlawry thus perpetuates a suspense that brims over itself in
anguish, cracking open spaces of metamorphosis and revolution, motivating the
impossibility we understand as justice. Outlawry is a shock, an impulse for
transformation, a summoning of hidden possibilities. Although it is structurally integral
to the law, it is that other side that appears not as a lack but as the affective force that
constitutes the law’s possibility and impossibility alike. It is the liminal tension that
activates the aporia of justice –as Derrida puts it, that “experience of the impossible: a
will, a desire, a demand for justice…a call for justice” (FL 244). Where the law strives
for the predictability of the rule, outlawry, in both its dystopic and utopic forms (threat or
promise) heralds the “to-come” (à venir) of justice, demanding a constant refounding of
law and politics (256). Propelled by anticipation, surprise, shock and catastrophe, justice
waits on the horizon and summons our responsibility to pierce the suspense and strive
toward it.
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Chapter 2: The (Un)Becoming Subject of Outlawry
To Simone de Beauvoir’s now classic assertion that one is not born a woman, but rather
‘becomes’ one, Judith Butler queries “Does one ever become [a woman], or is to ‘be’ a
woman a mode of becoming without end?”14 My questions follow from this. If the
subject is always, without end, a becoming subject, then is anyone ever really a subject?
What else might one be? If the subject exists in relation to the law, then is there some
kind of an outlaw that is an alternative to subjectivity? Is it possible to reverse processes
of becoming: to un-do one’s gender or ‘proper’ place, indeed, to change the very
conditions of the subject that one (never, after all) becomes? Is there perhaps an
(un)becoming as well as a becoming subject? Would such an (un)becoming subject be an
outlaw? My use of the term ‘(un)becoming’ is a tongue in cheek reference to the
disciplinary accusation leveled against certain girls, that one’s behaviour is ‘unbecoming’
for a young lady. I bracket the (un), because I do not merely want to suggest that the girl
will disappear (she always does, in one way or another). I also intend that the
‘(un)becoming girl’ is a mode of becoming outside of the law that challenges the
conditions of one’s possibility, and potentially alters not only subjectivity, but also (in the
context of collective (un)becomings), alters the law. I suggest that subjectivity is a
conflicted, doubled experience, a process whereby both law and subjectivity are
continually re-created at the law’s juncture with outlawry.
As de Beauvoir argues, to become a woman is to become subordinate to man, who is the
neutral standard that represents the law. By implication, she once was not his Other. Was
this before the law? Before the subject? Or before the subject’s relation to the law? To
become a woman is to ‘fall’ (in the sense of Eve’s fall), outside of the law. If this is the
case, then woman (along with queer, racialized, colonized, and disabled subjects) is
already outside of the law. For that matter, any subject who exceeds (or falls short of) the
law’s performative demand – that is, every subject, since the norm is an ideal that cannot
be realized – is in a way excluded from the law. No doubt there is something desirable in
exceeding the law, for an outlaw is, in some respects, free of the law. Yet surely one
would never wish to be an outlaw in the negated sense: at best a failed subject and at
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worst as an abjected, excluded, or eradicated one (the latter being another, more sinister
form of unbecoming). Wouldn’t the project be to find a way ‘inside’ the law? For we
submit to the law’s authority in order to receive its gifts of self-consciousness,
intelligibility, and agency.
By their very nature, law and subject depend on a constitutive outside. Something, or
someone, must always be excluded in order to establish identity. Moreover, it is an
exclusion that really places one inside the law, since the ruling order requires the
exclusion to exist. Being inside the law does not seem to guarantee the positive content of
subjectivity if one can be included by being excluded. Moreover there does not seem to
be any real way to get outside of the law, that is, any real possibility to be an outlaw in
the emancipatory sense, since the ‘outside’ is really ‘inside.’
The conditions for emancipation from the law are untenable. We cannot be freed without
canceling our very identity, because that identity is produced by our subjection to the
law.15 What is the point of resistance if it eradicates one’s comprehensible existence in
the world? Is there a way in which we might retain, or secure, our intelligibility and
agency without being subordinately Othered, without excluding some Other, without
being assimilated into a law that denies access to justice, and without being made to
disappear in any other way? Is it desirable, or even possible, to evict the ‘subject’ before
the law as a site of emancipatory politics? These questions are vital for communities that
fall outside of the law. How do we ensure that difference resists and transforms the law,
rather than constituting an impossibility under a law that either assimilates or eradicates
its others? And how might we accomplish this persistence of difference, this resistance,
this revision of the law?
In what follows, I analyze the subject’s relation to the law in its deconstructive relation to
outlawry, through a consideration of the interpellation scenario forwarded by Althusser in
“Ideology and the ideological State Apparatus.” This scenario describes the process of
becoming a subject by internalizing ideology and externalizing it in material practices: a
person on the street is hailed by a police officer and, recognizing the self in the call, turns
toward the officer. How might we read this scene in light of the persistent deconstructive
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force of outlawry in relation to the law? What is the subject’s relation to outlawry? Does
outlawry empower the subject to dismantle the injunction to assume a particular subject
position? Can we negotiate this space without simplifying the outlaw into a voluntarist
subject that somehow transforms the law through the force of individual will; or without
the subject simply ceasing to be; or without valorizing subjectivity (or outlawry for that
matter) as something that must be conserved at all cost? Can we find, in this
interpellation scene, some way to be outside of the law, to be outside of subjectivity? I
argue that it is possible, indeed, it is inevitable that we are always already outside of the
law, just as we are always already subjects, although just how ‘outside’ and how ‘inside’
we are depends on our social and political context and relative place in the hegemonic
order. Certainly there is no ‘outside’ properly speaking, but, I argue, neither is there a
fixed and proper inside. So how does the subject negotiate these translations (between
inside and outside) in its relation to law and outlawry?
To address these questions I engage substantially with Butler’s interpretation of Althusser
in Psychic Life of Power, in particular her discussion of the subject’s identification with
the bad subject and the “one who has broken the law,” as well as her theory of the
performative subject. I re-consider these possibilities in light of a concurrent
performativity of the law and the performativity of outlawry. I propose that at this site of
the double performative the subject is a linguistic placeholder that negotiates the
difference between interior and exterior. With each articulation of subject and law hovers
the possibility of something other, a contingent non-subject and non-law, an outlaw space
that constitutes and dissolves this performative pair.
My aim is to take outlawry as a starting place to re-think the complex series of relations
between subject, law and emancipatory politics. This is a very specific way of theorizing
the subject within the framework of deconstruction and performativity theory. In
addition, the (un)becoming subject is implicitly informed by three versions of the outlaw
that emerge elsewhere in this dissertation. The first is put forward by Walter Benjamin,
who is working within a Marxist framework. He proposes a revolutionary ‘great
criminal’ who possesses the power to both destroy and found the law (281). The public
admires the great criminal because everyone secretly wants to see the law overthrown,
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that is, to be freed of subjection to it. The second outlaw emerges from Carl Schmitt’s
totalitarian definition of sovereignty. In this approach, sovereignty is derived from the
conservative power to suspend the law, and as such, the sovereign is the outlaw.16 This
has the consequence of turning the state’s subjects into outlaws of a third sort, specified
by Agamben as homo sacer, who is stripped of subjectivity and exposed to death.17 The
concept of the great criminal exposes the openness and limits of the law in the context of
outlawry in its sense of revolutionary constituent powers, while the vulnerable outlaw
produced by sovereignty serves as a reminder of the risk of exposure to violence, death,
and incomprehensibility posed by outlawry.
These variations highlight the political stakes of outlawry in its relation to both
subjectivity and the law, and they also reflect the tension between resistance, subjection
and abjection. It is necessary that there be law, that there be subjects, and that subjects
submit to law; the alternative is both linguistically and politically incomprehensible. Yet
there is always a remainder in the contingency that is temporarily foreclosed, as law and
subject alike are repeatedly constructed and deconstructed. Through this, subjects
transform. Moreover the very laws, norms and conditions of possibility that produce and
constrain them are altered. As a site where the law and subject intersect to constitute and
deconstruct each other, outlawry is profoundly political, for it is the site where
individuals are subjugated, abjected, and emancipated, and where hegemonic norms –
indeed, even states – are sedimented, transformed, or overthrown.

The Hailing by the Law
Althusser’s theory of interpellation, proposed in “Ideology and the Ideological State
Apparatus,” has become seminal to conceptions of subjectivity in social and cultural
theory. The scenario establishes the law’s staging of the subject’s call into being: a
person on the street is hailed by a police officer (“hey you there!”) and, recognizing him
or herself in the call, turns toward this agent of the law (106). The scene describes the
process of becoming a subject that freely consents to subjection. This hailing/recognition
process of subjectivation (a translation of assujetissement – both forming and regulating
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the subject) denotes the importance of linguistic practices in subject formation, yet the
process is also embedded in the materiality of social rituals and social context. As
Althusser writes: “The subject acts ...by the following system...ideology existing in a
material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material
ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness
according to his belief” (159).
Subjectivity, for Althusser, is constituted materially by the internalization of ideology
through processes of interpellation. In this approach, ideology is not merely ‘falseconsciousness’ as it is in earlier Marxist theories. For Marx ideology responds to
material reality but is not constituted by it; it has no history of its own. Althusser argues,
“[Marx’s] [i]deology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream. i.e. as nothingness.
All its reality is external to it” (159). Althusser shifts this significantly by weaving
Lacanian psychoanalysis into historical materialism. He frames ideology as the reality we
construct upon our entry into the symbolic order, since we cannot access the ‘real’
conditions of existence except through language and convention. This interpretation of
ideology is based on Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage, which informs Althusser’s
structure for subject interpellation. Althusser suggests that all ideologies share a specular
or ‘double mirror’ structure. This mirror interpellates the subject in the name of a Unique
and Absolute Subject, which is the centre of the ideology. Althusser uses Christian
ideology in which the Absolute Subject is God, but we could just as easily substitute Law
in the place of God, as the analogy of the police officer suggests. The mirror duplicates
the reflection, which both constitutes ideology and ensures its functioning. A mutual
recognition occurs that assures the individual that everything is as it should be. One can
contemplate the image of the Subject (God/Law), which is one’s own image; One is
recognized by the Subject, thereby recognizing the self. One then behaves accordingly.
This doubly specular structure grounds the subject in terms of a relational connection
between the realm of ideas and the material world. Althusser thus suggests that it is not
the conditions of material existence that humans represent in ideology, but our relation to
those conditions - the relations of production and the relations that derive from them. In
this perspective ideology is twofold; first, "Ideology represents the imaginary relationship
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of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (162); and second, "Ideology has a
material existence" (162). Ideology is not about the world per se, nor about the
imagination per se. It is about how humans imagine their place, their role, and their
relationships within it. It is thus neither completely intangible, nor absolutely solid, but
rather has a dynamic materiality, the modality of which is praxis. Ideology is realized in
state apparatuses, which are governed by rituals that produce consent to social relations
and establish one’s ‘place’ in society. There are multiple ideological apparatuses:
schools, churches, the family, the political system, trade unions, communication media,
‘cultural’ organizations, and so on. These govern the ritualized social practices that set
the parameters for a subject’s range of possible characteristics and properties.
Althusser sees this material form of ideology at play in state systems that create the
subject in the specular image of the state, through an interpellation mechanism based on
recognition (and misrecognition), and through various rituals that produce the subject
through one’s mastery of skills. The state maintains its hegemony because it conditions
one’s behaviours and actions, compelling the individual’s beliefs through these processes.
The process is dynamic, for ideology is first about how humans imagine their relationship
to their existence; moreover, it is determined in part by materiality, and has material
expressions.
The Ideological State Apparatuses work together with the State’s Repressive Apparatus,
which includes a specialized legal apparatus (police, courts, prisons), the army, the head
of state, government and administration (131-2). The Repressive Apparatus uses violence
to “secur[e] by force (physical or otherwise) the political conditions of the relations of
production which are in the last resort relations of exploitation…” (142). It works
predominantly by repression, and secondarily by ideology (139). Although ideological
state apparatuses are diverse, they are unified by their functioning beneath the ideology of
the ruling class, which also holds state power, and has at its disposal the repressive state
apparatus.
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Resisting Subjects
But what potential for resistance and social change does Althusser’s theory promise? Is
there an outlaw hidden beneath the surface of his theory, or does the subject, who is
always already a subject, totally fill social reality? Althusser’s framing question is “how
are the relations of production reproduced?” Or in other terms, why do workers willingly
work in a system that exploits them? (130). His answer is complex and contradictory. He
points to a subject that is produced and reproduced by internalizing ideology, for
subjection marks consent to exploitation, on the one hand, and defines one as free person
on the other: “[T]he individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall
submit freely,” he writes (136). The contradiction in this theory of the subject has led
some readers of Althusser to charge that he leaves little room for agency, for the subject
is free only to submit. As Elizabeth Wingrove argues, Marxist readings of Althusser tend
to allow for agency only in the gaps and interstices when the system breaks down (872873).
Yet Althusser’s underlying concern is to discover how exploitative relations might be
disrupted. His philosophical work in general is inspired by the impulse for political
change. He is very clear on this point in the interview by Maria Antoinette Macciocchi
that opens the volume of work that contains his essay on Ideology: “My interest in
philosophy was aroused by materialism and its critical function…My passion for politics
was inspired by the revolutionary instinct, intelligence, courage and heroism of the
working class in its struggle for socialism…It was politics which decided
everything…Marxist-Leninist politics” (11). By implication, his theory as to how states
constitute ideological subjects represents his effort to understand the revolutionary
subjectivity of the working classes. Yet where this revolutionary subject is located in his
theory of interpellation, or how such a revolutionary subjectivity might manifest itself is
unclear. The subject, as he presents it, is really a subject-position in terms of the relations
of production. One’s subject position is created through a structural effect and determined
by the limits and possibilities made available through the ISAs. Nevertheless, something
in the repeated rituals of interpellation must allow an opening for the revolutionary
subject to appear, otherwise how could a revolutionary working class exist at all?
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Interpellation, in particular as it is understood through the analogy of a hailing by the law,
does leave open the possibility of both personal and political transformation, especially if
we consider the policeman’s hail as a performative speech act that itself undergoes
alteration. However, I shall defer my elaboration on the performativity of the law for the
moment, and first address some key elements of interpellation theory that might allow for
the possibility of an outside of the law, as well as some of the critiques and elaborations
of these elements by others. These features include: the dyad Althusser constructs
between a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ subject; the psychic remainder implicit in his reference to
Lacanian psychoanalysis; and the slippage between recognition and misrecognition in the
trope of specularity.

The Bad Subject
At first glance, Althusser’s essay is more diagnostic than prescriptive in terms of its
usefulness in determining how a revolutionary mode of outlawry might be realized (both
in the sense of a challenge to the law and resistance to subjection), for he proposes two
kinds of subjects, good subjects and bad subjects, neither of which seem to contain the
potential to transform their social situation, even though the bad subject might act outside
of the law. Good subjects are those subjects for whom ideological interpellation works.
These are the subjects who consent to hegemonic systems even when the system exploits
or oppresses them: they are the good workers and bosses, the good husbands and wives
and so on. Most of us are good subjects of ideology in this sense; we enact what we
believe and believe in how we act, and fulfill our roles as contributing family members,
community members and citizens. Our compliance allows for the reproduction of existing
relations of production (and reproduction).
Bad subjects, in contrast, are those uncooperative individuals who fail to work by
themselves, provoking the intervention of repressive agencies like the police or the
military (169). Yet these disruptive ‘bad subjects’ are not outlaws. They are not really
dissenting, but rather they are still subjects, infused with hegemonic ideology. The
difference between good and bad subjects is a matter of conscience in the Hegelian sense
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of harmony between one’s beliefs and actions. Good subjects have internalized a concept
of what is good and correct, and their actions reflect those beliefs. Bad subjects act
against their beliefs in contradiction with their consciousness as free subjects. “If he does
not do what he ought to do as a function of what he believes,” Althusser writes, “he has
other ideas in his head, and ...acts according to these other ideas, as a man who is either
inconsistent or cynical or perverse” (158, my italics). ‘Bad’ subjects are bad because they
have internalized an ideology that suggests they should act in a certain way, and for
whatever reason, they do not act in that way. Like the good subject, the bad subject is
constituted ideologically by the law, yet he or she also has ideas or experiences that
contradict his or her beliefs. These have led to transgressions that may provoke the
intervention of state violence, but they have not yet confronted the underlying ideology
that constitutes the subject of the law. The violation of that prior complicity is an act of
bad conscience.
For the bad subject and good subject alike there is an underlying presumption that the law
has a legitimate authority over them. The bad subject believes in the law’s authority, just
as the good subject does. His or her guilty transgressions do not challenge law, alter its
terms, or reconstitute it, but rather reaffirm its legitimacy by inviting the material praxis
of the repressive apparatus. For according to Althusser’s logic, material rituals, including
the rites of repression, cultivate belief. Thus from arrest, to conviction, to incarceration,
the disciplinary rituals of the RSA have a decidedly ideological as well as punitive
function. Yet it still remains a question why anybody would act in contradiction to one’s
beliefs. Is it some kernal of dissent that the subject possesses? Does the bad subject
represent some revolutionary pre- or post-subjective essence that possesses the
wherewithal to willfully refuse to be exploited?
Not according to Butler. In her analysis of Althusser in the chapter titled “Conscience
doth Make Subjects of us All” in Psychic Life of Power, the bad subject signals quite the
opposite to willful refusal. It reflects the condition for the psychic state of conscience that
prepares the way for a full hegemonic submission. This condition is guilt. For Butler, the
punitive inflection of the police officer’s hailing summons the turn of conscience that is a
necessary component of Althusser’s subject. We are vulnerable to law even before a
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critical understanding of it is possible, she writes, “in the anticipation of culling an
identity through identifying with the one who has broken the law” (108). This
identification is figured as a guilty one, rather than as a wish to transgress the law, for as
beings we seem to exceed the conditions of subjectivity imposed on us: “the law is
broken prior to any possibility of having access to the law, and so ‘guilt’ is prior to
knowledge of the law” (108). The result for Butler is that subjects’ complicity with the
law limits the possibility of a critical view of it, since it is necessary for our very sense of
self to exist (108). Butler thus positions the Althusserian subject vis a vis ressentiment,
for this guilt leads the subject to deny the assertion of one’s own will: “in a Nietzschean
sense, the subject is formed by a will that turns back upon itself, assuming a reflexive
form … the subject is the modality of power that turns on itself; the subject is the effect
of power in recoil” (6).18 In this view, the bad subject is not precisely a ‘subject’ but
rather what precedes the good subject as a figure of originary guilt.
In Butler’s reading of Althusser, subjectivity is a repeated performance of innocence,
necessitated by this state of guilt, which is derived somehow by transgressing the law
before being aware of it. Butler writes that: “[t]o be ‘bad’ is not yet to be a subject, not
yet to have acquitted oneself of the allegation of guilt” (119). This conditions the
subject’s turn against itself and toward the law. The bad subject’s identification with the
one who has broken the law does not challenge the law, in the mode of outlawry, but
instead merely conditions the person to consent to subjection.
What for me is most interesting about Butler’s reading of the ‘bad subject’ is not entirely
explicit in her text, but emerges through an apparent contradiction. This is the
paradoxical synchronicity of the bad subject as a figure that precedes the subject (“to be
‘bad’ is not yet to be a subject” 119), with the conjecture that one is ‘always already’ a
subject (“one …always already… yield[s] to the law in order to assure one’s own
existence” 112). This contradiction is evident in Althusser’s argument as well. He writes
of the subject as if it were temporally preceded by a non-ideological individual that
undergoes interpellation in order to ‘become’ a subject. But this is nothing more than a
false temporality intended only as a narrative device. For he is also firm in his assertion
that we are ‘always already’ subjects. The various ideological apparatuses pre-exist us;
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they establish precisely what kind of subject we are expected to be. Interpellation calls us
into being, compelling in us a recognition of ourselves as that subject. ISAs thus establish
the criteria for what it means to be a subject in a particular time and place so that we
consent to our role in economic, political and social systems. According to Althusser:
“That an individual is always-already a subject, even before he is born is…the plain
reality, accessible to everyone and not a paradox at all. Freud shows that individuals are
always ‘abstract’ with respect to the subjects they always-already are, simply by noting
the ideological ritual that surrounds the expectation of a ‘birth,’ that ‘happy event.’
Everyone knows how much and in what way an unborn child is expected” (176).
Althusser invokes Lacan’s Law of the Father to affirm the inevitable positioning of the
subject in one’s community, continuing that: “it is certain in advance that it will bear its
Father's Name, and will therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth,
the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the
specific familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been
conceived" (176). In this perspective, if one is always already a subject, how can the bad
subject not already be a subject? One is pre-figured in relation to the law even before one
is born: there is no one that is outside of the law.
So why does Butler take such care to explicate the ‘bad subject’ as a figure that precedes
the subject? Surely she is not misunderstanding Althusser, who has, after all, been very
clear that one is always already a subject. The logic of conscience, if we follow it
through, suggests that a guilty pre-ideological individual is a subject already, for one
must first believe in order to act against one’s beliefs. So the bad subject does not stand
temporally before the good subject as a subject-to-be, but rather after the good subject, as
a good-subject-gone-bad. However, such a temporal reading of the subject is not to be
taken literally. Butler casts the bad subject as a pre-ideological placeholder in order to
establish Althusser’s emphasis on conscience, which answers the question as to why a
subject would turn to face the law, if that means turning away from one’s own will. The
logic of conscience demands that one is always already a bad subject because one always
falls short of the call to inhabit a particular subject position (no matter how she strives to
be good, there is always something unbecoming about the girl), and this conditions ones
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willingness to be good. Indeed, the temporal ambiguities lock the subject into subjection
because, guilty at the core, they must never cease to prove their innocence.
To be clear, this does not entirely represent Butler’s position. Indeed, she argues that
Althusser is overly constrained by the “logic of conscience” (129). Conscience does not
seem sufficient as an explanation for why one would relinquish one’s own volition and
turn toward the law, for, as Butler frames it, “the discursive possibilities for existence
exceed the reprimand voiced by the law” (129). If this is the case, she continues, the need
to “confirm one’s guilt” in order to attain an identity requires conditions in which our
existence depends on self-negation. She asks how we might oppose the law without
denying our complicity in it – a turning away from the law that is enabled by the law
itself. Such a turn would not only resist the “lure of identity” and agency promised by the
law, it also “demands a willingness not to be — a critical desubjectivation — in order to
expose the law as less powerful than it seems” (130). Conscience alone is not sufficient
as a rationale for the subject’s willing turn toward the law, nor does it allow for the
subject to change its circumstances. Butler critiques the dependence on Judeo-Christian
morality, reflected in both Althusser’s analysis and his examples. Casting the subject-tobe as always already guilty, she argues, supposes a “highly religious scenario” in which
an “original guilt” is relieved through the promise of identity relayed in the Divine
performative (109). The reliance on metaphors of religious authority closes off “any
possibility of critical intervention in the workings of the law” (109), as well as suggesting
that ideology is somehow eternal or universal. As such, originary guilt renders
submission inevitable, diminishing the possibility of dissent on the part of the subject,
foreclosing the potential failure of interpellation and subsequent resistance. Butler turns
to psychoanalysis in order to address these difficulties, arguing that the subject’s turn
toward the law is not merely self-recriminatory, but reflects a passionate attachment to
the law and its gifts of intelligibility and agency.
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The Psychic Remainder
In order to support her argument that the subject is constituted by a passionate attachment
to the law, Butler takes up Mladen Dolar’s suggestion that the psyche exceeds subjection.
For Dolar, interpellation fails at the site of love, that is, through an unconditional
surrender to the other, which is an instance of the “pure contingency of the Real” (83).
For Butler however, love is directed as surrender to the Law, rather than as a surrender to
the other. I will presently review this discussion, but to a different purpose than Dolar and
Butler, both of whom seem intent to rescue Althusser’s subject with love, in one form or
another: Dolar wants to save the subject from ideological totality, and Butler want to
release her from the depths of religious self-recrimination. I too am interested in
alternatives to a totalized, conscience-ridden subject, but I am skeptical of the capacity of
the psyche – presented here as an inner essence constituted by its ability to love – to undo
this totalization. I maintain that contestation of the law is derived the law’s impossibility
to be identical to itself. The subject and the outlaw are deconstructively intertwined, so
that resistance is political, as well as psychic. The psyche is insufficient as a figure of
resistance since as Butler argues the psyche does not “dismantl[e] the injunction or
chang[e] the terms of subject constitution” (PLP 88). Psychoanalysis locates resistance in
the imaginary realm of fetishes and dysfunctions of the unconscious, those aspects of the
psyche that escape subjectivation, in which case resistance is nothing more than the limits
of normalization (88). I turn instead to Slavoj Zizek for the key that unlocks the
tautological circle that fixes the subject. Zizek reminds us that the Law is itself a fiction.
With this in mind, what remainder does outlawry produce that might open up a space for
resistance on the part of the subject? That is, what remainder in addition to a psychic
inner essence of the subject?
Dolar situates subjection as an entry into the symbolic and repudiation of the abject realm
of the Real. Althusser, he contends, wraps the subject too neatly in ideology, failing to
account for the psyche, which is a residue or remainder that is left over in the
interpellation process. Dolar argues that the specular process of becoming a subject is
constituted through a shift from a pre-ideological subject to an ideological one. In a
Lacanian approach this transition is represented in the mirror stage: the critical point in
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development when a child enters the symbolic realm of language and meaning,
establishing a sense of self that is distinct from other beings and other objects. For
Althusser, as we have seen, the ideological subject is the only subject, since
subjectivation always occurs retroactively. One becomes a subject by recognizing that
one has always been a subject: the mirror’s double reflection. However Dolar submits
that this approach erases the existence of “a pre-ideological entity, a sort of materia
prima” (76) that undergoes subjectivation.
Countering Althusser, Dolar insists that the psyche pre-exists and exceeds subjectivation;
the psyche can never be assimilated but remains to haunt the subject as a “flaw in the
interior” (78). The subject is divided, in the classic psychoanalytic sense, between the
conscious subject of ideology (the symbolic self) and the unconscious, psychic self.
Where Althusser privileges the symbolic self and excludes the psyche, Dolar intends to
correct Althusser’s theory of subjectivation from the psychoanalytic point of view: “For
Althusser, the subject is what makes ideology work; for psychoanalysis, the subject
emerges where ideology fails” (78). This ‘subject’ is really the psyche, an inner essence
that the ISAs cannot assimilate. It can be glimpsed in those cracks in the symbolic self
where the unconscious peeks through: dreams, neurosis, and perversion, which are ways
to “deal with the remainder,” which is after all, the impossibility of really becoming a
subject (78). Interpellation is viewed by Dolar as a way of avoiding this reality. Yet
interpellation cannot entirely succeed, because the Real nonetheless persists alongside the
Symbolic realm. A remainder is expressed, not through the self-restriction of the
conscience, which is imposed externally via the Law of the Father, but through “a certain
interior register of love.” This love for the other is a complicated love, because it is also
tied to fear and lack, and is experienced by the subject as if there were no choice. One is
overwhelmed by love (Butler 127).
This contradictory situation, constituted by both autonomy and suppression of that
autonomy, is reconciled by a retrospective logic. Dolar writes: “the young man [who is in
love] has chosen only by recognizing that the choice has already been made…he can only
endorse and corroborate the decision of the Other by accepting the unavoidable as his
own inner essence. In other words, choice is a retroactive category; it is always in the past
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tense, but in a special kind of past that was never present” (83). This retroactivity
structures both the love of the symbolic order and a love for the barred other, and it
signals, for Dolar, the failure of ideology, in the last instance, to constitute subjects.
Yet is the young man’s choice, and his retroactive love, not the same choice and love as
that made by the pedestrian who turns toward the police officer? Such ‘love’ is a self
recognition (desire/lack) that is merely a reconfiguration of submission to the law of the
father. Butler picks up on the theme of love, but she shows that Dolar missed Althusser’s
key point that subjectivity combines ideology and materiality. Althusser sees the inner
self as something that is derived through the subject’s relation to what is exterior to that
person. Dolar, however, reduces subjectivity to pure interiority. He claims the human
subject is comprised of a material prima, which is not material so much as it is an inward
consciousness similar to that forwarded by Descartes in his cogito. As Butler writes:
Dolar distinguishes between materiality and interiority, then loosely aligns that
distinction with the Althusserian division between the materiality of the state
apparatus and the putative ideality of subjectivity. In a formation with strong
Cartesian resonance, Dolar defines subjectivity through the notion of interiority and
identifies as material the domain of exteriority (i.e. exterior to the subject). He
presupposes that subjectivity consists in both interiority and ideality, whereas
materiality belongs to its opposite, the countervailing exterior world.” (121)
Ideology, for Althusser, is decidedly not about an internal soul; it is pressed onto us
through material practices and made to appear internal through the mirror function. But it
is lived out materially. Butler asserts: “The constitution of the subject is material to the
extent that this constitution takes place through rituals, and these rituals materialize the
‘ideas of the subject’” (121-122). Subjectivity, the “lived and imaginary experience of
the subject” (122), evolves through repetitive, material practices, a repetition that
produces the belief itself. Where Dolar constructs an opposition between repetition and
materiality, Butler reasserts that for Althusser not only is materiality “defined by ritual
and repetition” but also that this is what produces subjects. Love-feelings – for Dolar, the
young man’s interior passion – are no more purely interior than those exterior conditions
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that produce the range of possible subject-positions. Love for the other is love for the
law; it is a love that one chooses, without choosing. This is a re-articulation of
Althusser’s formula for subjectivity: one submits in order to be free.
Butler reintroduces materiality to the subject’s love, which is now directed as a
passionate attachment to law. This is represented as the love of the pedestrian for the
police officer who stages the entry into the symbolic order. She thus also critiques
Althusser’s constraint by the logic of conscience: “Althusser would have benefited from a
better understanding of how the law becomes the object of passionate attachment, a
strange scene of love. For the conscience which compels the wayward pedestrian to turn
around upon hearing the policemen’s address … appears to be driven by a love of the law
which can be satisfied only by ritual punishment” (128). The guilt of the subject
encompasses not merely a fear of retribution, but a demand for, a love of, and an
attachment to, the law and its promises of intelligibility and agency. This signals a kind
of masochism, or “turning back upon the self.” Yet it is not purely masochistic, for the
law offers the gift of the existence of the self, and the joys of being intelligible to others
that comes with it. Without this turning back on the self, there is no I, no self that is left
to consent or to resist. She writes: “That the subject turns round or rushes towards the law
suggests that the subject lives in passionate expectation of the law. Such love is not
beyond interpellation; rather, it forms the passionate circle in which the subject becomes
ensnared by its own state” (129). This passionate attachment is ensured by the law’s
promise of identity. For Butler, the psychic remainder that signified a failure of
interpellation – love – is as ensconced in repetition as the rituals of subjectivity: “To the
extent that primary introjection is an act of love, it is…not an act performed only once,
but a reiterated and indeed a ritual affair” (128). So while she finds Dolar’s analysis errs
because he fails to grasp Althusser’s thesis that ideology has a material existence, she
also criticizes Althusser for an emphasis on conscience that precludes the space, in the
rituals of subjectivity, of a love for and passionate attachment to the law that subjects.
However, a passionate attachment to the law still does not allow for alteration in the
subject’s relation to the Law – nor for alterations of subject and Law – any more than a
conscientious self-recrimination does: indeed, even less so. A passionate attachment
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suggests that the relationship of the subject to the law is structured as lack/desire, and this
produces its own kind of guilt. Guilt is etymologically associated with debt: Schuld, the
German term for guilt, has its origin in the Schulde, or debts. Similarly, in Old English
gylt is connected to gieldan ‘to pay for, debt.’ Traces of these origins are retained in
contemporary legal systems: the guilty party must ‘pay one’s debt to society.’ The law
does not offer its bounties for free, one purchases intelligibility and consciousness with
submission in the form of a debt, the burden of which is another motivating force of
complicity.
The passionate purchase thus is the very condition for the guilt of not just the bad subject
(whose debt is ‘bad’ for he has, in a sense, missed a payment), but also the good subject,
who also lives under the burden of a life-long debt. Under this coercion, complicity in
guilt is not an absolutely free turn against oneself and toward the law. At the most it is a
gesture that mimics freedom, so how could it produce a free subject? Moreover, a love
relationship with the law is a complicated one: one loves law, but it is a love that the law
itself produces, and forces on its subjects, much as a child has no choice but to love its
parents. How is a critical view of the law possible, if the relationship is saturated by the
subject’s dependence on the law for intelligible existence? The theory of conscience at
least hints at resentment on the part of the subject; some (suppressed) motivation for a
critical perspective.
Yet the point of Butler’s repeated demand for a critical view of the law is to identify the
site of a failed interpellation. This is necessary if we are ever to act back on the systems
that constrain us (129). However, we can neither simply will such a failure through
resentment, nor through love. The success of interpellation is not barred by a foreclosure
of self-negation and rescued by the psyche or by some internal volition, in the sense that
Dolar has argued. Rather, the limit of interpellation, Butler argues, lies in its “inability to
determine the constitutive field of the human” (129). But what does this mean? Is it not
through ideology that we invent such categories as human and determine humanity’s
limits?
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In one sense, it is precisely ideology that determines humanity’s constitutive limits. Yet
Butler is not merely calling for a more inclusive humanism. Rather, she is pointing to the
contradictory structure of subject interpellation and illuminating the undecidability of the
category ‘human.’ Interpellation does not allow us to see what constitutes one’s
possibilities outside of its own limited terms; it guarantees its own failure to do so by
foreclosing any critique of itself. At its root is a fundamental irony: subject interpellation
works because we are passionately attached to the law that promises us an identity. But
our dependence on this identity constrains any critique of the law we might forward. As
Butler writes: “One cannot criticize too far the terms by which one’s existence is
secured” (129). Yet our possibilities nevertheless exceed these limits. The very
passionate attachment that conditions conscience and allows interpellation to take place is
also what signals the failure of interpellation. But we still do not have a real answer to
what constitutes a failure of interpellation beyond the contradiction that Althusser has
already forwarded: “[T]he individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he
shall submit freely.” What else is there, or are we destined never to alter the conditions of
our subjectivity? There must be a way out of this paradox, because we know that social
and political conditions do change.
A remainder exists in the interpellation process, something that is external to and
different from subjectivity and law, that is, a remainder aside from the psyche, which
exceeds, but does not always dismantle the interpellating injunction. Indeed, this
remainder must exceed the psyche, for as Zizek argues, the psyche is precisely the
condition for submission to the ideological command: “it is precisely this non-integrated
surplus of senseless traumatism which confers on the Law its unconditional authority: in
other words which—insofar as it escapes ideological sense—sustains what we might call
the ideological (43-44). On the one hand, like Butler and Dolar, Zizek positions the
psyche as a remainder that exceeds interpellation. However it is not this excess, but its
conjunction with fantasy that exposes the workings of interpellation. His criticism of
Althusser is that he missed this element of fantasy, which draws in a subject-to-be who is
captivated by the Other as object and cause of his or her desire. Zizek describes the
Lacanian theory of fantasy as follows:
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[I]n the opposition between dream and reality fantasy is on the side of reality; it is, as
Lacan once said, the support that gives consistency to what we call ‘reality’…
Ideology is not a dream-like illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in
its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our
‘reality’ itself. (45)
Fantasy, rather than providing an escape from reality, “offer[s] us the social reality itself
as an escape from some traumatic real kernel” (45). For Zizek, as for Lacan, equating the
subject with an object of fantasy endows the subject with a positive content that cannot
be symbolized, and that belongs to itself, outside of the symbolic intersubjective network
of Others. This traumatized kernel of the real that exceeds the subject is in keeping with
what Dolar describes as the psychic remainder of interpellation, and that for Butler
conditions a passionate attachment to the law. Escaping all ideological sense, this
remainder sustains what Zizek terms “ideological jouis-sense” or “enjoyment-in-sense”
that he finds is proper to ideology, and that is the very “condition of the ideological
command” that confers authority on the law (43).
Yet the theory of fantasy also shifts the focus from the psyche to a critical view of the law
and of social reality that I argue produces another sort of remainder. For Zizek is very
clear that the law and social reality, like the subject, are fictions. In the
Althusserian/Lacanian framework, our ideas are materialized in our social activities,
which become standardized through the actions of subjects. “Belief,” Zizek writes,
“supports the fantasy which regulates social reality” (36). In other words, the law that we
have so far considered in its hailing role in subject interpellation is itself supported to a
large extent by the subjects’ faith in it (as well as by the repressive apparatus). The law
(or what Zizek terms ‘social reality’), is contingent on this belief, “it is supported by a
certain as if” (36). One acts as if one believes in the law, as if it is all powerful, as if it
reflects the people’s will, and as if it express their interests, to paraphrase Zizek’s
argument (36). Moreover this ‘belief’ should be understood as ideology in Althusser’s
sense: it is embodied in material rituals. One turns to face the law. One works, and takes
pride in this work. Without this ideology, that is, without the subject, the law is null: “the
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very texture of the social field disintegrates” (36). Zizek argues that we obey the law
“simply because it is the law,” not because it is just or good (37).
Although he doesn’t cite the precise passage, Zizek is referring to Pascal’s homage to de
Montaigne’s concept of the mystical foundation of authority. In his Pensées, Pascal
writes: “Nothing, according to reason alone, is just in itself; all changes with time.
Custom creates the whole of equity, for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the
mystical foundation of its authority. Whoever carries it back to the first principles
destroys it” (10).19 In Zizek’s interpretation, the law’s authority is tautological; it has
authority because it says it does, and subjects believe it. As Zizek writes, the law’s
authority “lies in its process of enunciation” (37), a phrasing that implies the
performativity of the law.
Yet there is a remainder that is produced by the fact that the force that interpellates the
subject is itself a fiction. Moreover, this relationship between subject and law is
conditioned as much by a bracketing of a disbelief that accompanies the subject’s belief
in the law. For as Zizek points out, we act as if we believe in what the law promises, but
“we all know very well” that the law is neither all-powerful, nor just (36). He points to
the senseless bureaucratic machines represented by Kafka to demonstrate this: “Is not
Kafka’s ‘irrational’ bureaucracy, this blind, gigantic, nonsensical apparatus, precisely the
Ideological State Apparatus with which a subject is confronted before any identification,
any recognition –any subjectivation – takes place?” (44). Zizek argues that Kafka’s
novels represent a kind of predictive critique of Althusser by revealing the fissure
between ideological apparatuses and the subject’s internalization of hegemonic norms:
the ISA is impossible to identify with. As Zizek writes “the Kafkaesque subject is a
subject desperately seeking a trait with which to identify, he does not understand the
meaning of the call of the Other” (44).
The law’s injunction, its enunciation, is to be obeyed not for its rational qualities, but in
its very irrationality, and this is what for Zizek conditions one’s entry into ideology. We
must make sense of the contingency of the command and of our submission to it. To do
so, we repress the law’s senselessness through ideology, which gives the law its meaning.
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“What is repressed is not some obscure origin of the Law but the very fact that the law is
not to be accepted as true, only as necessary—the fact that its authority is without truth”
(38). This is why one comes to believe by acting as if one already believed, the senseless
injunction of Pascal’s that Althusser famously cited as the formula for the tie between
ideology and materiality. Althusser writes: “[W]e are indebted to Pascal’s defensive
‘dialectic’ for the wonderful formula which will enable us to invert the order of the
notional scheme of ideology. Pascal says more or less: “Kneel down, move your lips in
prayer, and you will believe” (IISA168). However, such a formula ties neither subject
nor law into neat totalities. Both subject and law are structured by clauses that allow for
contingency: one acts as if one believes, one kneels despite one’s lack of belief, one
accepts the law as true and just, despite its fictitious character. But how might this
contingency manifest itself, if laws continue to interpellate subjects, and subjects
faithfully submit to laws? And why would they not always continue to do so, if such
processes make sense of the senseless, and cover the incomprehensible trauma of reality
with meaning? What remainder is produced at the site of this fiction?

Misrecognition
The interpellation scenario incorporates a remainder into its very core through its basis in
misrecognition. The hailing call depends on the pedestrian recognizing him or herself as
the one being addressed, but even when the recognition function succeeds, it actually
fails. There is, after all, no true self to be recognized, and no true law to be obeyed. Dolar
puts it clearly when he writes that: “One becomes a subject by suddenly recognizing that
one has always already been a subject: becoming a subject always takes place
retroactively – it is based on a necessary illusion, an extrapolation, an illegitimate
extension of a later state into the former stage. A leap – a moment of sudden emergence –
occurs” (76). The recognition occurs as a revision of the self. As such, it not only opens a
possibility for misrecognition, it depends on it.
In part, recognition and misrecognition coincide, for the subject is always doubled. This
is why we can accept both Butler’s supposition that the bad subject is pre-ideological and
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Althusser’s assurance that there is no pre-ideological entity. We can, indeed we must,
live with this contradiction. Every subject is both a good subject and a bad subject at the
same time, because identity is constituted through misrecognition and retrospective
revision. Thus the “always-already” subject is not a total foreclosure of resistance to the
law. Indeed, one is also always already something other than the subject one is expected
to be. None of us are perfect daughters, parents, students, or workers, for the mechanisms
of subjectivity are never complete. As Althusser specifies, that “former subject-to-be will
have to ‘find’ ‘its’ place i.e. ‘become’ the sexual subject (boy or girl) which it already is
in advance” (132). The subject is thus launched upon a never-ending quest to find its
place, to become a subject despite a sense of dissonance with the subjectivity that is
expected.
Subjectivity appears as the threshold between the ‘always already’ and a guilty ‘not-quite
yet.’ Anticipation thus persists with misrecognition, summoning up the continual
performance of subjectivity, the striving to be what one is or ought to be. This failed
subjectivity persists at the precipice where the always already subject is never quite a
subject. Ideology fills up this gap by offering one a “place,” as worker, student, daughter,
mother and so on. Yet, as Butler argues, this ‘recognition’ of oneself as a subject is a
form of self-deception that is enacted and made to seem real (PLP112). One’s position in
society appears natural, and everything seems to be as it should be, but ideology is itself a
misrecognition of the reality of the relations of production, which are not necessary and
natural. Althusser writes:
[W]hat is really in question in this mechanism of the mirror recognition of the Subject
and of the individuals interpellated as subjects, and of the guarantee given by the
Subject to the subjects if they freely accept their subjection to the Subject’s
‘commandments’? The reality in question in this mechanism, the reality which is
necessarily ignored (méconnue) in the very forms of recognition (ideology =
misrecognition/ignorance) is indeed, in the last resort the reproduction of the relations
of production and of the relations derived from them. (182-283)
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The point, for Althusser, is to disrupt this process of recognition/misrecognition, in order
to change the relations of reproduction with an ideological mirror that reveals the
exploitative relations and conditions non-exploitative social roles.
The interpellating scene is thus pivotal to social change, as the central activating force of
the internalization of ideology. The Ideological State Apparatus is, for Althusser, “not…
only the stake, but also the site of class struggle” (140), since “no class can hold State
power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in
the State Ideological Apparatus” (139). To be a subject is to hold a certain prescribed
position in the relations of production. To be a revolutionary subject is to change these
relationships, to make possible a different position. But what mechanism does Althusser
propose, in this article, to achieve such disruption and move toward both a material and a
hegemonic revolution? And who achieves it, if the freedom of the subject is really itself a
kind of subjugation?
An answer persists as an undercurrent in the work of both Butler and Althusser at the site
of the temporal contradiction that presupposes both a pre-ideological entity and a subject
that is always already a subject (this is mirrored as the contradiction of the good subject
that identifies with both the law and the one who has broken the law). Butler relates the
issue to a resistance to narration on the part of subject interpellation. She writes that the
process of interpellation that is literalized in the analogy of a guilty turning toward the
law “exceeds the narrativizability of events” (106). Instead of constituting an event,
interpellation is “a certain way of staging the call, where the call, as staged, becomes
deliteralized in the course of its exposition or darstellung” (107). In other words, the
representation of the event does not reflect the explicit content of the event. Indeed,
Butler suggests that the event of interpellation need never actually happen for it to take
effect. Even if the police officer never actually hails us, we remain ready to turn toward
him; we submit to the law. One might also say that interpellation is always happening,
although not in a form that can be literally narrated. We are caught, suspended in
perpetual interpellation. Imagine, for instance, instead of a linear series of events, a
subject frozen at the moment of exposition, the moment the call is staged. Such a subject
is always already a subject, true to the Althusserian/Lacanian model. But it is doubled as
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a pre-ideological entity anticipating the call. Now imagine that this doubled presubject/subject, although fixed in its moment of exposition, is also revolving in the
continual motions of becoming. Two additional effects spin out of this revolving, or dare
I say, revolutionary subject. The first is an intensification of the doubled specular
structure of interpellation, with its reliance on misrecognition: a misrecognition that
signals the inclusion of potential alterity on the part of the subject. The second is the
retroactivity of the subject in its relationship to the psyche, the real, and the symbolic
order. Both of these are effects of performativity. If we look to the now well-established
theory of the performative subject we can see how this allows for alterity in
subjectivation. But how does this change social reality? How might we read
performativity theory such that it also revises the law? In other words, what is the relation
of the subject to outlawry?

The Performative Subject
In Bodies that Matter, Butler explicitly describes the interpellation scenario as an
instance of performativity. The police officer’s hail is a performative utterance that brings
the subject into being: “The reprimand does not merely repress and control the subject”
she writes, “but forms a crucial part of the juridical and social formation of the subject.
The call is formative, if not performative, precisely because it initiates the individual into
the subjected status of the subject” (121). As described in Chapter One, the concept of
performativity is derived from J.L. Austin’s speech act theory (1965). Austin introduced
the performative as a category of utterance that, unlike the descriptive constative
utterance, has no truth value. It does not describe the world, but acts upon it. The
performative utterance, epitomized in the form of vows and promises, is a way of "doing
things with words." As such, to ‘act’ with language constitutes more than mere linguistic
play. Performativity combines the realms of the ideal and the material. Not only does this
underscore the pertinence of performativity to the Althusserian model of subject
interpellation, which also merges ideology and materiality, it also highlights precisely
why the ideological subject is neither static, nor totally determined by the ISAs.
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Performatives contain the creative and fictive qualities of the linguistic realm, and also
the force to transform reality.20
Butler employs the theory of performativity to explore subjectivity, and in particular, the
gendering of subjects. She proposes that instead of preceding its actions as an entity with
its own ontological status, the subject is constituted through its repeated performance of
material and linguistic acts. In other words, subjectivity is not a de facto state of being,
but a state of doing. Referring to the absence of a “gender identity” prior to gender
“expressions,” in Gender Trouble Butler writes, “identity is performatively constituted by
the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (25). Performativity theory presents
the subject as a becoming subject, one that is produced discursively, rather than emerging
from an essence internal to the individual. Thus for Butler, gender is not merely produced
as a social construct. The materiality of sex is itself created as a fluid and transforming
reality. If this was not always clear in Gender Trouble, in Bodies that Matter, Butler is
decisive on the point that discursive performativity has a material reality in the
Althusserian sense. In this, she counters de Beauvoir and social constructionist feminists
that divide gender and sex into separate spheres of culture and nature. Sex is gender,
according to Butler, because we inscribe meaning in the materiality of bodies, and
produce meaning through our bodies’ actions. Materiality is more than just a landscape
on which we signify, for performative enactments of subjectivity shape the material
world, in which we encounter real physical benefits and penalties that are attached to
these subjectivities and the context in which they are lived.
Some critics caution that performativity theory is limited in its capacity to theorize a
subject capable of transforming the law. How can subjects dissent if their very identity is
dependent on their consent? Or, as Seyla Benhabib (1995) and Katherine Magnus (2006)
caution, how can the subject really act, if the subject is a mere effect of language?21
Moreover, Butler’s critics contend that performativity effectively blames subjects for
their subordination, since we must submit to power in order to exist and have agency, a
critique Butler herself points out in her introduction to Psychic Life of Power (6). Yet this
is precisely the tension that performativity theory makes sense of: we are called into
being as subjects by discourses that we do not choose, but that nonetheless designate the
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available modes of being in the world, in a given time and place. Yet the theory of the
performative subject includes a “refusal of the law” that is concurrent to one’s
submission: “Where the uniformity of the subject is expected, where the behavioural
conformity of the subject is commanded, there might be produced the refusal of the law
in the form of the parodic inhabiting of conformity that subtly calls into question the
legitimacy of the command, a repetition of the law into hyperbole, a rearticulation of the
law against the authority of the one who delivers it” (BM 122). The performative subject
is not a puppet of language, locked into a single pre-determined path; it “exceeds” and
“confounds” the discursive injunction, acting back on the law that calls it into being.
Butler uses the example of drag to show how one can re-work or re-signify an oppressive
subject position. Drag is subversive, she argues, because it exposes the fiction of the
heteronormative gender ideal that otherwise appears naturalized. By parodying gender
norms, the drag queen or king contests those norms. Parody blends so well with the
theory of performativity because it works through citation; the drag queen cites the
gender norms that are already prescribed, she doesn’t invent new norms. Yet some
questions still remain unclear. How precisely does this “refusal of the law” operate
outside of the example of parody? Is drag not an act, a critique of gender norms, rather
than a revision or re-creation of one’s subject position? What does the critique in fact
accomplish, when, as Butler points out, drag can also help reinforce gender norms by
exaggerating gender stereotypes? How does an apparent ‘conformity’ call the legitimacy
of the law into question? Does performativity open up the space for a subject to undo its
subjection, and in so doing, alter the discursive terrain of the law? Or does it merely
plummet the doer into abjection and incomprehensibility when the subject exceeds the
law’s command? How does one negotiate the tricky terrain between re-signification and
abjection when one acts back against the law that calls one into being? In order to
explore and unpack this dynamic, I consider the interpellation scenario with respect to the
tension between repressive and productive power, and between re-signification and
abjection as well as iterability and alterity. Subjects do negotiate the performative
translations between law and outlawry; their comprehensibility and agency, indeed, their
very existence in the world is at stake. But how is resistance meaningful if it is
unintelligible? How do we dissent intelligibly? Or is dissent always incomprehensible?
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Revolutions of Power
It is curious that Althusser makes the hailing figure of a police officer, of all possible
examples, exemplary of subject interpellation. Butler suggests that casting the call in the
singular voice of a policeman is without doubt intended to imply its punitive nature; it
sets up the call as a “demand to align oneself with the law,” and to establish a relation
with the law through an appropriation of guilt (PLP 106-107). Yet Althusser does not
restrict interpellation to the juridical sphere. Interpellation includes the power to name
and beckon in everyday ways, such as shaking hands, greeting friends on the street, or
addressing someone by name. Indeed, as Wingrove points out, it is not a given that the
legal metaphor is meant to be paradigmatic of the interpellation scenario. It may simply
be an example among many possible examples (878). Indeed, one is interpellated
repeatedly throughout one’s lifetime by a variety of ideological apparatuses, such as
families, religious organizations, schools and peer groups. But I concur with Butler,
rather than Wingrove, that the “special” form of the policeman’s call to suspects in the
street is the paradigm for the performative interpellation process, taking centre stage in
Althusser’s essay for good reason. However, it is not the presumed guilt of the preideological subject that, in my analysis, is produced in this relation. Instead, casting the
interpellating agent as the law clearly establishes the power relations at play in subject
formation as well as the political stakes of personal agency: these relations oppose
political transformation to repression, and subjection to abjection. These stakes have
everything to do with the deconstructive relation between the law and outlawry. The
implied threat of violence in the spectre of the Repressive Apparatus that looms behind
the hailing is thus indicative of the undecidability of the interpellation scene.
Whereas some argue that Althusser polarizes the RSA as an instrument of force and ISAs
as mechanisms to gain consent, the use of a representative of a repressive power to
demonstrate the process of an ideological apparatus suggests that the distinctions between
violence and willing compliance are blurred. For Althusser, neither the repressive nor the
ideological apparatuses are “pure.” Rather, Althusser writes: “every State Apparatus
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whether Repressive or Ideological, ‘functions’ both by violence and by ideology” (138).
The difference is that the Ideological apparatus functions predominantly through consent,
even though it includes the possibility of violence. The threat that repressive action might
be taken if we do not submit haunts our response to the policeman’s call. We see this
resort to discipline in other otherwise ideological apparatuses as well: the school, the
family, and even peer groups might resort to force when a member’s actions fall out of
line with group hegemony.
Yet this threat of violence, which seems to foreclose the possibility of a refusal to
consent, actually indicates the possibility of such a refusal. The threat not only anticipates
resistance, it produces it, if we understand the power of the discursive call in a
Foucauldian sense, as both repressive and productive. For Butler this definition of power
resolves the ambivalence of the subject – subordinated yet free – which, as she asserts, is
essential to a theory of subjectivity. She writes: “How can it be that the subject, taken to
be the condition for and instrument of agency, is at the same time the effect of
subordination, understood as the deprivation of agency” (PLP 8-9)? Butler argues that
the necessity of this ambivalence is grounded in two modes of power: power as an
external and prior force that “makes the subject possible” and power as the internal
agency of the subject, as “what is taken up and reiterated in the subjects ‘own’ acting”
that is, as the “willed effect” of the subject (14). Butler continues:
As a subject of power (where “of” connotes both “belonging to” and “wielding”), the
subject eclipses the conditions of its own emergence; it eclipses power with power.
The conditions not only make possible the subject but also enter into the subject’s
formation. They are made present in the acts of that formation and in the acts of the
subject that follow. (PLP 14)
The crux of the ambivalence of the subject for Butler, then, is that subjection is the
requirement for agency, and thus it conditions resistance and opposition to the very
power that subjects. To suggest that power does not simply repress offers a route for
resistance to repressive power, for power is understood in terms of action. In “Subject
and Power” Foucault asserts: “power is a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting
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subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action” (220). Resistance is for
Foucault an effect, or self-subversion, of power, which is prolific and multi-faceted (PLP
93). Consider the example of the homosexual that Foucault introduces in History of
Sexuality. The subject position ‘homosexual’ is made possible through the proliferation
of discourses of sexuality that emerged in the 17th century. The identity is constructed as
a clearly pathological one, and one that faces severe social penalties. Yet the birth of the
homosexual at once signals an emergence of the heterosexual, and comes with a
challenge to compulsory heterosexuality that is instituted through the homosexual’s very
existence. The Foucauldian subject is repeatedly re-created as a series of effects, rather
than as a totalized unity, so that even as it undergoes forces of normalization, it launches
an assault against normalizing forces (Butler 93). Even as the subject is produced and
regulated, a zone of resistance also emerges.
According to Foucault’s logic, with every subjection emerges the possibility of resistance
to subjection. Thus a reversed threat is implied in the example of the policeman chosen
by Althusser: the ‘threat’ to the law when we do not acknowledge its authority over us.
The potency of this threat should not be underestimated, but neither should it be
overstated – a missed or refused hailing is not always a revolution. Yet as the earlier
discussion with reference to Zizek makes clear, the law is not as all-powerful as we
pretend; instead, the law stands on the shaky foundation of its own fiction. Indeed, as
Butler argues in Gender Trouble, the law produces the subject as a fiction to ground its
own legitimacy: “In effect the Law produces and then conceals the notion of a ‘subject
before the Law’ in order to invoke that discursive formation as a naturalized foundational
premise that subsequently legitimates that law’s own regulatory hegemony” (2-3). Butler
is responding here to Derrida’s discussion in “Force of Law,” in which he stipulates that
there can be no subject who stands “before the law,” for the law is founded by “who is
before it” (270). Something else is thus at play in the performative interpellation scenario,
in addition to the constitution of the subject, and that is the simultaneous constitution of
the law. When the subject turns to accept the conditions of subjectivation, the law is
supported by a faith in the law signified by the action. But the very act of belief
underscores the law’s fictitiousness. It is as Derrida writes in Limited Inc.: “If the police
is always waiting in the wings, it is because conventions are by essence violable and

81

precarious, in themselves and by the fictionality that constitutes them, even before there
has been any overt transgression, in the first sense of to pretend” (105). For whether we
are talking about the juridico-legal system or the psychoanalytic Law of the Father, the
law is itself constituted through the interpellating performative; it requires the subjects’
belief in it to maintain its legitimacy, a belief that in effect proves its illegitimacy.

Outlaw Identifications
Earlier I discussed Butler’s argument that Althusser’s logic of conscience, which she
describes as “culling an identity through identifying with the one who has broken the
law,” forecloses the possibility of a critical understanding of the law because it preconditions the subject as guilty (108). But what if identification with the outlaw is not
always a guilty identification? Perhaps it signals the very possibility of criticism of the
law. If so, it would signal an aspect of subjectivity that is distinct from both conscience
and the passionate desire for the law that Butler indicates. Indeed, where both conscience
and desire rely on the subject’s belief in the law’s authority, such a critical identification
highlights the law’s fictionality and fragility.
This is precisely what Benjamin writes of when he argues that the public admires the
outlaw, not for the deeds committed, but for exposing the fragility of the law. Benjamin
writes: “however repellent [the great criminal’s] ends may have been, [he] has aroused
the secret admiration of the public.” The outlaw, Benjamin continues, “arouses even in
defeat the sympathy of the mass against law” (CV 281). What if we were to conceive of
the “one who has broken the law” not as a subject of bad conscience, but as an outlaw
more along the these lines? Let us consider this possibility for a moment, but with a
certain reservation. For this ‘outlaw’ serves the text as a placeholder on the way to a more
general theory of subjectivity.
An outlaw does not stand before the law, but only outside of it.22 As such, this great
criminal is no longer a subject; he neither submits to the law, nor enjoys its rights and
protections. The outlaw exposes the limits of the law. The transgression of the one who
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has broken the law signifies a simultaneous acknowledgement of the law (the bad subject
is always already a subject) and refusal of it. Yet for the outlaw, breaking the law is not
the violation of the subject’s belief and resulting bad conscience; it is the emergence of a
real contradiction in ideology that cannot be tolerated, and this signals a critical view of
the law that demands a change in the conditions of subjectivation. For example, in the
case of gender interpellations, a transgression of the laws of ‘girlness’ re-writes the
conditions of possibility for being a girl, exposing possibilities that the law failed to
anticipate. This is the case even when the transgression also produces guilt or is met with
sanctions. The girl has not simply broken the law, but rather refused it (willfully or
accidentally), because unlike the conscience-ridden bad subject, her refusal signifies a
challenge to the law’s legitimacy, her girlness exceeds the law’s expectation. At play is
an unmasking that exposes the law as a fiction. The possible refusal of the outlaw,
moreover, is the condition under which subjects might freely consent to their subjection.
For both conscience and passionate attachment to the law are tainted by coercion, through
the threat of repression, and the burden of debt, as I earlier argued. The identification of
the subject with “the one who has broken the law” affirms the possibility for something
else, some change, some other law.
This undecidibility is the condition of a decision – a choice to be made that always comes
from the outside. Yet what remarkable individual overcomes guilt and passion to so
boldly act back against the law? And how does this outlaw manage the contradictions that
restrict action to subjects who submit? For it seems as though the one who breaks the law
must also be both guilty and passionately subjected in order to be an outlaw; indeed, they
must be so, if one is always already a subject. These ‘identities’ seem to cancel one
another out. Can we be both an outlaw and a subject simultaneously? Can we be one
without the other? What happens to that subject that turns on the law in a critical refusal?
Is that person launched into the incoherent and vulnerable sphere of abjection? How
might one identify a site of resistance in which real alteration, including not just personal
transformation, but social change, is possible?
The possibilities of an ‘outlaw identity’ hinge on a tension between re-signification and
abjection that is dangerous to the extreme. Butler frames the problem in Psychic Life of
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Power. She argues that the law so thoroughly “monopolizes the terms of existence” that
to oppose it would be to resist the “lure of identity.” Such a turn away from the law, she
contends, “demands a willingness not to be … in order to expose the law as less powerful
than it seems” (130). Thus there is an extremely high price to pay when we engage in a
critical resistance to the law: one potentially ceases to be. One must take the threat of
eradication literally: when one is abandoned by the law, one is exposed to death. To ‘not
be’ a subject is compellingly undesirable. The psychoanalytic term for this exposure is
abjection, the defining limit of the subject. Abjection is that which the subject has to
repudiate or exclude in order to come into being. The term ‘abject’ literally means to be
"cast off” or “rejected." In Powers of Horror Julia Kristeva defines abjection as the
horror we face when meaning collapses and distinctions between subject and object, self
and other, are blurred (2).
The prospect of maintaining a critical understanding of the law is indeed a daunting one,
for one risks plummeting into the abyss, and losing all sense of oneself. Yet not only
does a vast population of marginalized subjects live at the border of this abyss, every
subject risks this loss by identifying with the one who has broken the law. Why would
anyone risk this? It is because abjection is more than simply a zone of absolute
vulnerability and dejection – it is also the site of confrontation. Resistance is possible in
its social and psychic realms, as “from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease
challenging its master” (2). This is possible because where the object is barred from the
subject, the abject dissolves the border between them. The subject is not constituted by
her submission to the sovereign father, but by the outlaw/abject status she shares with her
mother, and the ongoing struggle for sovereignty that constitutes her relation to the
social. Abjection thus facilitates the double exposure of the fragility of the subject, and
also the fragility of the law.
Abjection is not, therefore, a direct opposition to subjectivity, but instead interacts with
the subject as what constitutes and deconstructs it. Abjection is not absolutely outside, it
contests the limits of what is outside and what is inside. As Kristeva writes, the abject
includes “what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions,
rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (4). Abjection is to the subject
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what outlawry is to the law: exposed and vulnerable, it is also what exposes the fragility
of the law. Thus, in Kristeva’s framework, the one who has broken the law is abject.23
Identity is thus conditioned by the haunting presence of outlawry in the subject – the
undecidable refusal to submit that we encounter in Althusser’s scenario. This is a
presence that charges the subject – every subject – with a responsibility to critique the
law, even at the risk of unintelligibility. Thus ‘the outlaw’ is not some extraordinary
individual, but rather constitutes an aspect of our subjectivity. As such there is a trace of
resistance in one’s very submission, for the submission is based on possibility – what
Derrida might call an essential or necessary possibility – of the refusal to submit.
Outlawry takes its place in subject formation as the potential to alter the terms of
subjection. But this is not without risk of exposure to death and loss of self. The
structure of abjection thus constitutes a kind of doubling; a complex subject of a complex
law whose borders are under contestation. Yet we have not yet discovered how this is
possible if one is always already a subject. How might this introduce some alterity that is
truly outside of the conditions of the law? For as Butler argues, in the Foucauldian model
resistance is limited by the terms of whatever discourse is at play: we can only “work the
power relations by which we are worked” (100). There is no mechanism for the subject to
change its conditions of subjectivation.

Iterability
Butler unhinges power from the path on which it is locked through the linguistic terms of
the performative call. Here, where power recoils, the subject’s agency emerges, an
agency that consists “in opposing and transforming the social terms by which it is
spawned” (29). The form of the recoil is open, for the performative utterance that
constitutes subject and law is structured by alterity itself. This is because its own
condition of possibility is iterability: identity is constituted in repetitive, regulated
linguistic and material acts, which incorporate change, or difference in the space between
each repetition. But how does alterity, as such, slip into the repetitive sequence?
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Butler turns to Foucault’s definition of power as what acts on a subject capable of action
to illustrate the play of iterability. The reiteration of the subject is not merely mechanical,
for power moves fluidly through its capacities to constitute subjects and to act through
them as their ‘own’ action. When we think of the subject in time, we can envision its
shifting relationship to power as what limits it and opens up its possibility for action.
Each time power repeats, it dismantles its former character: it acts on, it acts through, it
acts on, it acts back.24 The changing nature of power, as it repeats, endows the subject
with a changeable character; even as one conforms to the discursive call, one acts back
with power of one’s own. In other words, the subject is not static, but is a subject in time
that is not simply subjected once, but is continually acted on by power in changing ways.
Thus, while one arguably always remains on some continuum of subjectivity, one is not,
from moment to moment, precisely the same subject, of precisely the same power. This
iterability is, in part, how Butler explains the paradoxical nature of subjection and
identity formation, whereby the person must submit in order to be free.
This transformative capacity of power offers a partial explanation of how transformation
is conditioned by performativity. Yet the subject still remains locked by the terms of
institutionalized discourse. We can see how the subject might transform, and even resist,
but it is not clear why acting back would not simply result in punishment or abjection in
its vulnerable sense. How is the discourse itself transformed? What space for contingency
is there? How does iterability make it possible for the conditions of subjectivation to
change?
In Limited Inc. Derrida identifies iterability as one of three qualities that mark the
performative utterance with difference at its very core. In this he departs from Austin’s
theory, which demands a kind of authenticity or purity for an utterance to qualify as
performative (i.e. a wedding vow uttered as a part of a stage performance does not count
as a performative utterance). For Derrida, iterability contaminates the purity of any
performative (17); indeed, “iterability…ruins (even ideally) the very identity it renders
possible” (76). That there is no ‘authentic’ or ‘pure’ performative underscores the
absence of a pure and authentic subject, and of a pure and authentic law. But why is it the
case that all performatives (and this means also subjects and laws) are always already
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corrupted by a fiction in advance? It is because every performative utterance – including
the policeman’s call, “Hey you there!” – is already a citation, it has already been “put
between quotation marks” (12). This is important because when it is cited it breaks with
its original context, which is to say there is no original context, only citation after
citation, “engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely
illimitable” (12) There is something deceiving in a citation that claims originality,
moreover, since it fakes its authenticity. This is why drag is such a powerful example of
resistance to the call of gender, but also a misleading one, because on the surface the
example implies that we ‘act out’ our gender. Yet as Derrida argues, all performatives are
citations, that is, fictions that break with context:
For, ultimately, isn’t it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, “nonserious,” citation (on stage, in a poem or in a solilquey) is the determined
modification of a general citationality—or rather a general iterability—without which
there would not even be a “successful” performative? So that – a paradoxical but
unavoidable conclusion—a successful performative is necessarily an “impure”
performative… (17)
Drag puts the performative utterance on stage and forces us to recognize the action as an
act, the citation as a fiction. When we witness the hailing police officer in the
exaggerated performance of a drag king phallically swinging his nightstick, the fiction is
transparent. But the point is not that such conscious criticisms are possible, but rather that
the police officer that really does hail us in the street is just as fictional. All identity is a
sort of unconscious drag, a citation of a citation. The drag king is not cast as the figure of
resistance, in this sense, but as exemplary of the fictional quality of identity, all identity.
What the drag performer does consciously as a critique of gender norms, we all do
unconsciously, as expressions that constitute our identities.
Moreover, iterability, as Derrida theorizes it, also demands that identities constantly
transform, for iterability is constituted “in itself [by] the discrepancy of a difference”
(53).’ Any identity is determined through differential relations, but the performative
identity is always already different, even from itself. This is because it is constituted
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through repetition, and each repeated element defers and differs from the others. The
sequence might repeat, as follows: law, outlawry, law, outlawry; or subject, abject,
subject, abject. This repetition of alterity operates in the context of the materiality of the
performative utterance, which “produces or transforms a situation, it effects” (13), and
the reliance of performatives on the constitutive outside: “[performatives] do not exclude
what is generally opposed to them, term by term; on the contrary they presuppose it, in an
asymmetrical way, as the general space of their possibility” (18-19). What does this mean
with respect to Althusser’s theory of ideology? How might iterability transform the
subject, and the law, that is, the conditions for subjectivation?
For Althusser, the subject is interpellated into ideology through the repetition of material
practices, the mastery of a kind of “‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology” (118).
The repetitions continue throughout one’s lifetime, as one strives to become the subject
that is expected. But already we have discovered a number of obstacles to successful
interpellation; there is some blurring of the distinction between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ subjects
who share a false temporal sequence that is belied by the ‘always already’ status of the
subject; there is a remainder in addition to the psyche that is related to the mystical
foundation of the law’s authority; and there is slippage between recognition and
misrecognition in the specular structure of interpellation. Indeed, the recognition of self
as depicted in the hailing scenario is reiterated through the multiple hailings of various
social apparatuses over time, each haunted by misrecognition.
If we conceive of the subject as performative and iterable, the distinction between the
good and the bad subject is not the difference between a subject and a non-subject, nor is
it temporally inscribed as a good subject gone bad, as it initially appears. Recall that in
Althusser’s scenario, with reference to Pascal’s defensive dialectic “Kneel down, move
your lips in prayer, and you will believe” (127), he is clear that the repetition of material
rituals is what produces subjectivity, and not vice versa. What is the consequence for
subjectivity, then, of a bad subject that believes, but enacts a different relation to his or
her material existence? On the one hand, he or she is wicked, perverse or cynical,
according to Althusser. One outcome is that the repressive state apparatus enforces
material rituals of submission – the subject is disciplined, in both the punitive sense and
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the Foucauldian sense. Indeed, this is where Althusser takes it – for the distinction
between good and bad is not a question of whether or not a subject works, but whether or
not they work by themselves. Bad subjects work, but only under the coercive violence of
“repressive agencies like the police or the military” (169). Yet the recourse to repression
is only one logical conclusion to the material transgressions of the bad subject. After all,
in Althusser’s framework, it is the material enactment that produces the belief. If one
refuses to kneel and refuses to pray, one might continue to believe (as a bad subject) but
one might also cease to believe. In this case, the bad subject would be positioned on a
path to transforming themselves, and their material reality.
In each instance that subjectivity is repeated, there is an invitation for alterity, including a
critical desubjectivation. This is how performativity resolves the temporal contradictions
of the good and bad subjects as well as the outlaw: they are, in a sense, simultaneous if
we freeze the frame, but if we watch in slow motion they constitute repetitions of each
other, each slightly different. Moreover power shifts between the subject and abject, and
law and outlawry, as they act on each other. Indeed it must, for neither subject nor law
has an independent existence but each produces the other through their relation. The
relation is that of the unnarrativizable performative staging of the call and the turn to face
the law, including the inevitable hesitation (“perhaps I will not turn,” or “is the call for
me?”). As the subject repeats, so does the law, so that the difference is produced not
merely in the subject, but in the law as well.
The difference between deconstituting powers and constituting powers is undecidable.
But the potential to refuse the hailing remains as a trace in each misrecognition. This
trace is identified by Butler as another aspect of subjugation that accounts for resistance.
She argues that the production of a “continuous, visible and located” subject is
impossible in its purity and totality. Instead, the subject is “haunted by an inassimilable
remainder … that marks the limits of subjectivation” (PLP 29). Turning to Freud, she
identifies this remainder as melancholic loss, which, like bad conscience, “rifts the
subject” and represents a kind of inarticulate grief that one can sense but cannot quite
recall25 (23). As what “inaugurates the subject and threatens it with dissolution” this loss
is the very ipseity that the subject desires and represses. But it is not a loss in the sense of
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an absence, but rather of the haunting presence of outlawry in the subject who is
ensconced at the unstable threshold of a law whose legitimacy is ‘mystical’ and
retrospective.

Becoming (Un)becoming
The police officer’s call on the street – “hey you there” – sets the stage for a complicated series
of becomings…and unbecomings. The linguistic terms of the call summons both the subject and
the law into being, but under the conditions of the fiction and alterity of the performative
utterance. The subject thus includes its own undoing and potentiality to be outside of the law as
an element of its very constitution and relation to the law. Outlawry is the ever-present condition
that allows that the potential subject might refuse the edict to turn. Outlawry is always included
as a part of law. Its trace lingers in the force of law, that aspect of the performative utterance that
has the power to transform, to violently shock, to create reality, to produce a subject. In addition,
outlawry persists in the iterability that is inscribed in the performative, as what alters in each
repetition, as what differs and defers as the law reconstitutes itself. Yet the outside of the
law/subject is bracketed. For these possibilities lurk within the subject, not as what is prior or
subsequent, but as what persistently haunts the subject as she performs her allegiance to the law.
Even when the person does turn, she must pass through a moment of decision that holds the
possibility that she might not turn. Otherwise, she is not a free subject at all. Alternately, for
every resistance to subjection the person draws her power from her very subjection: one cannot
speak intelligibly at all except in the language of the symbolic, that is, through the laws and
conventions of language of one’s community.
Subjectivity thus occurs as a perpetual event, unsteadily anchored at the site of repetition
and threshold of a double performative – the performativity of the law and of the subject
– each granting the other the conditions of its possibility and threatening the withdrawal
of those conditions. Althusser’s hailing scenario explicates the dependence of the subject
on its being expected or recognized by the law and subsequently addressed: “hey you!”
Likewise, the law depends on the subject’s recognition in order to establish its
legitimacy, whether that recognition comes in the form of conscience or passionate
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attachment. This recognition is not guaranteed. The scenario includes the possibility of a
refusal of subjection, or a critical or abject desubjectivation, as a condition of
subjectivity. Althusser’s pedestrian might not turn in answer to a discursive hailing, as a
condition that the turn be a free acceptance of subjection. The imperative might be
refused. The subject is caught between conscience (a reprimanding or accusing voice)
and desire (a passionate attachment to the law and its promises), and also refusal or
rejection of the law. That is, the subject is a hybrid of submission and freedom, and of a
becoming that hovers on the verge of unbecoming. The law and the subject found each
other’s fictions, and neither may obtain a purchase on a legitimate identity without the
acknowledgment of the other.
In processes of subjectivation, which involve the double performativity of law and
subject, just as there is abjection to be repudiated, ideology to be internalized, and
authority to be submitted to, there persists some element that escapes subjection and that
‘acts back’ on what founds it, that resists and re-founds the law. The subject that I
propose is a subject of outlawry as well as being a subject of the law, not a subject per se,
and not an outlaw, but both at once. This subject/outlaw is both a becoming subject and
an (un)becoming subject, a term which implies a deconstruction of the subject that is
simultaneous to its construction. The (un)becoming subject is an aspect of every person’s
subjectivity, but just how (un)becoming one is also depends on one’s relative position in
the social realm. This doubled dynamic, between subjection and alterity, connects us one
to the other, for one is only a subject in relation to the Other (which does not erase
agency, but does demand responsibility), and ensures our individual and collective
variation and variability. The (un)becoming subject is in a continual process of becoming
a subject, of repeating the performance of material and linguistic acts with the constraints
imposed by the discursive context. He or she is constantly deconstructing this
subjectivity, this self that is under construction, and the very discourses that call it into
being – to varying degrees. Thus, the (un)becoming subject is an aspect of everyday
changes of self and social world. Notwithstanding some people are more normative and
others more likely to inhabit zones of subjectivity that might be perceived as ‘abject’ or
‘outlaw.’
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The theory of outlawry redirects the focus from the performativity of the subject per se to
the site of mutual performative constitution of subject and law, for the law is likewise a
series of performative citations constituted in its enunciation. I propose at this threshold
law and subject are under continual re-creation through a mimetic doubling with their
constitutive outsides: that is with outlawry and abjection, respectively. I thus extend
Butler’s and Althusser’s analyses, and, while holding to the general logic of their work,
re-direct the lens to the simultaneous construction and deconstruction of the law, via
outlawry. The becoming subject mirrors not only the law, but also both abjection and
outlawry. It is an (un)becoming subject that acts back against the law; yet this
(un)becoming is at second glance a becoming. Thus, in my reading of the hailing scenario
forwarded by Althusser, not only is the subject produced and revised by the police
officer’s call and the pedestrian’s ritualized response, so too is the law constituted and reconstituted. Subjectivity is a perpetual event in which one is always already a subject, a
becoming subject (subject-to-be), and site of desubjectivation or (un)becoming (turning
away from the law, agency, identity). Our notion of the subject is merely a placeholder at
a threshold that encapsulates all of these possibilities and impossibilities. This threshold
of subjectivity is a porous space, framed by the conditions of performativity – iterability,
and différance. Neither subject nor law can be fully contained when undecidability and
alterity play a pronounced role in their being and becoming. This is the space of
resistance and repression through which the law and the subject are constituted and
reconstituted, a space of outlawry.
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Chapter 3: Sovereignty, Outlawry and the Wolf
During the first Gulf war the American media devised a nickname for Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein that echoed the ancient proclamation of outlawry: wargus esto, or
“become a wolf.” They called him “the Beast of Bagdad,” a title he held until his death
by hanging in 2006.26 Thrust into a zone of indistinction between sovereign and outlaw,
human and beast, Hussein was transformed into a contemporary equivalent of a
werewolf. With this performative proclamation, the world changed. The 1990 American
invasion of Kuwait and attack on the World Trade Centre in New York a decade later
heralded a new era in global politics, one in which the lines between law and outlawry
blurred to a point of such crisis that an indefinite state of exception was declared across
the globe. What has been termed the ‘war on terror,’ with its indeterminate territories,
ambiguous enemies and indefinite timeframe not only made a werewolf of Hussein, it
makes werewolves of us all. Transfixed and alienated by the screen image, from the
video-game-like bombing of Bagdad to the fall of the towers, those of us who live in the
west feel ourselves simultaneously disconnected from, and exposed, to death by
terrorism; we barely notice when our own rights are eroded by the new security
measures. Moreover, the actions of our own states, and our subsequent complicity in
terror, torture, and acts of aggression that contravene international law, put our very
humanity to the test, as well as the efficacy and justice of political concepts such as
sovereignty and democracy. What are the implications of outlawry in the political
sphere? Is this ‘new’ form of politics a total catastrophe? Or is there space for resistance,
political transformation, and justice when our political concepts blur the lines between
sovereign, outlaw and wolf?
As the reference to the wolf ban implies, the ambiguity between criminal, sovereign and
beast is ancient. The ban dates at least as far back as Hittite law, and was a common
mechanism to outlaw criminals in archaic and medieval European societies.27
Historically, outlawry has contested boundaries and oppositions, allowing for
transformative flows of power, and complex passages between the domains of nature,
culture, and the supernatural.28 According to Giorgio Agamben, the pronouncement
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“become a wolf” placed outlaws in an ambivalent position, both inside and outside of the
law, and in a liminal position between humanity and animality, as a werewolf (HS 105).
It is no coincidence, moreover, that this is precisely the position of the sovereign, who
must be above the law in order to declare such an exception to law. However, legal
mechanisms for proclaiming outlawry are long outdated in western countries; so why
take the question of outlawry up now? What is it about modernity that compels a detailed
consideration of the outside of the law, and of its operation in the political realm?
As the mechanism by which the law takes bare life as its object, the proclamation of
outlawry is, for Agamben, the ancient predecessor of biopolitics, a modern form of
politics that administrates life, rather than governing subjects. Agamben points to the dehumanizing effect of biopolitics on human populations, which Foucault phrases the
“bestialization of man” (HS 3). It is Agamben’s particular contribution to link biopolitics,
which for Foucault is a function of governance, to modern forms of sovereignty, which
are informed by Carl Schmitt’s understanding of the sovereign as “he who decides on the
state of exception” (11). For Agamben, the sovereign is outside of, or above, the law, but
so is homo sacer, a figure of bare life that emerges as a remainder produced by the
sovereign exception. Notably, where in the past homo sacer was an exceptional category,
today everybody is homo sacer, because, Agamben argues, the exception has become the
rule.
By merging biopolitics with the sovereign exception, Agamben sets up the implicit
significance of outlawry in biopolitics: the lives of homo sacer and the sovereign are the
objects of law by virtue of their being outside of the law. This dual role of outlawry in
modern politics has catastrophic implications in Agamben’s view. Sovereign and nonsovereign entities alike are turned into outlaws, although they are outlaws of very
different sorts. Sovereign outlawry is characterized by the power to act outside of the law,
whereas the outlawry of homo sacer lies in a sheer vulnerability and exposure to death
through exclusion from the law. Human life is stripped of its meaning, and governments
become outlaws who treat their extralegal activities as if they are legitimate, and deal
with citizens and non-citizens alike as objects of bare life, leaving the door wide open for
abuses.
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These are serious concerns, but it is also feasible that sovereignty may alternately
collapse under the sway of outlawry, rather than being supported by it. Does a
biopolitical citizenry challenge the law? A close examination of biopolitics through the
lens of outlawry opens the possibility of an entirely different kind of biopolitics than we
find in Foucault and Agamben. With this in mind, is the relationship of outlawry to
sovereignty always necessarily catastrophic? Or could outlawry perhaps provide a means
to deconstruct sovereignty in a political context that, by virtue of the various outlawries at
play in the sovereign sphere, and in light of the threat posed by politics to life itself,
demands new concepts of the political?
Despite a certain overlap in their diagnosis of the political issues faced in modernity,
Agamben and Derrida disagree on the meaning of the play of outlawry in modern
politics. In recent work, Derrida contends that the sovereign sphere is permeated with a
wolfishness that blurs the boundaries between law and outlawry, but with significantly
different implications than for Agamben. In Rogues Derrida addresses the question of
what he terms ‘rogue’ sovereignty, and in La Bête et le Souverain, he links the sovereign
and the beast with criminals through a shared status outside of the law.29 Yet for Derrida,
there is no clear division between such abjected beings as homo sacer and political
subjects, nor between sovereignty and outlawry, nor between political life and bare life
(bios and zoë), the latter being the distinction on which biopolitics rests. Moreover, he
disagrees with the contention that biopolitics is a distinctively modern political norm,
positing instead that it represents a ‘threshold’ between old and new political concepts.
Such a threshold does not separate the old from the new, but rather traces the continuity
and discontinuity of transformations of political concepts through time.
The prevalence of outlawry in the political realm clearly involves some urgent dangers.
Since the enlightenment, a cooption of outlawry by sovereignty constitutes the structure
of modern secular politics, so that today, something bare is exposed at the heart of the
political. However, the solution cannot be a foreclosure of outlawry, for that would only
push the present dangers to their totalizing extreme; such a foreclosure would fully
enclose outlawry in the law. We need new concepts in light of this bare politics, but not
concepts that exclude outlawry. Our task, rather, is to free outlawry from the grip of the
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sovereign. A deconstruction of biopolitics, sovereignty, and the law opens up possibilities
to re-create our political concepts, by generating openings toward the future, and toward
the other. It may be disastrous when sovereignty becomes a roguish wolf, as Derrida
argues in Rogues, and when political subjects are dehumanized as homo sacer, as
Agamben contends. Yet a focus on the outlawry of biopolitics also emphasizes the
performative and deconstructive interplay between law and outlawry, in which outlawry
possesses the power to create something new.

The Biopolitical Outlaw
In the first volume of History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that the rationalism of the
Enlightenment has led to a new form of politics, particular to modernity, that takes life
itself as the object of the law. Biopolitics involves the “growing inclusion of natural life
in the mechanisms and calculations of power” (119). This new form of politics takes
charge of life through “continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms” that
“distribut[e] the living in the domain of value and utility” (144). The result is a
dehumanization of the population, as human lives become the object of politics. Foucault
writes: “What follows is a kind of bestialization of man achieved through the most
sophisticated political techniques. For the first time in history the possibilities of the
social sciences are made known and at once it becomes possible both to protect life and
to authorize a holocaust” (HS 3). In Agamben’s view, the roots of biopolitics in outlawry
are ancient. He frames biopolitics as a form of politics that transforms citizens from
subjects to persons who are outside of the law. His investigation in Homo Sacer
circulates around the political function of the sacred man “who may be killed but not
sacrificed” because he is included in the law only by being excluded from it (8). This
sacred figure has, for Agamben, its origin in archaic legal structures banning lawbreakers,
placing them in an ambivalent position both inside and outside of the law. Indeed, he
poses the wolf ban as evidence that, since ancient times, sovereignty has rested on a
continuous state of exception in which bare life is indistinguishable from politics.
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The ban is the performative proclamation wargus esto (become a wolf),30 pronounced by
the sovereign to exile certain lawbreakers from the community as werewolves. Exiled as
a being that is neither entirely human nor beast, the person who has been banned from the
city is, like homo sacer, a sacred figure who can be killed without culpability like a wolf,
but not sacrificed. In the figure of the werewolf, animal life and political life have merged
to the point where they are indistinguishable. As Agamben makes clear, the ban does not
draw a sharp limit between humanity and animality, city and forest, but rather blurs the
boundary between such oppositions. He writes:
The life of the bandit, like that of the sacred man, is not a piece of animal nature
without a relation to law and the city. It is rather, a threshold of indistinction and of
passage between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and inclusion: the life
of the bandit is the life of the loup garou, the werewolf, who is precisely neither man
nor beast, and who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging to neither. (105)
The ban strips the outlaw of the status of subject, and dissolves the boundaries between
human and animal by narrowing the scope of the sovereign’s authority over the bandit to
the bare fact of his or her being alive. This special category of life, which Agamben terms
‘bare life,’ is produced performatively as part of the discursive construction of
sovereignty. The ban merges, to a point of indistinction, zoë, “the simple fact of living
common to all living beings,” and bios, “the form or way of living proper to an individual
or group” (1). However ‘bare life’ is not simply the sheer fact of living as we understand
it through zoë, a ‘being alive’ that humans share with all other plant and animal life. On
the contrary, the bare life of humans is something that has been performatively produced
by sovereignty; it is a political concept of life that belongs as much to bios as it does to
zoë. The ban’s proclamation “become a wolf” marks the very instant that constitutes the
political power of the sovereign, by suspending the law and including bare life in the
political realm. The sovereign dictum wargus esto inaugurates sovereignty, by
designating who is included and who is excluded, through the performative power of the
sovereign to decide, and through the indistinction between life and politics wrought by it.
The bare life of homo sacer is what's left of the performative production of sovereignty.
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As such, homo sacer is a remainder of the originary exclusion that constitutes the
political domain: “The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill
without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life—that is,
life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in this sphere”
(83). In this formulation, the sacredness of homo sacer is particular to the state of
exemption decided by the sovereign. It is a sacredness that is not consecrated, in which
the life of homo sacer is merely exposed to a death that is devoid of the meaning imbued
in a sacrificial death.
Agamben argues that western politics is constituted by including ‘bare life’ – the life of
homo sacer – through excluding it from the sovereign community: “bare life has the
peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men” (7). This tie
between law and bare life, Agamben argues, is the always present and always operative
presupposition of sovereignty (106). Thus Agamben’s biopolitics is a performative
concept that produces two outcomes: it transforms all humans into outlaws/werewolves
whose deaths hold no meaning; and it inaugurates the power of the sovereign.

Outlawry and Sovereignty
Agamben ties biopolitics to the concept of sovereignty, and more specifically, to the
sovereign exception, and thus to outlawry, through the writing of Schmitt, joining what
was for Foucault a matter of governmentality, with the sovereign exception. Although he
wants to disassociate himself from any political allegiance with Schmitt, Agamben
cannot help but stay critically, but uncomfortably, close to the Nazi jurist, because by
proposing an era of biopolitical exceptionalism, he leaves no room for an ‘outside to the
law’ that is not subordinated by sovereignty. This corrupts democratic societies’ claims
of liberty and justice: not because outlawry inevitably leads to fascism, but because it
does so when it is reduced to a tool in the hands of the state.
Defined by Jean Bodin as the “absolute and perpetual power in a commonwealth” (1), the
model of sovereignty that emerged during the Enlightenment was tied to outlawry, and
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this, rather than the archaic ban, is the understanding of sovereignty that informs Schmitt.
Bodin’s conceptualization of sovereignty was designed to unite a divided society as one
body under a single authority. It places the sovereign outside of, or above, the law, in a
formula that in different ways has come to structure both totalitarian and (so-called)
democratic regimes.
For Bodin, sovereignty is distinguished from other forms of rule by three key features:
the sovereign is not answerable to any higher authority (such as a Pope or emperor);
sovereign power is permanent rather than being held for a term that expires; and as the
one who makes the law, the sovereign is above the law. Each of these conditions is
likewise present in Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty, connecting the outlaw aspects of
Bodin’s concept of sovereignty to fascism. For Schmitt, the power of a sovereign who
decides on the exception is both indivisible and perpetual. But it is the third characteristic
that points most explicitly to the outlawry contained within sovereignty. Indeed, for
Schmitt, Bodin’s key contribution is his specification of the sovereign’s power to suspend
valid law (PT 9). Bodin writes:
[A] subject who is exempted from the force of the laws always remains in subjection
and obedience to those who have the sovereignty. But persons who are sovereign
must not be subject in any way to the commands of someone else and must be able to
give the law to subjects, and to suppress or repeal disadvantageous laws and replace
them with others – which cannot be done by someone who is subject to the laws or to
persons having power of command over him. This is why the law says that the prince
is not subject to the law; and in fact the very word “law” in Latin implies the
command of him who has the sovereignty. (11)
The law is thus constituted through its own suspension with respect to the sovereign, that
is, Schmitt’s ‘decision on the exception.’ Since the law must be suspended in its relation
to the sovereign, the sovereign is outside of the law. For Schmitt and Bodin this lends
sovereignty its power and perpetuality. Schmitt specifies that the exception is a
temporary suspension of the law in times of emergency, en route to a return to the normal
situation. What distinguishes the sovereign from other citizens, or a sovereign act from
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other political decisions, is this power to become an outlaw and to temporarily make
outlaws of all citizens by suspending their rights.
For Schmitt this is precisely what saves the law from the rupturing effects of competing
interests in liberal democracies; indeed, Schmitt totalizes sovereignty to such an extent
that it includes even what it excludes. What this means is that outlawry, which formerly
only founded and destroyed law, now serves the contradictory role of conserving the law.
Schmitt trades what he perceives as the compromising erasure of the political (as he
understands it through the friend/enemy antagonism) in liberal pluralism for the more
decisive ideological fanaticism and united stand of fascism. Through his affiliation with
the Nazi party (a decade after he wrote Political Theology) he was implicated in the very
Holocaust that for Agamben exemplifies biopolitical state atrocity. It is no wonder that
Agamben and Derrida, however much they may draw from Schmitt’s analysis of the state
of exception, seek an alternative direction, a route out of the ontotheological political
legacy that brought us from the revolutions of France and America to the Shoah.
Nonetheless, the Schmittian logic of the exception fascinates Agamben, as the norm of
modern politics. The state of exception is structured by an inclusive exclusion that takes
the form of a suspension of the law rather than a clearly defined inside and outside:
“[T]he most proper characteristic of the exception is that what is excluded in it is not, on
account of being excluded, absolutely without relation to the rule. On the contrary, what
is excluded in the exception maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule’s
suspension. The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing it”
(HS 17-18). Agamben points out that, according to its etymological root (ex-capere), an
exception suggests something that is not simply excluded, but rather taken outside (18).
Working in the theoretical space between Benjamin and Schmitt, in State of Exception
Agamben suggests that the force that is freed up when the law is suspended in the state of
exception is a “mystical element,” that references Derrida’s theory of law. He terms this
element a “force of law” that both the state and its adversaries try to appropriate (51):
[I]n extreme situations “force of law” floats as an indeterminate element that can be
claimed by both the state authority…and by a revolutionary organization…The state
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of exception is an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without
law (which should therefore be written: force of law). Such a force of law in which
potentiality and act are radically separated, is certainly something like a mystical
element, or rather a fictio by means of which law seeks to annex anomie itself. (SE
38-39)
The force of law exposes the law’s fiction by dividing the potential and the actual to
reveal how fragile this tie is. Agamben specifies that in Metaphysics Aristotle defined
potentiality as follows: “A thing is said to be potential if, when the act of which it is said
to be potential is realized, there will be nothing im-potential (that is there will be nothing
able not to be)” (HS 24-26). Potentiality thus contains both possibilities ‘to be’ and ‘not
to be.’ The actual occurs when what is potential sets aside its potential not to be (45-46).
The law is never fully actual, for it can never rid itself of the potential not to be, or the
potential to be something other; it can only suspend this potential. Thus force of law is a
deconstructive concept that floats, rather than finding semiotic grounding in an originary
signified. Yet in the final analysis, Agamben still leans toward Schmitt and not Derrida
(or Benjamin), for he finds that the force of law is particular to the state of exception
which has been declared by the sovereign. His emphasis lies on the state’s appropriation
of the force of law to occupy anomie; the fiction is the lie that provides the means for this
annexation.
Indeed, in the sovereign decision, the whole reason that what is “taken outside” of the
law is excluded is not to establish some area of existence that is outside of the law
(Benjamin’s aim), but rather to preserve the normal situation. What this means is that the
sovereign and the citizens are taken outside of the law by the sovereign decision in order
to preserve the very law that is suspended. Both the law and its outside are permeated
through and through with sovereign power, for the sovereign rule extends beyond the law
to the space of its exception. In other words, what is at stake is the capture of outlawry in
sovereignty, so that there is nothing that truly escapes from the totalizing reach of the
law.
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Yet Agamben points out that this logic is not as new as Schmitt makes it appear, since it
is the same logic that structures the archaic ban. By pronouncing the ban the sovereign is,
like the outlaw, simultaneously included and excluded from the juridical order, and is,
like the outlaw, a werewolf (15). With reference to Plato and Hobbes, Agamben argues
that the sovereign is a wolf at the heart of the city. Holding sovereign power and bare life
together, the structure of the ban thus blurs the distinction between nature and the state,
rather than instituting a boundary between them. This suggests that the originary
juridico-political relation is not a departure from nature, but instead is “always already
non-state and pseudo-nature” (109). This power to decide on the state of exception that
defines the sovereign (or for Hobbes, what appears as the right to punish) is not
something given to the sovereign by citizens as part of a social contract, but is instead
something left over from Nature, something that the subjects of the state have agreed to
lay down (106).31 “So in the person of the sovereign,” writes Agamben, “the werewolf,
the wolf man of man, dwells permanently in the city” (107). What the sovereign and the
outlaw have in common is this natural remainder, which imbues them with a force that
places them outside of subjection and subjectivity. The difficulty is that by naturalizing
the sovereign claim to outlawry by grounding it in the ban, Agamben makes it seem as if
totalitarianism were inevitable, however undesirable he finds it. We need to look beyond
Agamben if we are to find an alternative to a totalitarian style biopolitics.
For Agamben, the totalitarian implications of his argument that the state of exception has
become the norm are clear. Moreover the stakes of the re-emergence of the ban in
modern biopolitics are high: if the structure of biopolitics turns all humans into outlaws
and werewolves whose deaths hold no meaning, than the new world order is a dangerous
one indeed. Agamben defines totalitarianism as “the establishment, by means of the state
of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of
political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be
integrated into the political system” (2). Where Schmitt is concerned with the powers
with which the state of exception endows the sovereign, Agamben asks what becomes of
political subjects under this structure. His conclusion is that the exception, like the
ancient wolf ban, does not produce subjects, but instead it produces abject beings that are
stripped of the status of subject.
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By showing that the production of bare life was the originary activity of sovereign power
Agamben differs from Foucault, who saw biopolitics as distinctively modern. What is
new for Agamben is that where in the past, homo sacer was extraordinary, today the state
of exception is the norm, and all human life has been biopolitically stripped of its
meaning, becoming bare life. Where for Foucault this biopolitical blending permeates
modern politics, as “modern man is a living animal whose politics calls his existence as a
living being into question” (HoS 43), Agamben argues, “the production of a biopolitical
body is the original activity of sovereign power” (HS 6). He proposes that bare life
constitutes the new “biopolitical body of humanity” (9), which is to say that in modernity,
the sacred man replaces the subject in its relation to sovereignty. Everybody is homo
sacer, a person whose rights have been suspended in light of the ongoing emergency that
defines the modern condition.
Thus, for Agamben, in modernity there is no biopolitical distinction between accident
victims on a holiday weekend, and the victims of the Shoah – both are merely bare life
exposed to violence (HS 114). There can be no sacrifice, because the sovereign exception
produces a space of disarticulation, in which no act under or against sovereignty can have
any significance, since sovereignty itself operates as a zone of indistinction between
nomos and anomy. To qualify as sacrifice, an action would necessarily entail a revolt
against sovereignty in its very demand for significance. Agamben’s primary examples of
the modern homo sacer, concentration camp inmates and comatose persons, exemplify
the uncanniness and horror of the modern predicament, since these figures of bare life
could be more aptly termed “barely alive,” and the new biopolitical world order is thus
characterized via the double metaphor of a holocaust and a hospital ward in which the
state’s role is to administer life and death. This realizes what Benjamin warned against in
“Critique of Violence”: a pernicious rendering of the sacredness of life that reduces
human beings to bare life. As Benjamin writes: “[W]ith mere life the rule of law over the
living ceases” (297). It is on this basis that Agamben nominates homo sacer, an obscure
figure in archaic Roman law, as the object of biopolitical sovereignty.
Yet I am no more convinced that everyone today is an outlaw with the same degree of
vulnerability and exposure to death, than I am that totalitarianism is inevitable. Indeed,
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we must ask who is most likely to be injured or killed by state violence and non-state
violence, workplace injury, environmental disaster, war etc., and for what categories of
person such death would constitute a tragedy in the (western) political consciousness. As
Judith Butler makes clear in Precarious Life, in an era in which violence has become
globalized, some human lives are treated as if they count more, or as if they are more
“real” than other lives; some lives are perceived as more grievable, and others as if they
did not count at all (33-34).
On the other hand, Agamben’s point that the general logic of the exception has come to
permeate the political realm more and more thoroughly does demand consideration. This
is the result of the normalization of the sovereign exception over the past century.
Agamben argues that “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency … has
become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called
democratic ones” (SE 2). The state of exception has subtly become the norm as a result of
a gradual transformation of the structure of western democracies from parliamentary to
executive.32 While much of this transformation has gone unnoticed by the general public,
it is visible in security measures that have become a norm in western countries in
response to international terrorism. These new security measures perpetuate a continual
state of exception since rather than instituting laws to deal with the crisis – laws of war,
for example – modern states tend to suspend the juridical order itself (4). Agamben points
to the US Military Commissions Act which denies habeas corpus to those suspected of
terrorist activities, and the detainee prison at Guantanamo Bay operated under the Bush
Administration. These are examples in which democratic governments deny individuals
basic rights that are guaranteed by international law, and prohibit their legal status as
individuals.
What this signifies for Agamben is that the subordination of bare life to sovereignty
means that sovereignty has fallen into a catastrophic disorder, and this is where his
argument begins to reflect Benjamin’s perspective. Agamben argues that Benjamin’s
eighth thesis on the philosophy of history – that the state of emergency is the rule − is
decisive for understanding modern sovereignty.33 This thesis collapses the Schmittian
theory of the state of exception by dissolving the distinction between exception and rule,
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leaving sovereignty with nothing but pure, extra-juridical violence. This is the
sovereignty that holds bare life as its object, a sovereignty that is itself stripped bare to its
anomic foundation. Like Benjamin, Agamben seeks to free both life and violence from
Schmitt’s onto-theological politics, in which sovereignty is posed as an absolute and
indivisible power and the sovereign, though not actually divine, is posed as analogous to
a god. What we need, Agamben suggests, is a complete re-thinking of the political,
because what was purportedly a temporary suspension of the normal situation has instead
resulted in its extinction. An ontotheological politics that grants a godlike absolute and
indivisible authority to a political power is no longer possible in a political terrain
constituted by the administration of life itself.
Where for Schmitt sovereignty is a borderline concept that manages the distinction
between a normal and an abnormal situation, for Agamben it is a concept that erases
borders, especially the one that marks the limit between exception and rule. Yet however
penetrating Agamben’s insights about the modern state of exception may be, in the final
analysis it is Schmitt and not Benjamin that for Agamben decides the state of modern
politics, although not without a certain degree of despair. When Benjamin argues that the
state of emergency is the rule, his point is that from the perspective of the oppressed it
has always been so, and that we must not accept the tendency to normalize or naturalize
fascism, but must instead liberate revolutionary violence from the totalizing tendencies of
the law. From the point of view of outlawry, the problem that Agamben diagnoses is a
Schmittian problem: biopolitics is totalitarianism; it is the total capture of outlawry – that
is, both natural violence and life itself – in sovereignty. Benjamin suggests that outlawry
of a different sort, a disruptive, anarchic outlawry, is the cure. There is another face to
biopolitics that Agamben missed. When we deconstruct biopolitics as a play of outlawry
between the sphere of the sovereign and the bare life of its subjects, a critical stance
emerges in which our existence as living beings calls our politics into question. Such a
demand is nothing new, but its urgency reaches an extreme in modernity, as the
continued existence of all life is now at stake in our politics.
In this alternative biopolitics sovereignty may become as vulnerable as homo sacer. As
the outlaw is exposed to sovereign violence, the nomos of sovereignty is also stripped
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bare; subjectivity and sovereignty unravel together. In the ban, it is on the basis of this
dual rupture in subjectivity and sovereignty that the outlaw is exiled, rather than simply
punished. The outlaw is rendered unintelligible through a relation to the law marked by
the law’s relation to him or her not as a political subject but as bare life, rendered
vulnerable to be killed without meaning. If sovereignty operates in a mutually
constituting relation with subjectivity, the collapse of this reification not only reduces the
subject to bare life, it precludes the constitution of sovereignty as a legible construct.
Bare life is the only aspect of the outlaw that the law can grasp, since both operate in a
relation with each other that is absent of signification. The legitimacy and nomos of the
law has been exposed, so that the law’s relation to the bandit is anomic. State violence, in
this sense, is sheer violence, and like a hurricane or earthquake, its power to kill the
outlaw contains no meaning. This is the manner in which the life of homo sacer is
designated as insignificant and ungrievable. It is not because this life (or death) in fact
has no meaning, but that it does not have significance in the terms of a law that is itself
incomprehensible because it has been suspended. The injustice of killing such
desubjectified individuals is not absent, but it has been rendered impossible to signify.34
In this space the law and the individual that is held in relation to it are stripped of
intelligibility; they cannot grasp each other. This is why the bare life of homo sacer, is,
for Agamben, indistinguishable from the law. Unqualified, bare life is sheer life, the
politically produced fact of being alive, and the law is reduced to the mere fact of
violence.
Sovereignty is thus itself rendered unintelligible by the very gesture that produces its
intelligibility. When the law takes up a relation to the individual as bare life rather than
subject, when that non-subject is rendered unintelligible and unrepresentable, the law
itself becomes unintelligible. The violence does not constitute a political act, nor a
juridical one because it is based on a denial of the victim’s political and legal status, and
thus is distinct from an assassination or execution, which are based on the subject’s
political or legal significance. The condition of possibility for the nomos of sovereignty,
its law and power to name and to produce subjects, is the anomic space where the law
does not apply. From the perspective of an historic outlaw whose relation to the law
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centers on the law’s nonapplicability, the law appears merely as a force that kills. Its
powers to name, to produce the agency and identity that the subject enjoys, are unrealized. As the figure who inhabits this anomic space, the outlaw captured in the wolf
ban thus reveals the undecidability of a biopolitics that includes two opposite and
simultaneous actions. For rather than simply being an animal whose politics calls his
existence as a living being into question, the werewolf bandit is an animal whose very
existence as a living being calls the law into question.

Deconstructing Biopolitics
In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida turns a deconstructive gaze on biopolitics. The
aim of Derrida’s investigation of “man as a ‘political animal’” is this: “We had above all
to explore the ‘logics’ organizing both the submission of the beast (and the living being)
to political sovereignty, and an irresistible and overloaded analogy between a beast and a
sovereign supposed to share a space of some exteriority with respect to ‘law’ and ‘right’
(outside the law: above the law: origin and foundation of the law)” (BS xiii). Yet
however similar this may seem to Agamben’s project, in this approach some of the key
claims of biopolitics begin to fall apart. For instance, the distinction that Agamben makes
between biological life (zoë) and political life (bios), a distinction on which his entire
argument depends, does not hold. Derrida argues that politics and life were seen as
interrelated and not opposed in early Christian concepts about the founding moment of
the Divine arche-performative. He cites the Gospel of John: “the logos was in the
beginning with God …everything existed through it [through the logos] and nothing that
existed existed without it. In it [the logos] was life (Zoë) and life was the light (phos) of
men” (BS 313). Through the founding powers of logos, God, the sovereign, creates life,
life that is always already held in relation to sovereignty. Derrida corrects Agamben with
regard to Aristotle as well. For while Aristotle makes some distinction between the
simple life that is common to all living beings (zoë), and qualified, or political life (bios
politikon), the distinction is not absolute as Agamben claims. Not only are there
exceptions, such as the noble and eternal life of God specified in Metaphysics, Derrida
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also notes that Aristotle’s very definition of man as a political animal, or pointedly “man
who is by nature (physei) a political animal (politikon zoon),” merges natural life with
politics (BS 315).
Neither does the biopolitical distinction between sovereignty and governmentality hold in
Derrida’s consideration. Foucault and Agamben specify that biopolitics involves the
animalization of man, his reduction to bare life, and exposure to death. Biopolitics
represents the transformation from sovereignty (for Foucault, “power over life and
death”) to governmentality (“the administration of life”) that transforms citizens from
subjects to mere living beings that must be organized around the norm. In Agamben’s
revision of biopolitics, sovereignty and governmentality instead become merged in
modernity. However, for Derrida, bestialization (la bête) is associated with the status the
sovereign shares with animals outside of the law.
The association of sovereignty, animality and outlawry has three implications that are of
concern here: first of all, governmentality is nothing more than a mode of sovereignty;
consequentially the power to initiate the animalization of man is nothing new. Recall, for
instance, the sovereign power expressed in the wolf ban, or the exclusions operating in
slavery, patriarchy and colonization. Secondly, revolution serves as nothing more than a
transfer of power, if the revolution does not include a “poetic revolution,” that is, the
transformation of political concepts such as sovereignty (290). In other words, the
difference between sovereignty as it operates in a democracy (in its current form), and the
absolute sovereignty of fascism, is not as great as would appear, because in practice they
operate according to the same logic. Finally, sovereignty is indissociably tied not only to
outlawry (and the production of bare life), but also to liberty (and the interpellation of
subjects). Derrida writes: “our most accredited concept of ‘liberty,’ autonomy, selfdetermination, emancipation, freeing, is indissociable from this concept of sovereignty,
its limitless ‘I can,’ and thus from its all-powerfulness, this concept to the prudent,
patient, laborious deconstruction of which we are here applying ourselves” (301). This is
not to say, simply, that outlawry equals sovereignty equals freedom, any more that we
might say sovereignty opposes outlaws, and thus opposes freedom. Our concepts suffer
from a “double-bind” in which sovereignty is not indivisible and liberty is not
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unconditional: which is to say, they are each deconstructable, a deconstructability that I
tie to outlawry, which is the very force that thinkers from Hobbes to Schmitt have
attached to sovereignty’s absoluteness and indivisibility (although in different terms).

Derrida and the Beast
What for Agamben is an exceptional situation that is produced by sovereignty, that is, the
overlapping of bios and zoë, is always already an aspect of human politics according to
Derrida, who deconstructs the “oppositional limits commonly accredited between nature
and culture, nature/law, physis/nomos, God, man and animal” (LBLS 444). For Derrida,
not only is there a kind of beastliness to human politics, animals are political; they have
their own social organizations, laws, and even, in the case of some primates, prohibitions
against incest (444). In addition, with reference to Aristotle, Derrida argues that the polis
is itself a “part of the nature of things” so that “man’s political life is natural” (452).
Moreover he asserts that while man as a political being mediates between what are said to
be two unpolitical poles – that of beasts and gods – the politician draws a little from both
of these extremes. Referencing Rousseau’s Social Contract, Derrida describes human
politics as “theo-zoological.” Man is “evanescent,” a “hyphen between god and beast”
(442). Long before modernity, political man disappeared in an undecidable space
between god and beast. For, as Rousseau writes, Grotius described humans as herds of
cattle who were protected by shepherds only to be devoured by them.35 In a similar vein,
he cites Caligula, for whom kings were the shepherds of men, so that either Kings were
gods, or people were animals.36
That essential feature of sovereignty proposed by Schmitt – the power to make and to
suspend the law – imbues human politics, not only with onto-theology, as Schmitt
argued, but also with ontozoology.37 The power to decide places the sovereign above the
law, which means the sovereign is characterized by a kind of lawlessness. As a result, this
human being is granted the omnipotence of a god over other humans, but also rendered a
brutal beast that despises and flaunts the law (445). It is in this undecidable space
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between god and beast, the space where man appears only to disappear, that outlawry
reigns. Derrida writes:
…between the sovereign, the criminal and the animal there is a kind of obscure and
fascinating complicity, even a disturbing mutual attraction, a disturbing familiarity,
an unheimlich, uncanny reciprocal obsession. Both, all three, the animal, the criminal
and the sovereign, are outside of the law, or, variably, above the law; the criminal, the
animal and the sovereign curiously resemble each other, although they appear to be
located in diametric opposition, in diametric opposition to each other. […il y a entre
le souverain, le criminel et la bête une sorte d’obscure et fascinante complicité, voire
une inquiétante attraction mutuelle, une inquiétante familiarité, une unheimlich,
uncanny hantise réciproque. Tous deux, tous trois, l’animal, le criminel et le
souverain, sont hors la loi, a l’écart ou au-dessus des lois ; le criminel, la bête et le
souverain se ressemblent étrangement alors qu’ils paraissent se situer aux antipodes,
aux antipodes l’un de l’autre.] (LBLS444)
This resemblance between sovereign, outlaw and beast also has relevance in terms of
Derrida’s distinction between the concept of the rogue state and the French equivalent,
l’etat voyou. The English term, in its common use, refers not just to human vagabonds
and thieves, but also to outlaw plants and animals. It suggests a departure from
community, an isolated or individualistic flaunting of social norms and laws. A mutated
plant is said to be ‘rogue’ as is a vicious and uncontrolled animal that lives apart from its
herd. In “La bête et le souverain” Derrida writes: “The ‘rogue,’ whether elephant, tiger,
lion, or hippopotamus (and more generally carnivorous animals), is an individual who, by
its wild or wayward behavior, does not respect the law of its congeners, the animal
community, the pack, the horde, it has already left, or is leaving the society to which it
belongs” [Le « rogue », qu’il s’agisse de l’éléphant, du tigre, du lion, de l’hippopotame
(et plus généralement des animaux carnivores), c’est l’individu qui ne respect même pas
la loi de la communauté animale, de la meute, de la horde, de ses congénères, Par son
comportement sauvage ou indocile, il se tient ou il va à l’écart de la société à laquelle il
appartient] (446). The non-human rogue infects the concept of rogue states with a
suggestion of Nature and of beastliness, which Derrida emphasizes in both Rogues and
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the Irvine seminar. At the most basic level, the states nominated as rogue by the US, as in
the case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, carry the taint of wildness: “Saddam Hussein was
himself sometimes called … the ‘Beast of Bagdad,’ after having been, like Noriega, a
long standing ally and valuable economic partner. The beast is not simply an animal but
the very incarnation of evil, of the satanic, the diabolical, the demonic—a beast of the
Apocalypse” (Rogues 97).
It is not a secret that Hussein was no innocent lamb, even if he was not guilty of the
particular crimes of which he was accused.38 Yet there is something fabulous in this
appellation, which is an example of a wolf that masquerades as a lamb, accusing a wolf
of being a wolf. There is an echo of Hobbes here: “Man is a wolf to man.” Thus in the
appellation ‘rogue states’ is hidden a theme that is made explicit in the seminar on
sovereignty and beasts—both nature and fabulation have crept stealthily in. This crossgermination is addressed in Derrida’s attention to the pun “à pas de loup,” which means
both “with the step of the wolf” and “without a wolf.” The phrase implies a secretive
intrusion, “to be caught by surprise, a surprising understanding” (LBLS 434). Yet at the
same time it cancels out the presence of the wolf, which has a phantasmic or mythic
quality. Sovereignty, he suggests, is haunted by beastliness in its very concept. The
reference to beastliness evokes the natural force of sovereign violence, on the one hand,
but also something of the artifice of the supplement, of the beast myth, of story and of
falsehood. We must not forget that for Derrida there is no sharp and simple limit between
humans and animals, as he elaborates in “The animal that therefore I am (more to
follow).”39 Moreover bestiality (bêtise), itself distinct from animality, is a particularly
human characteristic, for only humans are asinine, and indeed, stupid (bête) enough to
use an appellation such as rogue when guilty of being rogues themselves.40
Like other idioms, from “howl with the wolves” to “the big bad wolf,” Derrida asserts,
the phrase à pas de loupe is figurative, culturally specific, and like sovereignty itself,
trapped by the “thorny problem of borders” which are of no consequence to ‘real’ wolves
(435).41 Indeed, real wolves are nothing like the ferocious and devouring beast implied in
the fables and analogies that relate wolves to sovereignty, but are in reality nurturing and
community-oriented animals.42 This, in a sense, excludes real wolves from sovereignty,

111

even as it includes the metaphorical wolf. But the real wolf, or the natural violence that it
signifies, is nonetheless there. The wolf that is not there enters, unseen and unheard, like
a burglar. Its very lack is its power: “The strength of the wolf is stronger and all the more
sovereign because the wolf is not there” (437). Like the wolf of the idiom “à pas de
loup,” ontotheological sovereignty derives its power from fabulation, from seeming to be
what it is not, from not being what it seems to be. And it derives its power from force, the
natural force of the wolf, the devourer.
For Derrida the resemblance between sovereign and beast involves doubling upon
doubling – it is uncanny because, like a magician’s trick, just when you think you see
what is before you it transforms into something else. Derrida compares the
superimposition to those vertiginous picture games where one image turns into another
when you unfocus your gaze. In one instant it is the image of a sovereign with the face of
a wolf. In the next, it is the reflection of the figure of the sovereign in the mouth of the
wild beast. The beast is sovereign and the sovereign is beastly. Derrida plays with a
continual slippage between the two; they are host and guest to each other, captor and
hostage (446). The figures devour each other. “The beast is devouring and the man
devours the animal” (450). But this does not signify, for Derrida, merely the violent
power of sovereignty, for the organs that tear, chew and swallow are also the topos of the
utterance, the cry, “the place of bringing voice.” The doubling thus blurs the very limit
between physis and nomos, the natural and the artificial, violence and language, the beast
and the animal, animals and our ideas about animals.
This signifies an important distinction between Agamben’s and Derrida’s arguments,
despite their similar association of outlaw, beast and sovereign. Where Agamben writes
of blurring borders and zones of indistinction, he is very clear about the limit between
nature and culture. Nature is the wilderness, the chaotic, the disorderly, the non-human,
and physis. Culture is the city, the polis, and nomos. It is the blurring of the borders that
is for Agamben artificial – an artifice miraculously produced by exceptionality and
mediated by sovereignty. In the normal situation, for which there is an implicit desire to
return, the borders between sovereign, subject, outlaw and beast are clearly drawn. For
Derrida, the beast is always already a fiction as well as a natural fact, as is the sovereign,
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represented in the figure of Hobbes’ Leviathan. Hobbes lingers just below the surface in
these discussions of sovereignty and outlawry, and was a key influence for Schmitt,
Agamben, and Derrida alike in their work on sovereignty.43 For Derrida, the
undecidability Hobbe’s proposes in Leviathan between the natural and the artificial, and
between man, god and the beast was particularly notable. As Derrida argues, the
association of sovereignty with the beast involves a tricky affiliation that not only marries
reason and force, but marries sovereignty to artifice as well.
In the Leviathan, Hobbes establishes the fallibility and finitude of sovereign power, “that
mortal god” and also the sovereign’s divinity, for as well as being absolute and
indivisible, sovereignty is in another sense immortal as power is passed from one
sovereign to another. The metaphor combines human, divine, animal and machine to
suggest that the state is at once natural, a copy of nature, and a prosthesis that institutes
an artificial order on a natural chaos. For Hobbes, the distinction between nature and
artifice is blurred from the outset – for nature is the art of God, and human artifice, of
which the state is an example, mimics God’s art. The state is a machine-like fabrication,
an “artificial animal” and sovereignty is its “artificial soul.” Sovereignty is the life of the
civil machine, its death is civil war. But what happens to sovereignty when the nature of
war changes? Derrida asks: “What is a war today, which recognizes the difference
between a civil war and a war in general? What is the difference between a civil war as
‘partisan war’ … and an interstate war? What is the difference between war and
terrorism? Between domestic terrorism and international terrorism?” (455).
Terror shares with sovereignty a structure that combines the virtual and the actual, fact
and fiction. Whether state or anti-state, Derrida argues, terror is the effective deployment
of virtual fear. And this fear, with its real political effect in the world is, in Hobbesian
fashion, “the spring of politics.” This, in the final analysis, is the core of Derrida’s
critique of enlightenment sovereignty, and what he finds roguish, beastly and criminal
about it. Terror, the reign of terror, is at the root of the liberal and humanist politics of the
Enlightenment, and is both the cause and the effect of sovereignty and of subjection
(461). Fear or panic motivates the union of civil society, the organization of citizens into
a state, and their obedience to the sovereign who protects them – the trade-off proposed

113

by Hobbes of which Schmitt was so fond.44 Sovereignty, that cyborg-wolf, is a terrormachine, precisely because it territorializes both law and outlawry and because it is
derived from both zootheology and ontotheology, wielding the righteous authority of the
gods, the violence of the wild beast, and the fabulation of the mythology that binds them.
For both the beast and the gods are, like the sovereign, outside of the law.

Deconstructing Sovereignty
The exclusion from the law that makes sovereignty all-powerful masks a secret
vulnerability. This grain of outlawry at the heart of sovereignty is an imperceptible
fissure that weakens the entire concept, even as it makes it possible. As Derrida argues in
Rogues, there is no pure sovereignty, because sovereignty “is always in the process of
positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or disavowing itself; it is always in the
process of autoimmunizing itself” (101). Autoimmunity has particular relevance in a
deconstruction of biopolitics, since, in a political sphere fixated on life itself,
autoimmunity is a process by which life opposes life. The term is borrowed from
biological sciences; it describes the semi-suicidal process of organisms that turn against
themselves, for instance when an organism, failing to recognize its various parts as
aspects of a cohesive self has an immune response to its own cells and tissues. In his
gloss of Derrida’s deployment of the concept, Michael Naas compares autoimmunity to
the death drive: “With ‘autoimmunity,’ deconstruction has to be thought as that which
happens, like a certain death-drive, to ‘life’ itself” (18).
Sovereignty, in other words, undoes itself in its very effort to present itself. If
sovereignty is indivisible, as Bodin and Schmitt contend, then it either ‘is,’ or it ‘is not’;
it cannot be shared, distributed, deferred, or justified. It begins to defeat itself the instant
it opens itself up to the counter-sovereignty of the other (Naas 21). Derrida is even more
explicit concerning this contradiction in the essence of sovereignty in “La Bête et le
Souverain,” where, with reference to Hobbes’ contention that politics is driven by fear, he
proposes that sovereignty presents itself as perpetual expressly because of its fragility: “It
[Sovereignty] is posed as immortal and indivisible precisely because it is mortal and
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divisible, and the contract or agreement is intended to ensure what it naturally is not, or
does not have” [“Elle [souveraineté] est posée comme immortelle et indivisible
précisément parce qu’elle est mortelle, et divisible, le contrat ou la convention étant
destine à lui assurer ce qu’elle n’a pas ou n’est pas naturellement"] (463). In a sense,
then, sovereignty is made both possible and impossible by the outlawry that founds and
then destroys as an autoimmune response to itself. In the biopolitical body politic, it
must defend itself against what is external to it (counter-sovereign others, outlawry), and
its own constituent parts (the ipseity of its subjects) which sovereignty must reduce to
bare life if it is to sustain itself.

Rogue Sovereignty
In Rogues Derrida brings the concept of autoimmunity to bear on the political sphere,
addressing the deconstructive relation between sovereignty and outlawry as he considers
the Enlightenment legacy of reason in relation to democracy and contemporary global
politics. With reference to a world order where the state is no longer what is at stake in
the war or terrorism, he questions sovereignty’s central place in ‘the political,’ suggesting
that sovereignty has, through various turns and transformations, finally undone itself. He
equates the terms ‘rogue,’ and ‘state’ suggesting an over determination that
simultaneously overflows and empties the political of its contents (106). What Derrida
announces is as much a disordering of the political as a new political order. What is at
stake is the collapse of the concept of sovereignty into outlawry, a term I use with an
inflection of the undecidable, of différance, of the pharmakon, of what Derrida refers to
in Limited Inc. as “wolves” in the “manger of speech acts” (175). Sovereignty, it turns
out, is just such a wolf.
The Bush Administration coined the term “rogue state” to refer to states that were
outlaws with respect to international law. Derrida writes that a rogue state is “a state that
respects neither its obligations as a state before the law of the world community nor the
requirements of international law, a state that flouts the law and scoffs at the
constitutional state or state of law [état de droit]” (xiii). The irony, as Derrida points out,
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is that America is itself the principal outlaw: “The first and most violent of rogue states
are those that have ignored and continue to violate the very international law they claim
to champion, the law in whose name they speak and in whose name they go to war
against so-called rogue states each time their interests so dictate. The name of these
states? The United States” (96). While Derrida is putting forward a decisive criticism of
American foreign policy in the past few decades, his argument goes well beyond
accusations with regard to which states are or are not rogue, for he contends that
roguishness signifies an aporia in the very structure of sovereignty: “There are … only
rogue states. Potentially or actually. The state is voyou, a rogue, roguish” (102).
Sovereignty is, by definition, roguish, in part because of its dependence on violence to
obtain and maintain its legitimacy, and because sovereign power depends on the
suspension of the very law that it names and enforces. The violence of sovereignty,
recalling Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” is illegitimate at the site of
constituting power, so that, as Derrida cautions: “Abuse of power is constitutive of
sovereignty itself” (102).
This anomaly at the heart of sovereignty makes sovereignty a rogue, and imbues
sovereignty with what it strives to banish (outlawry), culminating today in the decline of
the era of sovereignty. The political concepts that tied together the state, sovereignty and
democracy since the Enlightenment are no longer adequate in the context of late modern
global and technological realities. This is the second strand of Derrida’s critique of
sovereignty in Rogues – the demise of sovereignty, making way for a post-sovereign
concept of the political: “There are thus no longer anything but rogue states, and there are
no longer any rogue states” (106). As Naas asserts, Derrida is calling for an
“unconditional renunciation of sovereignty” (18), making way for a new order of the
political.
Derrida’s approach reverses what Agamben proposes. Where for Agamben,
totalitarianism is catastrophically inevitable, for Derrida it is the demise of sovereignty
that is inevitable, because in a decision sovereignty not only asserts itself, it cancels itself
out as a function of its autoimmunity. Following Schmitt, Agamben argues that the
decision represents the ipseity of the sovereign because it departs from the norm. Schmitt
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writes, “The decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the word. Because
a general norm, as represented by an ordinary legal prescription, can never encompass a
total exception, the decision that a real exception exists cannot therefore be entirely
derived from the content of a norm” (PT 6). However, as Derrida elaborates in
“Deconstructions: The Im-possible,” the concept of the passive decision counters
Schmittian decisionism because the absolute self-sovereignty of the decision-maker is not
possible. A decision, although distinct from a norm, always occurs in relation to the
other. A decision, as Derrida explains, “must interrupt, cut, rend a continuity, the fabric
or the ordinary course of history” (27). There must be something new in a free and
responsible decision; it must do something more than simply redeploy an already present
truth, power, or force. Derrida writes: “I cannot decide except when this decision does
more and other than manifest my possibilities, my power, my capacity-to-be, the
predicates that define me” (27). To derive something new, something that exceeds the
constraints and possibilities present in the subject who decides, a certain openness to the
other is necessary: the newness of the decision, its difference from the norm, must come
from outside. This responsibility, this openness to the other describes the paradox of what
Derrida terms the “passive decision.” “This is the sole condition of possibility of a
decision worth its name,” he writes, “if ever there were such a thing: a strangely passive
decision that does not in the least exonerate me of responsibility. Quite the opposite”
(27). The passive decision not only implies the in-operation of the rule, law or norm, it
also divides the authority of the decision maker, for the decision is received from the
other.
Thus where Agamben and Schmitt argue that the decision manifests sovereignty’s
indivisible power and capacity to be by suspending the rule, the sovereign does not, in
Derrida’s estimation, really own that decision, but on the contrary shares it with the
Other. If he were really master of the situation, there would be no call for a decision;
there would be no exception. Decisions are called into being only in circumstances of
uncertainty, which thus become the ground of a sovereignty that more and more strongly
has the appearance of a masquerade; uncertainty in the guise of certainty, and divisibility
in the guise of indivisibility.
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The new order of the political is an unmasking: it heralds an anti-sovereign politics that
takes the form of a certain uncertainty and a divisible indivisibility. Derrida frames this
new emergence as a manifestation of the wholly other: “To be sure, nothing is less sure
than a god without sovereignty; nothing is less sure than his coming, to be sure” (114).
What order of the political are we waiting for, what naked God, what certain uncertainty?
This newness seems to be what we have been waiting for since the dawn of the
Enlightenment, that golden promise that appears alongside modern sovereignty; that
promise which demands a certain order of decision-making in the realm of a countersovereign responsibility to the other. The name of this revelation? Democracy. Or, more
precisely, as Derrida has termed it, la démocratie à venir, the democracy to come.

Rogue Sovereignty and Democracy
The absolute and indivisible sovereignty of Bodin and Schmitt, that impossible
sovereignty that is made and undone by outlawry, makes the most sense in nondemocratic states with a single ruler, since sovereignty cannot be shared. Indeed, this is
how both authors saw the sovereign state. Yet the same concept of sovereignty is at play
in democratic states, where sovereignty is a manifestation of the will of the people, and
must by definition be shared. Democracy, it would seem, comes with a certain demand
for consensus, or indivisibility; the people must act as one body. Yet democracy, no less
than sovereignty, holds court with a certain outlawry, in more than one sense. For on the
one hand, democracy legitimizes the roguishness of sovereignty, which guarantees its
own autoimmunity. On the other, outlawry’s role in democracy is less a contradiction that
weakens the political concept and more a necessary element of its promise, its openness
and movement toward something new.
In Rogues Derrida sets out a critique of the liberal democracy that emerged during the
enlightenment and that typifies the structure of many western states today. Although
purportedly representative of the power of the people, intended ideally to protect against
the tyranny of the monarchy and noble classes, and to guarantee such Aufklärung
principles as liberty, equality, and fraternity, Derrida argues that democracy is instead
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merely a supplement that legitimizes sovereignty’s force in the Enlightenment project.
Rogues is prefaced with La Fontaine’s fable, Le loup et l’agneau, which forwards a
critique of justice and reason as a charade of force. The fable points to a confusion
between might and right: “The strongest are always the best at proving they are right,
Witness the case we are now going to cite.”45 In the fable, a wolf goes through the farce
of a trial before devouring a lamb, pointing to a perilous conflation of reason and force.
As Srinivas Aravamudan frames it in “Subjects/ Sovereigns/Rogues,” the moral of the
story seems to be “the world is one in which wolves generally have their way over
lambs” (459). The wolf represents a sovereign power that is above the law; he is referred
to by the Lamb throughout as “sire” and “Your Majesty.” Moreover, the wolf
supplements his natural violence towards lambs with a trial; he is a lawmaker, “creating
new norms with every utterance” (458), but he is himself unrestrained by law. To be sure,
the wolf’s rationale to defeat the lamb’s arguments and alibis is spurious and selflegitimizing; his justice lies not in the fact that he is right but in the fact that he possesses
the force to actualize his rule. The trial is a sham, rationalizing the wolf’s power and
inclination to devour the lamb.
The roguishness of the sovereign wolf is at the crux of Derrida’s critique. Sovereignty, as
a project of the Enlightenment, is at heart hypocritical. It makes a mockery of its own
claims to justice by relying on outlawry to claim its legitimacy, and depends on a beastly
and self-serving violence to defend that claim. The sovereign, who is the biggest outlaw
of all, treats the innocent as criminals. Aravamudan puts it this way: “Derrida’s
reflections suggest that the Enlightenment is a prime instance of the fabulation of
‘roguery.’ Paradoxically, the project of sovereignty that is the Enlightenment sought
doggedly to domesticate and sideline rogues, even while it proved itself to be the biggest
rogue of all” (458). The wolf is both a sovereign and an outlaw, but he hides his
illegitimacy behind the supplement of a fabulated justice. We might read La Fontaine’s
fable as an implicit critique of monarchy and the aristocracy: the nobility are wolves who
baffle the innocent masses with their rhetoric and exploit them through deception and
force. However, in Rogues the violence of sovereignty is framed in the context of
democratic forms of governance. It is western democracy, not monarchies or totalitarian
regimes, that primarily concerns Derrida as rogue states. Western democracies, he
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suggests, have become outlaws that transgress not only international laws, but their own
laws, in ways that contradict the very principles of democracy. Democratic sovereignty is
structured by an aporia: sovereignty depends on its indivisibility, absolute authority, and
cooption of the outside of the law, all of which are rationalized and enforced by violence;
democracy depends on the multiplicity of its members (the will of the people) and their
right to sovereignty (to be outside of the law). Yet who precisely are ‘the people’ in all of
their heterogeneity? Indeed, can we say they are heterogeneous, when they are united by
a common will? Who does the government in actuality represent? What of those who
dissent, or fall outside of the norm? How does outlawry operate in democracy in the
present? Are outlaws excluded or included? Is their disruption contained, or does it alter
the social and political realms?
Derrida’s claim that democracies are self-contradictory in relation to outlaws signals
aporia in modern struggles for justice. Democratic sovereignty both includes and
excludes outlaws. As Derrida writes:
democracy has always wanted by turns and at the same time two incompatible things:
it has wanted, on the one hand, to welcome only men, and on the condition that they
be citizens, brothers, and compeers [semblables], excluding all the others, in
particular bad citizens, rogues, noncitizens, and all sorts of unlike and unrecognizable
others, and on the other hand, at the same time or by turns, it has wanted to open itself
up, to offer hospitality, to all those excluded. (63)
The hospitality of democracy is limited and conditional: it embraces and then rejects its
others. This is the autoimmunity of democracy, it is what ruins it when it tries to assert
itself: democracy protects itself from internal and external threats by suspending
democracy itself. Because it excludes its other, democracy is always deferred. The
implication of this autoimmunity is that today’s so-called democracies are not really
democratic. This is part of what Derrida finds so roguish in the grand narrative of the
Enlightenment: the colonization of both outlawry and democracy by sovereignty. As it
turns out, the revolution might well produce a new sovereignty, but the winners will
always turn out to be wolves in the long run. Democracy is an end to which one never
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arrives. Like justice, democracy is always “to-come” (à venir), its existence at once
promised and deferred (86). The question is, what is a ‘real’ democracy in this case, what
is the role of outlawry in it, and how do we achieve it, presuming it is even desirable to
do so?

Voyoucracy, the Power of Rogues
We might start by reconsidering the relationship that democracy has to outlawry in its
deconstructive sense. Derrida’s discussion of the translation of rogue as voyou and roué
suggests a different kind of connection between democracy and outlawry, one that holds
some promise for a more ethical future. While none of the terms are precisely
synonymous with outlaw (hors la loi), rogues, voyous and roués are all outlaws of sorts.
All three terms refer broadly to unscrupulous and dishonest persons, vagrants or tramps,
although each term has a slightly different meaning. Voyou is derived etymologically
from ‘path’ or ‘track’ (voie is road, path or way) and suggests a denigrating association
with the streets, with the common folk, and with the other. In Parisian slang, voyou refers
to a ‘child of the people.’ Derrida describes this connection as follows: “The word not
only has a popular origin and use but is intended to designate someone who, by social
pedigree or by manners, belongs to what is most common or popular in the people” (R
64). Derrida associates the roué, which he describes as a kind of voyou, with “debauchery
and adversity, to the subversive disrespect for principles, norms, and good manners, for
the rules and laws that govern the circle of decent, self-respecting people” (20). It is
striking that the association of the roué with seduction and leading others astray
[dévoiement] and not merely the person’s own debauchery is what calls for exclusion or
punishment (20). A roué gathers together, transforming the renegade few to a more
threatening many, not merely rejecting, but disrupting social norms. Rogue, on the other
hand, suggests a singular deviation or mutation, a setting apart in contrast with the
collectivity implied in the French term.46 Etymologically ‘rogue’ is derived from Latin
rogare "to ask" and is associated with thieves’ slang for a type of begging vagabond
(roger with a hard g), a solitary activity in contrast to the groups of shameless libertines
or malcontented thugs rollicking through the streets of Paris. Thus we find with both
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voyou and roué a collectivity of outlaws that is absent in the more solitary and
individualistic English term ‘rogue.’ There is a distinction between outlaw states, which
are beastly, individualistic, and which treat the people as if they are outlaws, and a
collection of outlaws that threaten to disrupt social and political norms, yet both of these
versions of the politics of outlawry are connected to democracy: the democracies that
have turned into rogue states because of their sovereignty; and the democracies (to-come)
that are not yet legitimated by sovereignty.
The collectivity of the voyou takes us en route to a concept that counters sovereignty and
precedes democracy. Derrida terms this counter-concept voyoucracy. It is a dissenting
democracy, an alliance between outlaws that threatens the status quo:
Voyoucracy is a corrupt and corrupting power of the street, an illegal and outlaw
power that brings together into a voyoucratic regime, and thus into an organized and
more or less clandestine form, into a virtual state, all those who represent a principle
of disorder—a principle not of anarchic chaos but of structured disorder, so to speak,
of plotting and conspiracy, of premeditated offensiveness or offenses against public
order. Indeed, of terrorism, it will be said—whether national or international.
Voyoucracy is a principle of disorder, to be sure, a threat against public order; but, as
a cracy, it represents something more than a collection of individual or individualistic
voyous. It is the principle of disorder as a sort of substitute order… (66)
A voyoucracy is a threat to sovereignty, a competing power, and an offensive one, at least
from the perspective of the upstanding and law-abiding citizens of a sovereign power. For
voyou is an insulting appellation that is used only in the second and third person to
denigrate someone that deviates from the law or from proper behaviour. It is only used
with reference to others (one never calls oneself a voyou, Derrida notes). The voyou is
accused, called to order, and summoned to appear before the law (64). To call a power a
voyoucracy likewise opposes it to the presumed morality and legitimacy of a sovereign
power. Those it collects in its milieu are “individuals of questionable morals and dubious
character whom decent, law-abiding people would like to combat and exclude under a
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series of more or less synonymous names…” (66). A voyoucracy is illegitimate and
illegal, corrupt and corrupting.
Yet we must not forget that this appellation interpellates an addressee – it produces what
it names. The accusation voyou “casts a normative, indeed performative, evaluation,”
Derrida asserts (64). It reaffirms the legitimacy of the reigning sovereignty, the reigning
law, which shares this performative structure, and must be continually re-created,
reiterated. But this also means that the appellation is relative to the authority of the voice
of the accuser. The difference between sovereignty and voyoucracy is a question of might
and right, an equation that for Derrida remains at the heart of sovereignty in this era of
rogue states: “From ‘rogue state’ to ‘Etat voyou’ it is a question of nothing less than the
reason of the strongest, a question of right and law, of the force of law…” (2). In other
words, it is undecideable precisely which power is the legitimate one, when both the state
and its opposition are supported by outlawry. Since might is not equivalent to justice, the
question emerges: how do we strive for justice? As democracies, or as voyoucracies?
That is, is justice possible where there is sovereignty as it is currently understood, even in
its democratic forms?
Democracy is inextricably tied to the appellation voyou, for democracy is the power of
the people, and the people are voyous. As Derrida writes: “The demos is … never far
away when one speaks of a voyou. Nor is democracy far from voyoucracy [voyoucratie]”
(64). This is not to say that the two terms, democracy and voyoucracy, are entirely
collapsed, one into the other, for they are distinguished by such criteria as legitimacy,
secrecy, and order. Where a democratic sovereignty is a legitimate public order, a
voyoucracy is clandestine, illegitimate and disordering. Yet a voyoucracy might well be
on its way to democracy, to the democratization of sovereignty “by way of a revolution
and a beheading,” as Derrida puts it (20). Thus the very distinction between a democracy
and voyoucracy is undecidable. Both represent the force (cracy) of the people (demos),
the people of the streets, the people who take to the streets (voyous). And both are
structured by a relation to outlawry – voyoucracy as a corrupting force that lacks the
legitimacy bestowed by sovereign right, and democracy as a sovereign force that supports
its lawmaking right through a suspension of the law, a right of the people to be outside of
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the law in its inaugural moment. Derrida invites a new understanding of democracy with
the deferred structure of promise, one that would preserve the revolutionary urge to
defeat corruption and strive for justice, but one in which power has not been corrupted by
right. In this democracy-to-come the decision is undecidable, passive, a gift from the
other and a turning toward the other, a responsibility for the other, a hospitality that has
not yet closed its doors on the ones that democracy would exclude, the “bad citizens,
rogues, noncitizens, and … unlike and unrecognizable others” (63). Democracy-to-come,
like sovereignty, has a relation to outlawry, but one that allows deconstruction to work
through it, and through this opening, creates possibilities for justice.

From Outlawry to Justice
Both Derrida and Agamben critique a sovereign condition that is merged with bestiality
and outlawry, demanding a shift to a non-theological concept of the political that departs
from the legacy of the enlightenment, the Shoah and the biopolitical atrocities that follow
it. Agamben’s critique is diagnostic, rather than prescriptive. He explores the
problematics of the political as it has been transformed to the biopolitical in modern
sovereignty. The political is not marked out by the friend/foe dichotomy as it is for
Schmitt, but instead by the categorical pairings of bare life/politics, bios/zoë, and
inclusion/exclusion (8). As politics is not merely a category of human thought and
action, but fundamentally structures western metaphysics for Agamben, this has wide
reaching and catastrophic effects. Politics “occupies the threshold on which the relation
between living beings and logos is realized. In the ‘politicization’ of bare life – the
metaphysical task par excellence – the humanity of living man is decided” (8). Agamben
proposes that we live in an ongoing state of exception, characterized by conditions that
seem eerily similar to the Hobbesian state of nature, in which “man is a wolf to man.” In
this state of exception, what becomes pertinent in human relationships, and the relation
between sovereigns and citizens, is not what mediates differences between us, but each
person’s/political entity’s shared status outside of the law. For Agamben, man is an
outlaw to man – an outlaw that like the ancient werewolf occupies a liminal status
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between beast and man, nature and culture. We are homo sacer, available to be killed, but
not sacrificed. Our lives and deaths no longer have any meaning.
This is as true in modern democracies as it is in totalitarian states, Agamben warns.
Democracy, which presents itself as a liberation of zoë, a vindication and politicization of
the life of the people, has failed in this effort. It has become a corrupt version of the
democratic concept. Corrupt, decadent, and consumed in the society of the spectacle,
democracy converges with totalitarianism (HS 10). Surreptitiously (with the step of a
wolf) what we call democracy colludes with its enemy to “transform the decision on bare
life into the supreme political principle” (10). In such a context, sovereignty, which is
inextricably tied to the sovereign decision, no longer has an intelligible meaning. The
way has been cleared for a new concept of the political, but this concept “largely remains
to be invented” (11). Agamben’s call that this biopolitical hegemony must be stopped is
urgent. But he is not clear about how it might be halted. As Homo Sacer draws to a close,
he calls for “a politics that will have learned to take the fundamental biopolitical fracture
of the west into account.” Only such a politics “will be able to stop this oscillation and
put an end to the civil war that divides the peoples and the cities of this earth” (180). But
I remain suspect, or at least unsure about what is at stake here. Does Agamben call for a
return to a newly defined “normal situation?” His terminology suggests that biopolitics is
equivalent to a global “civil war.” If global conflict is a civil war, are we then one global
nation? If read in accordance with Hobbes, it is civil war that kills the Leviathan. Do we
build a new concept on the corpse of this body politic? Should we save the Leviathan and
cap the global body with a sovereign head, democratic or otherwise? If so, what becomes
of the exception? Does it revert to its place as a temporary solution meant to preserve the
law by acting outside of the law? Agamben does not answer these questions: his project
was to try to understand “the bloody mystifications of the new world order.” He does not
yet attempt to sketch out what a new concept of the political may involve, outside of the
disruption of biopolitics.
For Derrida an alternative political concept takes the form of Messianicity without
Messianism – an anticipation of something that is miraculous without being divine, what
Derrida names alternately as the justice-to-come and democracy-to-come. This involves a
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politics derived not from terror but from hope. Aravamudan points out that this glimmer
of hope prefaces the text of Rogues, where Derrida cites a single word from Ovid in the
voice of Echo: “Veni!” (462). Echo, Aravamudan continues, signifies not only the
“embodied alterity” that breaks Narcissus’ solipsistic gaze, but also the “audible but
invisible difference within” (462). Yet this patient and passive hope is also the limit to
Derrida’s analysis. The democracy and justice for which we wait are ‘weak forces,’ they
beckon with the faint intervention of an eventless ethics that turns outward (463). A
weak force, as Derrida explains, is a “vulnerable force, [a] force without power,” one that
“opens up unconditionally to what or who comes and comes to affect it,” and that exceeds
the performative conditions of mastery and authority (R xiv). If Derrida wants an end to
sovereignty’s occupation of the political – a sovereignty that is incurably infected with
the theological, and the metaphysics of ipseity, “a power that gives itself its own law, its
force of law” – it may take more than passive waiting. As Derrida himself points out in
Rogues, sovereignty is circular.47 If we wait, even in the context of an openness to the
other, of an extreme hospitality, what guarantee do we have that sovereignty will not just
take another turn, albeit in a new configuration? In the “in turns” and the “by turns” of
sovereignty, outlawry casts the totalizing shadow of the Schmittian exception, the
violence of the beast who does not reply and the omnipotence of an uncaring god who
does not answer. Outlawry’s productive potential, its counter-normative otherness, is
reduced to an iterability that allows for a performative transformation of sovereignty,
even a revolution, but not a rupture in the concept. The God of sovereignty continues to
reign, as long as there is sovereignty. This is the case even in a so-called democracy,
which remains a voyoucracy in the sense of a corrupt and corrupting force, but not one
that for more than an (already past) instant represents the power of the people who take to
the streets. Sovereignty will always be beastly, even if, for a brief turn, the wolf appears
to lie down with the lamb.
Derrida has something here, I think, as long as we do not read the deconstruction of
sovereignty too ‘passively.’ We need to read him with the injection of a little Bataille – a
reading of the passive decision as a passionate one.48 As Jean-Luc Nancy suggests,
passion, for Bataille is a “movement that carries to the limit – to the limit of being” (59).
Nancy interprets this as referring to the limit of singularity, the movement of any singular
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being outside of the self and toward others in community. I would add that the
passive/passionate decision is a movement toward the absolutely Other – an ethical
decision in the Levinasian sense. Not a passive turning toward the other, but a passionate
turn, an unleashing of passions. Such passion is evident in Benjamin’s work, which tends
to haunt Derrida’s more messianic political moments. For Benjamin’s anomic pure
violence (he calls it divine violence) is no weak force – it is expiating, shocking, and
altogether new. What Benjamin passionately demands is the coming of the Messiah,
rather than a perpetual waiting and deferment. Like Derrida, Benjamin marks the political
as a space of undecidability and anticipation for the shock of an event that is about to
happen. The Messiah, the new, the expected unexpected, always comes but never arrives.
It is an exception that, like a miracle, comes from the outside, not to preserve sovereignty
but to herald the arrival of its Other. The future is always deferred, but we do not
patiently wait. On the contrary, we advance steadily toward it. To advance toward this
Other, to risk uncertainty, is not to depend on a weak force after all, when we interpret
the passive decision as a passionate decision. The Schmittian decision, in contrast, is
weak in its very solipsistic ipseity. For Schmitt, the Other is an enemy, and the decision is
motivated by a Hobbesian fear that compels decisive action. The Sovereign trembles
inside his absolute and indivisible authority, which is why, for Derrida, sovereignty is a
fragile concept that only wears a mask of omnipotence.
Whatever concept of the political emerges in the coming years, if we heed the intended
and unintended warnings from Schmitt and Benjamin to Derrida and Agamben, we might
ensure that it includes, not a foreclosure of the outside, but rather a passionate turning
toward it. Sovereignty’s claim on outlawry poses certain dangers and risks, and outlawry
at times threatens order and the normal situation. Yet it would be catastrophic on the
scale of absolute and final totalitarianism to attempt to eliminate outlawry itself.
Outlawry can be seen, through Derrida’s framework, as both the poison and the cure,
which is why I include it, along with différance and the pharmakon, with the wolves that
Derrida finds in the manger of speech acts. Outlawry is both the terror wrought by
politics and its hope – the threat and promise of Benjamin’s great criminal who exposes
the violence of the law and signifies the potentiality of a new law. It is the undecidability
that undoes the theology of the political as we wait for something that is not precisely a
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messiah. It is the passive in the decision, which passionately opens the decision up to the
other, to the new and the future. To borrow from the religious metaphor that Benjamin
and Derrida are so fond of, the Messiah is an outlaw – he or she comes to us from the
outside, from outside of the law. Yet outlawry is not a moral or ethical term. Its relation
to good and evil is undecidable. Outlawry is integral to the law, and to the possibility that
the law might be replaced. It is essential to the law’s performativity, indeed to the
political as a performative concept.
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Chapter 4: Becoming-Outlaw
Emmanuel Levinas knew the political and personal costs of being cast outside of the law.
The philosopher was detained in a Nazi camp as a Jewish prisoner of war from 1940 to
1945, and he reflects on this dehumanizing experience in “Name of the Dog; Or Natural
Rights.” The Jewish prisoners of war, he writes, were “looked at” by both camp guards
and villagers as if they were “subhuman, a group of apes” (48). Those qualities that made
him a subject, that imbue life with meaning and form identity were bracketed: “Our
comings and goings, our sorrow and laughter, illnesses and distractions, the work of our
hands and the anguish of our eyes, the letters we received from France and those accepted
for our families – all that passed in parenthesis” (48). The Jewish prisoners were instead
“beings entrapped in their species; despite all their vocabulary, beings without language”
(48). They became what Giorgio Agamben terms homo sacer, a figure of political life
that has been returned ambiguously to nature and exposed to violence.
This process of dehumanization survives today as the logic by which everyone is stripped
of subjectivity and exposed to political power. Agamben calls it the new “biopolitical
body of humanity” (9): the structure of the camp, which is a suspension of the law, has
become the paradigm of modern politics. But if this is an outcome of the force of
outlawry at work within the law – a force that both makes the law possible and exposes
its fundamental insufficiency and incapacity to be at one with itself – then it seems we are
left with nothing but the horror of the law’s (il)legitimate violence, and our naked
exposure to it. Or is there some echo of hope, some positive, creative force, that is also
wrought through the law’s difference from itself? Can there be an ethical outlaw politics,
and if so, according to what understanding of ethics, and for what ‘subject’ and model of
politics?
Levinasian ethics are an obvious starting point for a study of the ethics of outlawry,
precisely because his philosophical insights locating ethics in relation to alterity are
informed by this experience of being cast outside of the law. The Shoah left a lasting
imprint on Levinas’ thought: in Difficult Freedom he describes his work as being
“dominated by the presentiment and memory of the Nazi horror” (291). His work
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critiques modernity’s totalitarian tendencies and explores the ethics of human
relationships. Yet notably, when he reflects on his experience of the Shoah, Levinas
reverses the ethical position he elsewhere maintains that makes human transcendence of
animality a prerequisite of ethical thought and action. In “The Name of a Dog" the only
ethical being encountered by the prisoners – the only being that recognized their
humanity – was a dog they named “Bobby,” whom Levinas nominates as “the last
Kantian in Nazi Germany” (51). “[Bobby] would appear at morning assembly and was
waiting for us as we returned, jumping up and down and barking in delight. For him,
there was no doubt we were men” (49). The dog was more ‘human’ than the camp guards
and the villagers who demonstrate no concern for the life the Other, and he restores the
humanity of the prisoners from whom this dignity has otherwise been stolen.
Levinas’ discussion pinpoints the very ambiguous space in which the differences between
human and animals blur, since what is animal about humans – the beastliness of the Nazis
and the passively complicit villagers – is in fact not animal-like at all.49 Moreover, in the
narrative, ethics, which is proper to humans for Levinas, is embodied by an animal in a
case where all the humans have been animalized as the subject or object of a beastly
action. This simultaneous animalization of ethics and ethical injustice raises questions,
not only about the subject of ethics, but also about the relationship of ethics to the law
and to outlawry, since animals exist outside of the law. While normally we might ascribe
a negative value to animality as such – it is what is unreasonable, non-conceptual, simple,
mechanical, bereft of signification, brute and violent – the notion of an ethical dog returns
some of the natural purity of zoë to the ethical realm. Is there an ethics in life itself, as it
occurs as a creative force outside of the law?
This concept of an ethical dog denotes a rather curious departure from Levinas’ usual
ethical stance.50 Levinasian ethics are situated in the human face-to-face encounter, an
openness to the Other that is both visual (one regards the face of the Other) and
performatively enunciated through language (a ‘saying’ that is also a doing) that
irrefutably exposes one to the Other. Where humans split from pure being in this
encounter with the Other, animals (including Bobby) exist in the world without the
mediation of language and conceptual thought. I include this deviation because it raises
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questions about the subject (via the face) as the proper site for ethics. Lisa Guenther
hints at the issue in the definition of friendship that she proposes as a criterion for an
ethics that includes a responsibility to animals. Guenther writes that such an ethical
friendship “involves a mutual exposure at the level of sensible, and potentially
nonsensical, life” (219). It is this basis of a ‘mutual exposure’ at the level of bare life as a
site of ethics that interests me. Bobby is witness to the significance of the Jewish
prisoners as living beings, a significance that he shares with them.51 He does not require
the legibility of the face to care for the Other.
But we are letting the tale get ahead of the dog. Bobby, and his ethics, are not really at
issue here. It is the becoming-animal of Levinas himself, during that period when he finds
himself excluded from ethical consideration, that launches this moment of ethical
becoming. Levinas extends his ethics to Bobby (he recognizes Bobby as an ethical being)
at the instant of his own desubjectivation. Indeed, this is his most ethical moment if we
are to truly locate ethics outside of the knowing ego. Thus taking my cue from Levinas’
own anomalous encounter with Bobby, the ethical dog, I wonder if the ethical/political
relation may not properly be that of the human subject at all; at least not as subjectivity
has been understood, from Aristotle to Heidegger, as what comes to be through a
negation of animality. An outlaw politics must be derived from the margins – including
the margins of humanity itself. By ‘margins of humanity’ I mean not only those humans
who are politically marginalized. I also intend to indicate the contingency of the limit that
demarcates our humanity, and the threshold where subjectivity borders on abjection.
Clearly, as the experience of the Shoah makes clear, the ethical violations and violence
associated with outlawry, directed at life itself, can be horrific. But what of the ethics for
and of those that have been cast outside of the law and exposed to that violence? Does
this ethics have a relationship to politics? For Levinas, the purview of ethics ‘outside of
the law’ is restricted to a general exclusion of ethics from politics. However, I am
interested in exploring the possibility of a specifically political outlaw ethics. If Levinas
cannot take us directly there, what concepts are available to us in contemporary theory
that depart from the political/ethical dualism that limits Levinas, while retaining the
ethics of alterity? Deconstruction provides one route for this, through the aporia of an out
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of joint understanding of time and a transformative understanding of law. Likewise,
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s theory of minoritarian politics, and in particular the
becoming-animal/becoming-minoritarian series of concepts elaborated in A Thousand
Plateaus establish an ethics of alterity that possesses some political force. These authors
blur the boundaries between the human subject and the animal and politicize the
ambiguity of subjection/abjection.
I bring together these frameworks – the ethics of exteriority, deconstruction, and the
minoritarian politics of becoming – to address the question: How do we conceive of an
outlaw politics that is located not only in the power that closed in on Levinas in the camp
in the form of a Schmittian exception and the cruelty of the dehumanizing biopolitical
gaze, but rather in the politics of those that were denied political status and exposed to
death? What force of change, what transformational power, do we possess to the extent
that we are denied the agency of the subject? By making beasts of us all (in one way or
another), the Shoah epitomizes the dangers of an outlaw politics when sovereignty
permeates even the outside of the law in the totalitarian sense. But is there an outlaw
politics that is ethical? Is there an anti-totalitarian outlaw politics, a politics of justice?
What would such a politics look like? Who is the agent of such a politics if not the
subject?

The Outlaw Ethics of Levinas
The prevailing norm of modernity places ethics firmly inside of the law. In the Kantian
regulative ideal, one respects or cares for the other by identifying with him,52 that is, by
recognizing that like the self, the other is a rational agent that obeys the universal moral
law, one that is ideally reflected, moreover, in the laws of the realm. In this view, we are
subjects to the extent that we transcend our particularities and share a common identity as
rational autonomous beings, a common identity that also grounds our rights in the
political sphere. The subject is thus constituted in its finitude: one finds within oneself the
human rationality that grounds one’s good will, and makes one a good community
member.53
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What makes Levinasian ethics interesting from the perspective of outlawry is the shift he
initiates that allows us to conceive of ethics as proper to the outside of the law (although
in the sense of a true outside that is completely divided from the law). The partition
between ethics and law that I point to is based on the separation Levinas makes between
ethics and politics. Where for Kant both ethical and political judgment are based on
rational autonomy mediated by universal laws, Levinas sees politics as mediated by such
generalizations, but ethics as instead based in singularity, heterogeneity and infinitude.
Levinas’ experience of being cast outside of the law, during the Shoah, was doubtlessly a
motivating force in this shift. Indeed, his work might be read, at least in part, as a
response to the role played by Enlightenment thought and German Idealism in preparing
the way for this atrocity.54 In general, he was skeptical about the moral autonomy of the
finite subject, and found the notion of a universal moral law to be homogenizing and
violent. These critiques lead him to disrupt the totalizing tendency of Kantian logic by
shifting the emphasis from identity to alterity. He subverts the inside/outside dichotomy
whereby Kant asserts an ethical relation to the extent that we share a common moral law.
For Levinas, we are responsible to the Other not because the Other is like us, but because
the Other is absolutely different.55 We come to ethics, in other words, through an
openness to heterogeneity, rather than its foreclosure. As John Llewelyn phrases it, the
implication is that: “The Other is he to whom and in virtue of whom I am subject, with a
subjectivity that is heteronomy, not autonomy, and hetero-affection, not auto-affection”
(4). One does not become an ethical subject by turning inward. On the contrary, through
the ethical relation the unity of the subject is disrupted and emphasis is placed on what is
exterior to the self.
The openness of the ethical is made possible by exposure to the face of the other, and
through speech, which is conceived not as mediating or universalizing, but instead as
what makes possible a “breach” of the finite totality of the subject (TI 23). “Speech
proceeds from absolute difference” (194), writes Levinas, continuing: “Language is a
relation between separated terms” (195). Being in language is not a total experience, an
identity with the Same, but instead is the experience of being Other with Others. Ethics is
thus communicative, derived of the face-to-face relation with the other: a relation of “a

133

living presence,” an “expression” that speaks to another expressive living presence that
speaks (66).
But how does this visual and articulate face-to-face relationship with the other breach the
boundaries of law, instead of simply re-creating the shared moral space identified by
Kant? Levinas shifts from an emphasis on the interiority of ethical rationality to the fact
of exteriority and from identity to difference. This shift will make possible an
understanding of outlawry as the constitutive outside of the law, through the later
introduction of deconstruction to Levinas’ logic. But it does not in itself envision a
political ethics of outlawry: it only divides the realm of ethics from that of politics and
law. For Levinas, the law, as an aspect of politics, is situated in relation to totality, rather
than the infinite embrace of the other. Ethics is what disrupts such finitude, as an
expression of the infinite. As he elaborates in Totality and Infinity, infinity, for Levinas,
is what exceeds totality: “[Infinity] is produced in the improbable feat whereby a
separated being fixed in its identity, the same, the I, nonetheless contains in itself what it
can neither contain nor receive solely by virtue of its own identity” (26-7). The subject’s
relation to infinitude grounds subjectivity as a relational activity, a hospitality toward the
other through extension outside of the self, but only on an ethical, and not a political
level.
There is no actual place for outlawry in politics, unless we bring in deconstruction,
because outlawry strides both sides of Levinas’ divide between ethics and politics: it
pertains to law as its outside in a somewhat impossible way, since the political realm is
finite (it has no outside), but outlawry also ‘belongs’ to the infinite as what is excluded
from the bounds of law and politics. Yet outlawry, as we understand it as a disruption of
the totality of the law, is also an implicit aspect of Levinas’ entire project. For the very
point of his development of an ethics of alterity is to disrupt the totality that constitutes
politics, and the primacy of identity (the same). But is this disruption played out in the
realm of the political, or in some other, transcendent sphere?
If ethics and politics are separate, there also must be a separation, for Levinas, between
the political subject and the ethical subject. A political subject would be an identity-based
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subject, a subject-in-common, whereas an ethical subject is an other among others.
Already there is some disruption of the political field when the subject is divided in this
way, for neither commonality, nor subjection to the sovereign, are any longer a
requirement for the agency of a subject who is split between their political being and
ethical being. Of the ethical subject Levinas writes: “Subjectivity realizes these
impossible exigencies – the astonishing feat of containing more than it is possible to
contain…. subjectivity [is] welcoming the Other, as hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is
consummated” (27). Ethics, in other words, is an openness to exteriority. But can a
political subject open toward the Other? It seems this openness only happens in the
ethical, and not the political sphere. The ethical relation, it follows, transcends the law,
because the law, as an aspect of politics, invokes identity and erases difference, indeed it
must, of we are to achieve ‘equality before the law.’ But this transcendence is not an
‘outlaw’ event, at least not prior to deconstruction, since it does not seem to exist in
relation to law and politics at all.
In a conversation with Derrida, recalled in Adieu Emmanuel Levinas, Levinas describes
his ethical approach as a matter of theology: “You know, one often speaks of ethics to
describe what I do, but what really interests me in the end is not ethics, not ethics alone,
but the holy, the holiness of the holy” (4). A kind of transcendental disruption of politics
is thus possible, but the disconnect between ethics and politics diminishes the political
usefulness of ethics as a concept, as Simon Critchley elaborates in Five Problems in
Levinas’ View of Politics. According to Critchley, Levinasian politics, in accordance with
the Schmittian friend/enemy divide, is derived from the antagonism between friends and
enemies. His ethics, however, is shaped by monotheism and a concept of fraternity that
contradicts this division, for on an ethical level “all humanity is my friend and no one is
my enemy,” as Critchley phrases it (174). In other words, humanity is a spiritual
fraternity mediated through the presence of God.
This separation, which aligns politics with totalitarianism and ethics with theology, does
not bode well for our political life. The ideal transcendence of the face-to-face encounter
is impossible in the plurality of beings that comprise the political sphere. Politics is the
regulation of chaos, the imposition of order on disorder: there is no outside. We are
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political when we find ways to manage our relation to each other, so the political is
always a mediation. Levinas calls it le tier, the third party. In contrast to ethics, the thirdparty relation refers specifically to law and the state, which tend always toward
totalization. Third-party relations are always already ethically unjust because they are
unable to account for the specificity of the face-to-face encounter, and must generalize
for the good of all citizens. As a consequence of this unifying function, Levinas equates
the political with violence and war. Politics is “the art of foreseeing war and of winning it
by every means … the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as
philosophy is to naiveté” (TI 21). As he continues Levinas links war, and implicitly
politics and political subjects, to totalization: “The visage of being that shows itself in
war is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates western philosophy. Individuals
are reduced to being bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to themselves.
The meaning of individuals (invisible outside this totality) is derived from the totality”
(21-2). Thus for Levinas it is not possible to be a political actor without being complicit
with the forces of totalization.
Levinas puts ethics to the task of re-constituting political space by repeatedly interrupting
all claims at totalization, including those hidden in liberal concepts of freedom and
autonomy, as Critchley points out in Ethics and Deconstruction (223). In other words, the
role of ethics in relation to the violent and totalizing forces of politics is to override and
guide political reason, to disrupt politics (222). A recognition of and responsibility to the
Other disrupts the hatred of the Other on which political unity is organized. Yet Levinas’
politics are fraught with difficulties. First of all, Levinas’ view of what counts as political
is very narrow (173). Indeed, his approach appears similar to Schmittian political
concepts in which the state’s role is to distinguish friend from enemy and foreclose all
difference in the name of unity. Moreover the political, as Levinas conceptualizes it, has
further traces of Schmittian decisionism, which ironically installs a different side of
outlawry at the heart of politics. As Critchley elaborates, Levinas sees politics as archic:
“it is obsessed with the moment of foundation, origination, declaration, or institution that
is linked to the act of government, of sovereignty, most of all of decision that
presupposes and initiates a sovereign political subject capable of self-government and the
government of others” (182). A decision is extralegal, for in order to qualify as a decision
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it must exceed the realm of rule and calculation that comprises the law. Yet the
Schmittian sovereign decision aims not at disrupting law, but at conserving it. This is the
essence of totalitarianism as conceived by Schmitt. As a result, the political sphere is a
realm where only the sovereign has agency and political subjects find themselves limited
by a prescribed social role, on the one hand, and exposed to the extralegal violence of the
decision, on the other.
To be clear, the similarities between these thinkers’ definitions of politics do not by any
means align Levinas with Schmitt, either ethically or politically: where Schmitt
recommends decisive totalitarian politics as an ideal political system, Levinas is intent on
disrupting such totalizing forces with what lies outside of the political realm. Yet his
ethical challenge to politics seems ineffectual. For as Critchley points out, Levinasian
ethics leaves no room for progressive political action: the disruptive moment transforms
into the archic founding gesture, instituting a new third party (1992). In other words,
when ethics engages politics, it becomes political, which is to say it takes on a unifying,
totalizing impulse and erasure of the ethics that founded it. If this is the case, can we put
Levinasian ethics to the task of disrupting politics as a mode of outlawry? In the
following section, I address this question, suggesting that while Levinas opens up the
possibility for such an ethical role for outlawry by replacing the identity imperative of
German Idealism with the imperative for alterity, he does not allow politics to contain
that ethical disruption within itself: but Derrida’s re-working of the ethics of alterity does.

The Ethical Politics of Deconstruction
How might we move toward an ethical politics that negotiates the subversive mimicry of
outlawry by disrupting the totality of the political realm? As we have seen in the work of
Agamben and Schmitt, outlawry can be captured in the political totality, where it wreaks
havoc to subjectivity in the manner that Levinas encountered in the camp. But if we align
what is outside of the law with the ethics of alterity, it can also subvert the homogenizing
identity of politics through an ethical opening toward others. Yet some commentators
argue that deploying ethics in the sphere of law is impossible if we are to maintain a
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Levinasian framework. In “Questions for a Reluctant Jurisprudence of Alterity,” Nick
Smith cautions that the ethics of alterity are simply neither generalizable nor
‘programmable’ in a political context. Smith argues that applying alterity to governance
would do violence to Levinas’ overall intent to critique such generalizations of identity
thinking, since it would generalize alterity itself. Levinas’ contribution is more useful in
terms of abstract theories of justice than actual legal issues, he argues. “Violence,” Smith
writes, “begins in the subsumption of the particular to the universal, and pretensions
otherwise only allow the roots of injustice to grow deeper” (2). As Smith sees it, for
Levinas the shift from ethics to politics would constitute a shift from the singular to the
general, and would necessarily be violent. This is especially so with respect to the law,
which “operates at the level of abstract universals” while “ethics can only be found in the
singular relationship with concrete particulars” (2). In other words, while politics
operates in the realm of law, ethics can only operate in a realm that transcends human
law.
Yet Levinas’ ethics of alterity, his hospitality to the Other, has been key in poststructural
ethico-political thought. This is especially pertinent in the project underway, since we are
conceptualizing outlawry as a deconstructive concept. Derrida scholars have been divided
as to whether deconstruction is ethical in a Levinasian vein, or whether ethics is
incompatible with deconstruction.56 I am in agreement with such scholars as Crichley,
Robert Bernasconi and Drucilla Cornell; deconstruction is informed by Levinas through
an emphasis on a responsibility toward the Other as a guiding principle for political
decisionmaking. However, Derrida departs from Levinas by bridging the gap between
ethics and politics. Smith may be correct in his affirmation that for Levinas the political is
a totalizing sphere that is incompatible with ethical alterity, but Derrida demonstrates that
the political need not be conceptualized as totalizing: the politicization of ethics does not
necessarily generalize alterity, but rather disrupts the general with difference.
Ethics is linked to politics, in Derrida’s approach, through the ethical structure of the
political decision. This differs from the Schmittian decision, which suspends the law to
eliminate difference and dissension under the unifying banner of sovereignty. What
Derrida terms ‘undecidability’ and the ‘passive decision’ invert decision making from an
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autonomous act, to a resolution that, received from the Other, demands responsibility to
the Other. In this approach politics can be ethical – that is open toward alterity – without
it being a contradiction in terms. For Derrida, undecidability is the condition of every
decision, because a decision, as opposed to a rule or calculation, contains the possibility
that it could have been otherwise. Decisions thus contain an element of chance and
judgment (LI, 116). Since no decision can be calculated in advance, it always carries a
certain responsibility. A decision must be made, which means that alterity (alternatives)
must be considered. It is not that every decision will necessarily be responsible to the
Other, but that in order to be a decision it must pass through a process of deliberation and
judgment (116). Irregardless of the decision itself, the responsibility cannot be shirked.
Decision making as such is a risky process; there is no guarantee that the ‘right’ decision
will be made, nor that the decision will be ethical. By virtue of undecidability however,
the political realm opens up from the total enclosure stipulated by both Levinas and
Schmitt. No longer is the political merely a realm of identity where restrictive rules of
sameness establish what it means to be in common. Instead, the political realm is open to
dissent and negotiation in defining what being in common means.
These conditions by no means establish a calculable program for ethical-political
decision making (an impossibility), but Derrida nevertheless proposes some general
criteria for ethical decision-making. These criteria are captured in the concept of the
passive decision, the notion that the decision (every decision) is received from the other.
This involves a tricky negotiation of the singular event of a given decision, which must
remain open to alternatives in order to be a decision, and the general rule of ethics
derived from the Levinasian framework: a responsibility to the Other. This transition is a
troublesome one: the very demand for ethical criteria – even when that criteria is
openness to alterity – potentially results in an erasure of that very openness. The relation
between ethics and politics, in short, involves the difficult translation between the
singularity of the event in question, and the universality of criteria for decision-making.
Yet the passage from universal to particular is negotiated all the time. Derrida’s approach
incorporates Levinasian ethics in order to shift politics from totality to transformation.
Derrida’s ethical decision interrupts and disrupts order in a field of risk and danger,
moved by a responsibility to the Other.
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This structure of the ethico-political decision shapes the concept of justice-to-come,
which constitutes politics as alterity. Such a politics of difference is possible for Derrida
where it is not for Levinas because Derrida supplements ethics (responsibility to the
other) with an ‘out of joint’ experience of time (the à venir or to-come) that structures his
concept of justice. This allows the contradiction between the general and the specific to
persist, and for an ethical politics to exist within this space of contradiction. Derrida
terms this experience of time ‘Messianicity without Messianism,’ elaborating it in various
works, but most notably in Spectres of Marx. This non-religious form of messianism,
understood as an anticipation of the coming of the Other, signifies a discontinuity of time,
a deferment to the future and a trace of the past that is present in every instant. This
heterogeneity in time is what conditions our relationship to justice, which Derrida
describes as the experience of absolute alterity and singularity (FL 257). We must
negotiate the contradiction that demands that justice be singular and immediate, yet
universal. This time of the event also ties and divides justice from the law, for the
impossibility of justice is what compels us to make the law, and it is what drives us to
deconstruct it. Justice-to-come is thus a political and juridical concept that re-founds and
transforms law and politics in the structure of openness. The distinction between the tocome [avenir] and the future is that the to-come is a “horizon of expectation,” a deferral
that never loses its openness and anticipation of the coming of the Other, whereas the
future simply re-produces the present (FL 256-257).57 Thus, justice, while never precisely
realized, is strived for through the dynamic politics of transformation.
Outlawry, as what disrupts the law with its difference from itself, has an implicit
relationship to ethics in a deconstructive approach, since it pertains to the relationship
between law/politics and alterity. Outlawry, moreover, signifies the impossibility of
completely separating the sphere of ethics from that of politics, since the concept is itself
a threshold connecting the law and its outside (ethics, in this case). Derrida shows how by
re-conceptualizing the political in its relation to alterity, the gap between ethics and
politics can be crossed, vis a vis the temporal disruption/suspension of the ‘to-come.’
This temporal approach to transformative politics makes sense with respect to outlawry,
because it suspends the difference between the archic and the anarchic in an undecidable
instant.

140

The Limits of Faciality
Yet we are faced with another restriction in Levinas’ thinking that neither undecidability
nor the out-of-jointness of time can resolve: the limitation of faciality as a structure for
ethics. For Levinas, subjectivity becomes visible through faciality, for through the face,
one’s uniqueness as an “incomparable subject” and an “other for the others” is
established. Levinas writes in Otherwise than Being: “as a subject incomparable with the
other, I am approached as an other by the others, that is, ‘for myself’” (158). But what of
the Other that is not recognized as a subject? Indeed, the subject as the ground for truth
and political action has been in crisis for some time, both through the psychoanalytic split
with the unconscious, and poststructural destabilizations that posit the subject as nothing
more than a linguistic placeholder. But even on a more concrete level, there are vast
populations who do not properly qualify as political subjects: the stateless, the
dispossessed, and the subaltern. As Derrida reminds us in Rogues, even liberal
democracy welcomes “only men, and on the condition that they be citizens, brothers, and
compeers [semblables], excluding all the others” (63). On the one hand, these
disenfranchised populations are the very Others that Levinas argues demand an ethical
response. But exclusion from the polis also demands a disruption of politics in the form
of a politics of the dispossessed. Moreover, we might also posit these others as more than
mere recipients of an ethical response, but subjects of their own ethical and political
agency. Levinas does not adequately account for Others whose faces are unrecognizable
to us, or whose language is incomprehensible. A critique of faciality, and of the
singularity of the face-to-face ethical relation, has implications for our questions about
the ethics of outlawry by shifting the focus from ethics directed toward those who are
excluded, to the ethics of those who are excluded, whose politics are disruptive of the
status quo. This involves a movement away from the singularity of the face-to-face
encounter to the multiplicity of the people, a crowd of others in which we cannot
distinguish faces.
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Somewhat ironically, the politics of the other is an area where Levinas falters. His own
thinking is shadowed by a xenophobic bias that seems to contradict the essence of his
ethical thought. Indeed in “Five Problems,” Critchely advises that politics is Levinas’
“Achilles heel” on account of the questionable political content of his ethics, including
his Zionism, French republicanism, Eurocentrism, and androcentricism (181).58 His
positioning of the feminine as other, or as a pre-ethical opening to the other, is well
known, since, for example, Beauvoir’s criticism of the Levinasian view of the feminine
other.59 Another form of xenophobia emerges in Levinas’ explicit racism, which is
revealed in a statement from a 1991 interview that Critchley cites: “I often say, although
it is a dangerous thing to say publicly, that humanity consists of the Bible and the Greeks.
All the rest can be translated: all the rest – all the exotic – is dance.”60 The embrace of
alterity suffers clear limits through such narrow lenses; there is a softening of the sharp
edges of difference that seems to arise from an astigmatism in the gaze that fixes on the
face. Some faces, it seems, are simply not apprehended as members of the fraternity of
Others. How do we resolve responsibility to the Other with an ethics that is restricted to
humanity, limits humanity to Europeans and Jews, and excludes the feminine half of this
humanity from ethical action?
The difficulties in Levinas’ political content suggest to me that there is a problem with
the structure of the formal ethical relation – that is the face-to-face relation – that is also
left unresolved in Derrida’s Messianism. Notwithstanding the importance of an ethics of
the subject, can we also conceive of an ethics that dos not reside in the subject, via the
face-to-face encounter between the self and Other, nor in the specifically singular
relation? Is there an ethics of what Derrida terms ‘the weak’ forces of messianic politics?
Derrida describes a “weak force” in the preface to Rogues, as: “This vulnerable force,
this force without power, opens up unconditionally to what or who comes and comes to
affect it” (xiv). The force is weak because it comes, not just from the Other but from the
Other who is to come, and therefore lacks legitimacy in the present moment. But this
weakness is not literally weak; it is more like an outlaw force, for Derrida describes the
call as “heterogeneous and rebellious, irreducible, to law, to power and to the economy of
redemption” (xv). The Others of messianic politics are weak because they are outside of
the law, their power has not yet arrived, it remains to-come.
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Derrida is precise on this point in an interview with globalization activist Lieven De
Cauterm. Messianic politics belong to those who fall outside of the lines of power in
today’s legal, political and economic structures. He asserts that it includes those
“movements that are still heterogeneous, still somewhat unformed, full of contradictions,
but that gather together the weak of the earth, all those who feel themselves crushed by
the economic hegemonies, by the liberal market, by sovereignty, etc. …it is these weak
who will prove to be strongest in the end and who represent the future.”61 But how do we
conceive of a political multiplicity, of a demos that is comprised not only of citizens but
of those excluded from the polis? What is the structure of politics, aside from a passive
deferral to the future – as we wait and hope for change – that makes possible the
translation from the margins to the mainstream, that is, real hegemonic and material
change? How do we experience such an outlaw politics, without it constituting a state of
chaos, or a new totality?

Deleuze and Guattari: Becoming-Outlaw
Identifying the ethics of such an outlaw politics is my aim in this chapter. In this politics,
the outlaw is both a vulnerable figure of bare life (i.e homo sacer) and a ‘weak’ but
threatening force that promises to disrupt the law. Both these aspects of the outlaw –
vulnerable and threatening – converge in the multiplicity of minorities. Levinas, in
particular as Derrida has developed his ethical thought, is key to this project because of
the shift his thought initiates from an emphasis on identity to difference, and from the self
to responsibility to the Other, as well as his overall project to disrupt the political with
ethics. However, neither Levinas nor Derrida accounts for an ethics of bare life, nor the
politics of the heterogeneous crowd of others.
For this I turn to Deleuze and Guattari, who share Derrida’s focus on themes ranging
from difference and alterity, to animality,62 and have an affinity with Levinas’ anti-fascist
position, although they counter his emphasis on faciality. Where Levinas saw the polis as
tending always toward totalization, as Deleuze describes in an interview with Paul
Rabinow, Deleuzian political philosophy treats society, the subject, and power as always
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already escaping the total.63 He comments that: “For me a society is something that never
stops slipping away. So when you say I am … ‘fluid,’ you are totally right: there's no
better word. Society is something that leaks, financially, ideologically – there are points
of leakage everywhere. Indeed the problem for society is how to stop itself from leaking”
(1985). In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze’s political philosophies are paired with
Guattari’s anti-psychoanalytic perspective. Guattari is known for an approach to
psychoanalysis that shifts the priority from the individual ego of the clinic and the couch,
to a subject in constant interaction with a plurality of other subjects. While trained as an
analyst under Jacques Lacan and Jean Oury, he came to oppose psychoanalysis as a
“capitalist drug” that placated desire, which is the impetus for social change, treating it as
an interior concern of the individual. Guattari politicizes what psychoanalysis treats as
strictly personal, that inner kernal that exceeds subjectivation, the psyche. The
‘schizoanalytic’ approach, as Guattari terms it, thus distinguishes this excess from the
concept of abjection derived from the psychoanalytic tradition, for schizoanalysis is not
concerned with the psychic struggles of a divided subject, so much as it is concerned with
the politics of the subject in relation to the psyche, which for our purposes opens up some
new ways to approach the politics of bare life.
As Foucault describes in the preface to Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy
lays out a political ethics that includes an emphasis on plurality that opposes fascism in
theory, politics and as a tendency in all of us. It is part of the authors’ anti-totalizing
innovations in a metaphysics that prioritizes what is positive, multiple, proliferating and
disjunctive over the “old categories” of the Negative (i.e. law, castration or lack), the
Individual and hierachization. They also propose a joyous (in the sense of jouissance),
non-unitary field of political action that is de-individualizing, and ungrounded in
mediating terms such as Truth (xiii). This approach thus complements deconstruction as a
way to conceptualize an outlaw political ethics, in particular adding an emphasis on
becoming and multiplicity that is not as prominent in deconstruction.
The implication is that for Deleuze and Guattari, an ethical realm of politics exists, but it
is separate from both identity (the face) and from the structural elements that are
considered proper to the political sphere by Levinas, that is, law and the state. Instead,
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ethical politics belongs to an interstitial space between identity and the law, and at the
same time, it lies outside of both spheres. In the chapter titled “Faciality” in A Thousand
Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari argue that we are ethical only insofar as we move away
from the assimilating “horrors” of the face, which they specify is a site not of ethics, but
of xenophobia: “From the viewpoint of racism there is no exterior, there are no people of
the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be,”
they write. This is a response to a logic that would appropriate what is outside the law,
through assimilation or extermination. They write: “Racism never detects the particles of
the other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been
wiped out…” (178). Faciality, in their analysis, is a fiction, a mask that is imposed as a
condition of humanity. The face is an artifice that limits and restricts our possibilities. For
Levinas the face is always the wholly other, the face of God, and through it our
responsibility, our love for the other: ethics. For Deleuze and Guattari, the face represents
a love for the same and the similar, its openness to otherness is a mere fiction.
What Levinas represents as ‘ethics’ – that is, the face – is in fact a ‘politics’ in Levinas’
own restricted sense. It is a totalizing force through which we represent ourselves and
establish our relation to structures of power: the face is the vehicle for signification and
subjectivation (181). Deleuze and Guattari write: “The white European male face defines
the apex from which humanity declines by degrees into the faces of women, children,
nonwesterners, subalterns, aborigines, hominids, troglodytes, chimpanzees, pets, bats,
flies” (29). As Gerald Bruns suggests in “Becoming-Animal (Some Simple Ways),”
instead of being the site of ethics, the face is “a regime of socialization to be escaped”
(712). A more ethical politics would involve a movement outside of faciality.
Such an embodied politics of difference and action is a posthuman politics, in the sense
that it deposes the human from its stature above all of nature, repositioning humans as
one of many species. Moreover, it expands the field of ethical consideration beyond the
human subject. This approach contradicts the conditions of Levinas’ face-to-face ethics,
but it is not entirely foreign to Levinas, who has himself experienced a posthuman ethics
in the camp, when he was reduced to bare life and positioned in relation to Bobby, the
ethical dog. Such dehumanization signals, or even demands the emergence of a post-
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human ethics because it exposes the limits of humanism: one can always disregard the
ethical demands of humanism by treating others as animals or as objects. If, on the other
hand, ethics extends to non-human others, then humanism loses its prioritizing
exclusions. This is the moment that we glimpse when Levinas reflects on his relation to
Bobby. It signifies what Deleuze and Guattari would term the Becoming-animal of
Levinas. A political ethics of the Other became possible when Levinas found himself
stripped of subjectivity and relegated to the sphere outside of the law.
In such becomings, politics and ethics shift from the face – that is, from logos,
signification and subjectivation – to the bare life of the body. In a short paper on the art
of Francis Bacon, titled “The Body, the Meat and the Spirit: Becoming-Animal,” Deleuze
describes the ethics of the animal spirit in man: “the face is a structured spatial
organization which covers the head, while the head is an adjunct of the body, even
though it is its top. It is not that it lacks a spirit, but it is a spirit which is body, corporeal
and vital breath, an animal spirit; it is the animal spirit of man: a pig-spirit, a buffalospirit, a dog-spirit, a bat-spirit...” (19). In effect, Deleuze deconstructs the mind/body
dualism that has structured western metaphysics since antiquity, positioning spirit as an
aspect of bare life, although in a different sense than we find in Agamben. Unlike
conceptions of spirit as logos or rationality, spirit and body are interconnected as a force
of sheer vitality, a kind of zoë. Deleuze’s approach in ‘Becoming-animal’ shifts the
ethical apparatus from face to figure, and from reason to passion. The political apparatus
is also dislodged from macro to micro elements, so that both ethics and politics coincide
in the mobile terrain of multiplicity. Yet the meaning of this shift remains somewhat
obscure, and is certainly foreign to models of political agency and of subjectivity that
often dominate western discourses, in which subjectivity is taken as a requirement of both
political and ethical action. What are the implications of this transfer of ethics from face
to figure with respect to the outside of the law? And how is such an ethics politicized in
its turn?
Becoming-animal situates the political actor in terms of movement between the inside
and the outside of the law, between identity and heterogeneity, between subjection,
abjection, and resisting subjection. The concept refers to the post-human shift in some
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post-structural and psychoanalytic thought from an ontology of ‘being’ to one of
‘becoming.’ In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari are very clear that “the
human being does not ‘really’ become an animal” for “becoming produces nothing other
than itself” (238). The authors remark: “a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself,”
adding that “it has no term since its term in turn exists only as taken up in another
becoming of which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms a block, with the first”
(238). The focus shifts from fixed terms of identification to what passes between such
terms.
Where for Levinas ethics as a singular event is divided from politics as a universalizing
structure, Deleuze and Guattari no longer hold to such polarizations: the realm of the
political includes both singular and general qualities. This approach has much in
common with deconstruction; these writers share a similar logic to Derrida with respect
to the movement that dislodges binaries, but their emphasis and the details of this
destabilization of identity thinking differ. Where Derrida resolves the tension between
the singular (ethics and justice) and the general (law and politics) with a temporal deferral
of justice-to-come, Deleuze and Guattari make the dichotomy vanish in a blur of
movement. Where Derrida plays with temporality, Deleuze and Guattari are spatial in
their approach. When we consider outlawry in Derridian terms, its difference from the
law proper is suspended in a time that is out of joint. Viewed in the terms of Deleuze and
Guattari, outlawry dissolves the borders between the law as a macro structure, and the
heterogeneous micro elements that both constitute and exceed the macro form. Similarly
to Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari are interested in process, metamorphosis, and
connection, rather than how, or what, things are. Where dichotomies depend on fixed
positions and oppositional relations, in this ontology of becoming the borders between
oppositions vanish. Becoming-animal takes place on a ‘vanishing line’ or a ‘line of
flight.’ Thus these thinkers offer us a way to conceive of a politics of minorities, but in
such a way that a relation to a ‘majority’ is always kept in view, and in which neither
position – minority or majority – is fixed. Indeed, minor politics as such act on and reconstitute the more structured third-party political sphere.
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This approach dissolves a polarized approached to politics. In “Power, Theory and
Praxis” Ian Buchanen describes Deleuze and Guattari’s abandonment of the “old binaries
that distinguish between the powerful and the powerless” in favor of a more variegated
view of power relations in which power exists in both consolidated and dispersed forms
(17). The consolidated forms, termed ‘molar,’ are comparable to a body of matter rather
than its molecules; this constitutes the realm of law, state, and subject. This is Le Tier, the
politics of the majority, or ‘majoritarian’ politics. The dispersed form of politics is a
micropolitics, or minoritarian politics. Such politics can be understood through a
molecular metaphor; it is like an infinitesimal multiplicity of molecules that exist in
constant movement and transformation. ‘Molecular’ politics challenges liberal notions of
the political, which tend to organize around static identities. Such minority politics
“express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or
always on the fringe of recognized institutions, groups all the more secret for being
extrinsic, in other words, anomic” (TP 247). Yet molar and molecular politics are not
opposed to each other. Instead they overlap and act on the other, much in the way the
human body is at the same time a solid and self-contained whole, and is comprised of
billions of minuscule and mobile molecules (Buchanan 17). Becoming-animal, and
becoming minoritarian more generally, move between these molar and molecular forms.
In becoming-minoritarian one finds an entryway along the borders of the molar forms of
politics, and passes through, always away from condensed forms.

Becoming-Revolutionary
Becoming-animal is a version of bare life that replaces the subject as the figure of
political agency. This anti-identity political actor signals a movement toward outlawry: as
bare life, becoming animal is vulnerable in her exclusion from the polis, but she
nevertheless acts to counter the law. Such revolutionary becoming is ethical, in Levinas’
sense, because of its relationship to Otherness, and the disruption of finitude that
constitutes it. But it is quite different from Levinasian ethics, because the ethics does not
arise through facial recognition (identity). Where for Levinas it is recognition of the
Other that constitutes one as a subject, for Deleuze and Guattari one literally becomes
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Other in a dispersal away from subjectivity. Where Levinasian ethics is an ethics of
hospitality in which the subject (understanding the self to be an other amongst others)
welcomes the other. But the authors of A Thousand Plateaus are not concerned with
hospitality; they are not concerned with welcoming in those that are on the outside. They
are interested instead in a movement toward the outside, leaving the safety of the familiar
and the similar, and casting off of privilege and dominance. It is an ethics of selftransformation, alliance, and exteriority, not hospitality. Deleuze and Guattari write: “As
Faulkner said, to avoid ending up a fascist there was no other choice but to becomeblack” (292).
Minoritarian politics is a politics of the Other, evoked through an ‘Anomalous’
phenomenon of bordering. The Anomalous (anomal) refers to “that which is outside rules
or goes against the rules” and moreover “an-omalie…designates unequal, the coarse, the
rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialization” (244). The concept dislodges the dominant
subject-position of the “self-conscious white male of the occident” and dismantles the
human ideal inherited from western metaphysics (Günzel 9). As Stephan Günzel phrases
it in “Immanence and Deterritorialization,” “the only way to realize what is hidden in the
idea of justice within ‘human rights’ ... is exactly ‘a becoming-inhuman’” (9). Becominganimal thus expresses a politics of the post-subject, a revolutionary politics of those who
exceed or fall short of the law. But the mechanics and motivations for such peripheral
revolutionary movement is perplexing. It is obvious why those who are outside of the law
might want a new law. But why would anyone who inhabits a dominant subject position
move out toward a minority position, which we know to be disenfranchised? How would
this be revolutionary? It seems as though it would simply expand the space of
disenfranchisement. Moreover it would appear to limit the ethical capacity of becomingminoritarian to those that first have status in major political structures, much like the
ethics of hospitality does (i.e. to men, but not women, to straights but not queers, to white
majorities but not racialized minorities). If one is already a minority, dispossessed of
subject status, is one barred from processes of becoming? Must one first assimilate to the
majority in order to then dismantle it?
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For Deleuze and Guattari, populations are not divided into simple categories such as
included/excluded or majority/minority. We are always already both at once. What
differentiates us, one from the other, as ethical beings is not our degree of inclusion or
exclusion, nor precisely our orientation toward others (although the latter is important).
Ethics is expressed through our becoming-ness, our movement away from generalizations
toward the specificity of the outside in all of its multiplicity and otherness. Ethics is
criticism, that is, self criticism and criticism of the general, from the perspective of the
particular. Becoming-animal specifies the direction of the flow between those aspects of
ourselves that are part of the majority (our sense of belonging, our sense of self) and our
affiliation with the minute particular. A becoming always begins in the majority, until
one meets that dispersive detail that launches the entity outward toward the margins.64
Deleuze and Guattari write: “Yes, all becomings are molecular: the animal, flower or
stone one becomes are molecular collectivities, haeccities, not molar subjects, objects, or
form that we know from the outside and recognize from experience, through science, or
by habit” (275). However the apparent primacy of majoritarianism (primacy in the sense
of coming first, which carries the implication of greater importance in western
metaphysics) may be a problem on at least two counts. The first is the assumption that
one is always already a subject, which returns us to the quandaries of the post-structural
subject: the fiction that the subject comes before the law that hails it into being. The
second is based on the risks of misreading Deleuze and Guattari’s specific uses of
common terms such as ‘minority’ and ‘majority,’ which lends itself to a romanticization
of disenfranchisement, and the erasure of the very real oppression experienced by some
populations.
For Deleuze and Guattari, one does not become a subject. Becoming is limited to a
deconstruction of subjectivity, since becoming is a process of dispersal, not
consolidation. While the authors specify that one’s engagement in molar politics may be
necessary for survival, this does not constitute a becoming. With regard to identity
feminism, for instance, they write: “It is of course, indispensable for women to conduct a
molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their
own subjectivity: ‘we as women’ makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation” (TP
276). But they find the revolutionary potential restricted in such identity politics, because
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the approach tends toward stasis rather than movement. Its criteria are confining. As they
continue: “But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not
function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow” (276).
The implications of becoming-minoritarian for feminist thought and practice is an
excellent example of shifts in the operation of ‘the political’ from identity-based
formations (molar models) to minoritarian ones, and from efforts to be included in the
law to disruptions of it from the outside. However, the argument has raised some alarms
for feminist scholars such as Alice Jardine and Rosie Braidotti, who question the
emergence of a post-subject politics just as women (and by implication other minorities)
consolidate our status as subjects. In “Woman In Limbo: Deleuze And His Br(Others)”
Jardine argues that “becoming-woman” is an example of the tendency by male scholars
such as Lacan, Derrida and Deleuze to mystify and fictionalize “woman” in response to
the rise of feminism, subtly undermining the feminist cause. Likewise, in Patterns of
Dissonance Braidotti critiques Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-minoritarian,” which
she argues destabilizes ‘woman’ as a specific category, and undermines feminism more
generally. Braidotti is concerned that the shift from specificity to multiplicity in
becoming-minoritarian will “result in women’s disappearance from the scene of history,
their fading-out as agents of history” (111). However, the minoritarian approach is
compatible with feminism. Indeed, it addresses some of the limits that identity feminism
has encountered as a monolithic entity that fails to account for the variability and
multiplicity of women themselves, critiques that have been forwarded by queer,
racialized, and disabled feminists. Moreover, as Pelagia Goulimari argues, Deleuze and
Guattari acknowledge the importance of feminism in their work on becomingwoman/minoritarian:
In my view … descriptions of ‘becoming woman’–as ‘introductory power’ and as
‘first quantum’– along with their comment ‘all becomings begin and pass through the
becoming-woman’ serve, first, to recognize feminism’s success in opening the way to
the desire of becoming other, that is, other than one’s ‘self,’ other than a branch on
the tree of Man, other than a subordinate referent of Majority Rule. (103)
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Moreover, as Goulimari continues, these are references to the historical role that
feminism has played in opening up minoritarian movements. Thus the loss of ‘woman’ as
a universal referent does not undermine either ‘women’ or feminism, but rather alters the
emphasis from unity of identity to a diverse, multiple collective understandings of both
‘women’ and feminism. Goulimari terms this “‘minoritarian’ feminism, a ‘becoming
minoritarian’ of feminism” (103).
In other words, the approach is more of a critique of identity politics than of feminism
proper. Deleuze and Guattari challenge the very binaries around which sexed identities
are crystallized: “It is as deplorable to miniaturize, internalize the binary machine as it is
to exacerbate it; it does not extricate us from it” (276). Thus it is precisely when women
consolidate our status as subjects that as feminists we must consider a post-subject
politics, an outlaw politics by and for the other. While identity groups must at times
consolidate (establish a state, struggle for recognition, demand rights, etc.), such archic
approaches ought not constitute the entire political field, or they may become counterrevolutionary forms that mimic their very oppressors. Political struggle takes molecular
as well as molar forms, forms that dismantle institutions and decentralize the flow of
power. Deleuze and Guattari write that: “It is thus necessary to conceive of a molecular
women’s politics that slips into molar confrontations, and passes under or through them”
(276). In other words, politics exceeds the accumulation of status in the present system,
the gaining of rights and participation in the polis to include a disruption and
reconfiguration of the political system. This is not to exclude the importance of molar
politics, including strategies to promote civic engagement for women and other
vulnerable groups. Because molar and molecular politics are not opposed to one another,
it does not constitute a contradiction for both forms of politics to occur simultaneously.
This is good news for feminists, for whom the need to organize under the molar identity
of ‘women’ has certainly not passed. At the same time, it allows feminism the mobility to
itself be multiple, to transform, and to engage in alliances with other identities and nonidentities.
The second concern with regard to the apparent primacy of molar positions is based on
the use of the terms ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ which might easily be misunderstood.
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Because they appear to have numerical significance, the majority might be understood to
be the larger quantity, minority the smaller quantity. However, the majority does not in
this case refer to the largest number of people, but is instead a normative model, an ideal
that nobody ever really attains. We might think of the majority as what is normatively
‘inside the law’ and minority as what moves toward the ‘outside of the law.’ In an
interview with Negri, Deleuze explains:
The difference between minorities and majorities isn't their size. A minority may be
bigger than a majority. What defines the majority is a model you have to conform to:
the average European adult male city-dweller, for example ... A minority, on the other
hand, has no model, it's a becoming, a process. One might say the majority is nobody.
Everybody's caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that would lead
them into unknown paths if they opted to follow it through. When a minority creates
models for itself, it’s because it wants to become a majority, and probably has to, to
survive or prosper (to have a state, be recognized, establish its rights, for example).
But its power comes from what it's managed to create, which to some extent goes into
the model, but doesn't depend on it. A people is always a creative minority, and
remains one even when it acquires a majority; it can be both at once because the two
things aren't lived out on the same plane. (N.pag.)
The suggestion that “the majority is nobody” and that “everybody is caught…in a
minority becoming” might be read as a refusal to acknowledge the reality that some
people really do benefit from privileged subject positions. Indeed, the fact that this can so
easily be inferred is a limitation of minoritarian theory. Yet the authors’ point is not to
deny real power imbalances and differential social statuses, nor is it to suggest that one
must be a member of the majority in order to engage in processes of becoming. It is only
to denaturalize the ‘normal’ on the one hand by suggesting that the majority is an
imaginary construct (in the ideal sense). And on the other hand, it is to suggest that to be
a subject (a member of a majority) is simply to have a consolidated identity, a sense of
oneself as a singular and continuous being, irregardless of one’s particular subject
position. One engages in processes of becoming as a dispersal of this unity, and as a
strategy to re-configure the model of the majority. Certainly some people are more
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engaged in minoritarian becomings than others, and some are more firmly ensconced in
majority subject positions that privilege them. Yet we are all subjects, whether we belong
to dominant or to marginalized communities. Deleuze and Guattari write that “[t]here is
no subject of the becoming except as a deterritorialized variable of the majority; there is
no medium of a becoming except as a deterritoralized variable of a minority” (292).
Since one’s status as a political subject is established vis a vis this molar sense of being –
that is, as a function of social identity – becoming as such operates as a critique of that
social position. State structures are constantly undergoing processes of dispersal and
transformation through this mode of the political.
Deleuze and Guattari are thus interested in the politics of the subject at that moment of
spontaneous rebellion that is a part of the movement of the subject between inside and
outside. Even as we undergo processes of subjectivation, to some degree we evade
hegemonic power and knowledge, as we engage in becomings that reverse subjectivation.
This is why Deleuze and Guattari frame minoritarian becomings under the heading of
becoming-animal: if subjectivity is based on a break from animality, then becominganimal must derive from a break with subjectivity.65 In psychoanalysis and metaphysics
more generally, such a movement toward animality is associated with degradation and
abjection (as with homo sacer), but this is not necessarily the case for becominganimal/becoming-minoritarian. The call to becoming-animal comes from the outside of
the generalizing, molar force of law. It is not a naming call to conscience, but instead an
affect that calls our humanity into question, propelling us into new configurations and
transformations outside of the law, at the threshold, and between the borders, altering
what it means to be political, revising what it means to be human.
Become-animal constitutes another version of the outlaw that I elsewhere took up as the
‘unbecoming girl’ and werewolf. What is distinctive about becoming animal is that the
concept brings a sense of multiplicity to conceptualizations of outlawry, unlike the
werewolf and becoming girl, who were discussed in their singularity. For however
singular an urge for becoming may be, becoming animal-minoritarian-revolutionary is
qualitatively affective: becomings pull beings together, one to the other, without binding
them under conditions of sameness. Deleuze and Guattari write: “[T]he affect is not a
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personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of the power of the pack
that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel. Who has not known the power of
these animal sequences, which uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant.... A
fearsome involution calling us toward unheard-of becomings” (240). The affect pulls us
into a becoming that is a critical de-subjectivation (like the unbecoming girl); it launches
into a border position (like the werewolf). But these alterations of the conditions of our
subjectivity exceed the transformation of singular beings. We are a gang of girls, a pack
of wolves, a swell of revolutionaries. The series of becomings produce a revolutionary
humanity, or more precisely a revolutionary post-humanity.
Becoming-animal thus brings us to a form of revolutionary philosophy, but not in the
precise sense derived from Enlightenment politics, nor from Marxism, as transfers of
power from one group to another. As Buchanen explicates, traditional revolutions, those
that focus on securing power, are counter-revolutionary: they don’t change the
institutions and ideologies in which power is invested; they merely transfer power from
one class to another (14). But what would a revolutionary dispersal of power look like?
Deleuze and Guattari propose a form of “revolutionary becoming” which Deleuze
contends in his interview with Negri is “the only way of casting off … shame or
responding to what is intolerable.” Paul Patton notes that what these authors are after is a
“resistance to the present” (178). Becoming-revolutionary transforms our social and
collective identities. The impetus for change is derived from the diffusion of molar
political forms, through a myriad of minoritarian-becomings (182). If these minoritarianbecomings constitute another version of outlawry, than revolutionary-becoming must as
well. But what kind of politics does this portend? If it involves a dispersal, rather than a
transfer of power, does becoming-revolutionary undo all molar forms and dismantle all
identities, leaving us in a wild realm of outlaw chaos? Is this a return to the state of
nature, in its brute Hobbesian form, or Rousseau’s idyllic version? Is becoming-outlaw
nothing but an assault against any form of structure or authority? Not necessarily.
Outlawry is a critique of molar political forms that allows for some creative processes of
re-invention. It is a critique of the present, so to speak, that launches us toward that
justice-to-come that Derrida promises. As such, outlawry, as I have conceptualized it,
informs (by resisting) the political structures of the present, such as democracy.
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Revolutionary Democracy
I began this chapter with the becoming-animal of Levinas and the becoming-ethical of
Bobby the dog, with the aim of exploring their mutual exposure at the level of bare life as
a site of ethics – an ethics that is situated in the space outside the law, that exceeds the
conditions of subjectivation, but that is nevertheless political. The irony of the association
of ethics with bare life should not be ignored: indeed, we are most unethically political
when we dehumanize others, as we have seen in the Shoah and other genocides, slavery,
patriarchy, colonization and so on. So how can the very terms of dehumanization – bare
life, or animal life – become a site for ethics and political action? Becoming animal sheds
a different light on the politics of life itself by presenting a post-human, rather than
merely de-humanized figure, that can be both ethical and political. Moreover, rather than
referring to some individual who flouts the law in isolation, becoming animal shares an
affective relation with other entities as part of a collective or multiplicity. If Agamben’s
conception of bare life diagnoses a crisis in modern politics in which the law is
suspended and everyone is homo sacer, exposed to death through totalitarian
appropriations of the outside of the law, Deleuze and Guattari’s minoritarian politics,
together with deconstruction, provide the framework to re-conceptualize our political
concepts so that outlawry becomes a threshold for a revolving disruption of the political
sphere with ethics. We might thus conceive of democracy in terms of a politics of bare
life, but along the lines of becoming animal instead of homo sacer, and theorize
democracy as processes of minority becomings instead of majority rule. How then might
we conceive of democracy as a becoming that moves in the direction of the outside of the
law, rather than always consolidating the terms of what is inside the law’s borders? In
short, how does outlawry, in its deconstructive sense, transform our understanding of
democracy?
Democracy is typically affiliated with the politics of subjects, and is what Deleuze and
Guattari term a molar model, since it is based on the majority, rather than minorities, and
consensus, rather than dissensus. As Patton suggests, contemporary liberal democracy is

156

“a form of government in which the governed exercise control over governments and
their policies, typically through regular and fair elections…They ensure equal rights to
effective participation in political processes, but also set limits to what majorities can
decide by protecting basic civil and political rights and ensuring the maintenance of a rule
of law” (185-6). Derrida has demonstrated how problematic this understanding of
democracy is with respect to minorities. As he argues in Rogues, the democratic state
excludes “all sorts of unlike and unrecognizable others,” in particular the “bad citizens,
rogues [and] noncitizens,” despite its promise “at the same time or by turns… to open
itself up, to offer hospitality, to all those excluded” (63).
The problem with – and the cure for, present forms of democracy arise from the autoimmunity of democracy. Democracy protects itself from what threatens it, from within
and from without, by suspending democracy itself. Because it excludes its other,
democracy is always ‘put off.’ Derrida refers to this as the Renvoi of democracy:
“[R]envoi signifies putting off to later, the reprieve [sursis] that remits or defers [sursoit]
democracy until the next resurgence [sursaut] or until the next turn or round; it suggests
the incompletion or essential delay, the self inadequation of every present and presentable
democracy, in other words, the interminable adjournment of the present democracy” (R
37-38). But this concept is more than simply a critique of the inherent failure of
democracy on account of its deferral and difference from itself. The renvoi of democracy
refers to alterity itself, to the difference of the other. The deferral is thus also a reaching
toward difference. In the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, it is a becoming-minoritarian. Or
as Derrida puts it: différance as reference or referral [renvoi] to the other, that is, as the
… undeniable, experience of the alterity of the other, of heterogeneity, of the singular,
the not-same, the different, the dissymmetric, the heteronomous” (38). Democracy thus
takes a liminal position between the law and justice, the political and the ultra-political:
from this border it seeks to re-create itself through a simultaneous construction and
deconstruction.
With these concepts Derrida provides a starting place for bringing Levinas’ ethics into
the political realm. It is through this very contradiction, this difference within itself that
democracy-to-come incorporates an ethics of alterity and exteriority. The Derridean sense
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of time as out of joint suspends the difference between the law and its outside through a
‘revolution’ that literally implies revolving or circling about. It is through this circular
action that democracy-to-come overcomes the homogenizing exclusions of what Levinas
terms third party politics (A Tier) with a movement toward alterity – that is ethics – in the
political field. However, the deconstructive approach also has its limits: the
impossibilities, passivity and the necessary deferral to the future produces a political
concept whose praxis is somewhat obscure. What of the politics of the present? What
route do we take, as individuals or collectively, toward this future? And who or what is
the agent of such a politics?
Deleuze and Guattari propose a theory of becoming-democratic that sounds strikingly
similar to Derrida’s democracy-to-come, but point also to modes of political praxis in the
present, or more precisely, to political praxis as a mode of resistance to the present. This
includes a resistance to present democracies, which, Deleuze and Guattari agree, are
Capitalist fraternities that have no claim to justice.66 As they ask in What is Philosophy:
“What social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor came out of their
territory or ghetto?” (108). Democracy, no less than other political forms, makes outlaws
of its minorities, in the vulnerable and disenfranchised sense of homo sacer. But like
democracy-to-come, becoming-democratic involves becoming-outlaw in its anarchic
sense. Becoming-democratic is the politics of the poor when they come out of their
ghetto, and it is the becoming-minoritarian (opening up) of those very forces that exclude
the poor. It is a dispersion of the majority that makes up a conventional democracy.
Where a democracy is a state of law, becoming-democratic is outside of the law; where
democracies are communicative, becoming-democratic is creative. Deleuze and Guattari
describe becoming-democratic as a critical philosophy, as follows:
We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself
calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist…Art and
philosophy converge at this point: the constitution of an earth and a people that are
lacking as the correlate of creation. …This people and earth will not be found in our
democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which
always eludes the majority. (108)
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This form of politics differs from present constitutional states – indeed from any
constitutional states – and does not specify a determinate structure. In his commentary on
“Becoming-Democratic” Patton points out that the concept “points towards future as yet
unrealized forms of democracy, but also reminds us that there is no definitive form that
will ever arrive….it enables us to perceive the world differently (180-181). Like
Derrida’s ‘to-come’ of democracy, the concept does not offer specific models of political
practice, or universal maxims, but instead a critical approach that is anti-conservative; it
deconstructs current realities from outside, rather than conserving them from within.
With their series of concepts of becoming Deleuze and Guattari set the groundwork for
an ethical politics of bare life because people are seized by these becomings to the extent
that they are not subjects, citizens or members of normative majorities. Bare life is
precisely what we exclude in order to be subjects. However, bare life is not simply
‘being alive’ in the sense that all animal and plant life is alive. It is the politicization of
the sheer fact of living through its exclusion from the polis. Agamben discusses bare life
as a site of vulnerability and exposure to death, but in Deleuze and Guattari’s framework
we might also conceive of bare life as the spring of resistance to the present by which we
strive for something new. Levinas experienced this ethics, and this politicization of his
own bare life, with his fellow prisoners in the camp. Bare life is thus what constitutes the
demos: the people, before they become a democracy, are in processes of becomingdemocratic. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is possible as a movement of dispersal even
when we are already citizens, or members of the majority, but it is absolutely necessary if
we are not.
The distinction between bare life and the subject is not absolute when we consider it in
the framework of outlawry as a deconstructive becoming minoritarian. We might be both
vulnerable and exposed, as in the camp, and yet imbued with the capacity to resist the
present, as those in the camp did in various ways, even to their death. And this resistance
has the capacity to reconfigure the political sphere – as indeed, those in the camp
succeeded at doing (some like Levinas, in a literal sense, and others less directly), for our
ethico-political concepts have been dramatically transformed as a consequence of the
Shoah, and continue to be. For Deleuze and Guattari, ethical political action occurs at the
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threshold between centre and periphery, subject and non-subject, singular and general
that is expressed in ‘becoming-animal’ and becoming-minoritarian. From this liminal
position agency is not only possible but is, as a matter of necessity, tied to the
vulnerability of bare life, which is always poised at the edge of violence or death. In
other words, it is those very people that are excluded, or more generally anyone to the
extent that one is outside of the law, that demands both an ethical and political response.
Political change, if it is to be ethical, mobilizes around those exclusions.
Let us return to Levinas, but this time through Critchley, who both embraces and
critiques Levinasian politics. Critchley forwards a very clear description of a demos that
possesses the deconstructive qualities of outlawry. His solution to Levinas’ political
difficulties – the separation between ethics and politics – follows Derrida’s lead,
incorporating an ‘a priori’ notion of the messianic into the formal concept of the ethical
relation, while refusing Levinas’ more problematic specific political content (i.e. the
androcentricism, racism and Zionism) (180-181). The approach is also similar to
revolutionary minoritarianism: Critchley proposes the incarnation of ethics in politics
through the manifestation of what he terms an ‘anarchic demos.’ This shifts the
discussion from ‘politics’ to ‘the political,’ that is, from politics as it is played out in
present government structures, to the political as a field of theoretical concern that
defines the content of the politics of the future. In this view, the state is undermined by
the politics of the people as they exceed any classification. The people, in this sense, are
not subjects, citizens, or members of some group, they are those “who do not count” and
“who have no right to govern” (183). Critchley thus situates “a radical manifestation of
the people” as the agent of politics. As he describes it, this refers to “the people not as das
Volk or le peuple shaped by the state, but as die Leute, or les gens, the people in their
irreducible plurality” (182). This turn toward an anarchic demos corrects Levinas’
separation of ethics and politics for Critchly, by making politics the stake of ethics.
In this formulation, ethics is “a moment of disincarnation that challenges the borders and
legitimacy of the state” (181). Critchley bridges this gap between ethics and politics by
re-defining the political terrain, shifting politics from what mediates the multiplicity, to
the multiplicity itself. Politics, for Critchley, is an anarchic demos, a zone in which
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people live a politics, as opposed to politics producing a people. But who precisely are
‘the people?’ How do we differentiate the anarchic demos from the fascist masses, and
from the depoliticized body of the people as bare life, that is, the people as they are
exposed to death, as in the camps? Or, more to the point, how do we disengage the
fascist masses of their fascism, or, in more moderate regimes of governance, free the
citizens of their subjection and make their lives (bare life) matter, once again? And how
do we maintain a politics that acknowledges and supports the politics of the people in the
margins and in the camps, the people as beings exposed to one another and to death?
Critchley proposes that ethics become an “anarchistic disturbance of politics,”
transforming ethics from a theological term to a kind of outlawry. His approach is similar
to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming democratic in that it involves a revised
definition of politics as the “dissensual space of democracy” instead of the generalizing
structures of law and governance. This is a metapolitics of the people that is intended to
prevent politics from “closing over itself” in a totalizing sense (181). An ethical politics
is possible, for Critchley, if it is a politics of difference and disruption, involving a
metapolitical process of democratization that does not allow itself to become a totality.
Through a structure of dissensus and openness to transformation, a political system can
avoid becoming “tyrannical” (181). In Critchley’s engagement with Levinas we find not
only a reversal in the definition of the political from mediation to disruption and from
consensus to dissensus – we also find a new kind of political subject. Or, rather, not a
political subject per se, but a political multiplicity that is not a mere mass or mob, but a
demos. This demos is different from the body politics as it is currently constituted,
because it is based not on the common terms shared by subjects – their common will, or
shared national or cultural identity – but on their internal differences as a collective
determined by dissensus and the anticipation of disruption.
For Deleuze and Guattari ‘the people’ of becoming-democratic make up just such a
demos. The people are performatively constituted as pre-political agents, or outlaws who
have both an archic and anarchic function. We find them in Deleuze and Guattari’s
enigmatic phrase “the people are missing” derived from their discussion of Kafka and
minor literature. For Kafka, minor literature treats private affairs as political matters of
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life and death, as opposed to adhering to the border between public and private that is
maintained by major literatures. Major literature, or for our purposes major politics, treat
only those who are included and privileged in the system as political subjects. In this
definition of the political the people are missing because they exist only as minorities. As
discussed earlier, a minority is not to be understood conventionally as a disenfranchised
few. Indeed, the people insofar as they constitute a minoritarian becoming – a becominganimal – are a multiplicity. Becoming-animal is part of a movement, a collectivity: “A
becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short a
multiplicity... modes of expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, peopling” (TP
239). But what is the difference between a majoritarian multiplicity and a minoritarian
one? It is precisely the difference between Levinas’ Third Party politics, and a
revolutionary democracy. The former, which Deleuze and Guattari term a ‘mass,’ is the
collective of subjects organized under the banner of a state. But the minoritarian
multiplicity is ‘the people’ in what Critchley terms their “irreducible plurality” (1992).
Do we not, in this schema, end up with something that resembles a band of outlaws more
than a mode of politics? Are we heading straight into chaos and anarchy? Becomingrevolutionary and becoming-democratic always move in the direction of the outside of
the law, since they involve processes of dispersal away from the molar forms that are
definitive of law and state politics. But like the deconstructive, performative theory of
law explored in Chapter 1, the concept of ‘becoming-outlaw’ disrupts and dissolves
binaries of inside and outside of the law: the archic becomes anarchic, the anarchic
founds a new law, and keeps revolving in new becomings. New fields of molar and
molecular politics allow for simultaneous condensation and dispersal of our affinities and
identities. Deleuze and Guattari propose a dispersing direction of becoming-minoritarian,
in the movement of its vanishing lines, yet all these becomings move back and forth
between minor and major frames, dispersing and condensing, condensing and dispersing.
The shift from the individual to the multiplicity is imperative in these movements.
Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari explicitly depart from traditions that oppose the total to the
multiple. We are always both molar and molecular. Moreover, their aim is to escape
dialectics in an effort to distinguish between different kinds of multiplicity – of selves, of
states, and of political movements, those that condense in molar forms and others that
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disperse in the direction of infinity. They move away from always conceiving of the
multiple in its totalizing form as an archaic or future unity, and instead conceive of it in
its “pure state” of sheer multiplicity (32).
The relationship of the self to such multiplicity is not the same as the subject’s relation to
state. The self, in this approach, is a threshold between multiplicities that are always
transforming, multiplicities that are “composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis”
(249). The self – the fascinated self, as the authors term it – occupies various positions
along the borderline of these shifting multiplicities, desiring both the otherness of the
other, and desiring to become the other. Fascinated selves form and dispel collectives
with other diverse elements, and act back in relation to the molar forms of power that it
meets in its bordering capacities. These relationships are not dialectical, and they may be
simultaneous. For on the one hand, these collectives interact with the state political
forms: “they continually work them from within and trouble them from without, with
other forms of content, other forms of expression” (242). And on the other, multiplicities
may transform from one form to the other “replacing pack effects with family feelings or
State intelligibilities” (256).
Becoming-outlaw involves a new way of understanding or undertaking democracy, in
this case as a mode of outlawry in the form of the ongoing revolution, in the sense of
revolving, continual disruption from the outside, and continual change.67 Yet can we say
that those individuals who are systematically stripped of their politics – the people who
are missing – make up the political demos? The answer is definitively yes. Since
outlawry is a deconstructive and performative concept, it disrupts binaries such as public
and private, major and minor politics. We can see this in the outlaw politics of the camp,
where the switching that is endemic to outlawry thrives. The inmates are stripped of
humanity and transformed into beasts without language, but it is the Nazi guards and the
villagers who “sometimes raised their eyes” that are inhumane and beastly (they saw, but
did not see, they retained their politics and language, but neither acted, nor spoke).
On the one hand, it seems as if there is an inherent contradiction in conceiving people (les
gens) as a force of political agency because it is the denial of political agency that
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constitutes them as outlaws in the sense of homo sacer, yet a politic directed toward the
future belongs to them, since their very degradation and lack of representation demands
change, and movement toward the future. Yet only the people (le peuple) that are
interpellated as subjects through the state are capable of acting or representing themselves
as political subjects. Thus liberal social movements aim to insert those who are excluded
into the polis as people who count, have rights and the capacity for self-representation.
Of course, on one level this is to be desired. But how is this to be achieved without
limiting citizenship and participation in the polis to sheer subjection and assimilation to
current structures of power, especially those structures that are unjust or totalizing? Is not
subjectivity/subjection what transforms us, as individuals and as a group, from les gens to
le peuple, separating us from animals and grounding our agency, consciousness, and our
rights as political subjects in our very humanity? How do we grasp that space in which
the unrepresented Other or outsider gains access through action that instead transforms
the political sphere? Outlawry thus raises questions about the very relationship between
politics and subjectivity and the direction of the flow of power between those who are
included and those who are excluded.
In a revolutionary democracy, the figure that is marginalized has a kind of outlaw force –
or conversely, those who are afforded privilege in relation to the law foreclose that
privilege in the ethical demand to strive for justice. Often representations of exclusions
from the law demarcate a kind of helplessness, an absence of subjectivity, articulation,
and action – we see this in Agamben’s concepts of homo sacer and bare life. These are
important dramatizations of spaces of unrepresentability that illuminate gaps in the realm
of the political where some groups fall outside of the lines of power and channels of
representation. Nevertheless, revolutionary democracy provides a structure of the
political through which outlawry might address that tension between exclusion and
inclusion. It is a matter of how Foucault’s assertion that “where there is power there is
resistance” plays out. The people (les gens) are the people to the extent they threaten and
push back on the law in becoming-democratic. They are the anarchic demos that take to
the streets. They are what Derrida terms a voyoucracy. They are outlaws. Yet they are
also potentially the people (les peuples), the citizens and subjects of the law that have
agency and are represented in politics and in language – in the democracy that is to-come.
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Conclusion
The deconstructive logic of outlawry is ancient. The sovereign proclamation of outlawry
– Wargus Esto, in Frankish law, or “become a wolf” – was a common legal penalty from
the archaic period through the Middle Ages that tied sovereign power to its own undoing.
The post-human politics of twentieth-century post-structuralism was thus anticipated
hundreds of years earlier in a figure who challenged the law from the outside, not as a
subject, but as liminal creature suspended between human and beast. This post-human
figure is both a werewolf and an outlaw. In the wolf ban the law is constituted by what
challenges it; as recourse to this challenge, the law is dissolved with respect to the
offender in order to preserve itself; but it can never completely preserve itself. By
banishing its challengers instead of killing or rehabilitating them, the sovereign reduces
the outlaw to absolute vulnerability and exposure to death, but also ensures its own
mortality.
Outlawry exposes the law’s inability to be at one with itself, its fundamental insecurity,
its undecidability, and its dependence on force to come into being and maintain itself. Yet
outlawry is the non-presence that allows the law to begin its presencing. What is outside
of the law is included in the law: even as the outside is severed from the inside – it is
nonidentical to it, exterior to or excluded from it – it is nevertheless joined to it by the
very limit that defines it as other. Outlawry is always already present as the law’s
deconstructive double: it is fundamental to the law’s structure as a performative force. By
refusing to allow the law to be final or complete, outlawry keeps the political system
from stagnating. The law must continually transform as its context changes, or it will be
replaced with a new law. In transformation or revolution, for better or for worse, this
alterity is derived from outside of the law. Outlawry is persistent in its presence (as a
nonpresence), and in its promise and threat to the law.
But it seems as if in modernity, outlawry has a new logic; one that conserves the law
instead of ensuring the law’s difference from itself. Giorgio Agamben points to the
dangers of this modern mode of outlawry in Homo Sacer. Outlawry structures
Agamben’s vision of biopolitics: sovereignty, which today takes life itself as its object,
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depends on forces outside of the law for the foundation and conservation of its power (the
sovereign’s decision on the exception comes from outside of the law). As such, modern
sovereignty, even in democratic states, is a totalizing force that encloses its outside. In
this extra-legal state, everybody becomes an outlaw of sorts as they suffer a withdrawal
of legal rights and protections. Citizens are no longer subjects capable of political action,
but instead are abjected and exposed to death. This double mode of outlawry is the legacy
of the camps. Agamben writes:
[t]here is no return from the camps to classical politics…[T]he possibility of
distinguishing between our biological body and our political body…was taken from
us forever. And we are not only, in Foucault’s words, animals whose life as living
beings are at issue in their politics, but also—inversely—citizens whose very politics
is at issue in the natural body.” (188)
Western metaphysics, politics, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence are together
implicated in a state of affairs that brings us to the edge of “an unprecedented biopolitical
catastrophe” (188) as bare life (life that is excluded from the law) becomes the object of
the law (a law that preserves its power by suspending itself in relation to the life that it
excludes).
There is something compelling in Agamben’s dark vision, in which exposure to death
seems to enter the very core of life, infiltrating every aspect of social and political life in
a new kind of totalitarianism. His diagnosis of the modern political condition as an
indefinite state of exception populated by homo sacer, while cynical, seems to hit the
mark, whether one is considering the post 9-11 global ‘war on terror,’ or biotechnology.
Whether it is in the decision to cease life-preserving treatment, or to deem someone a
terrorist or “unlawful enemy combatant” and detain them without the protection of the
usual legal rights, the suspension of the law in relation to some lives changes the law’s
relation to all human life. In Agamben’s analysis this new relation – what he defines as
biopolitics–takes the structure of the archaic ban, the proclamation of outlawry that
inaugurates sovereignty by excluding the outlaw. In this view, the ban does not
deconstruct sovereignty, it preserves it. For Agamben, outlawry serves two functions. It
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guarantees the total indivisible power of the sovereign, while in the case of the subject,
outlawry constitutes an erasure of agency and exposure to death (the banned individual
enters a liminal space between human and beast, and as such can be killed but not
sacrificed). In effect, for Agamben the reappearance of outlawry as biopolitics encloses
all forms of modern sovereignty in a form of totalitarianism.
However, it is not outlawry that traps modernity in the logic of the camps, nor is it a
return to some ‘normal’ situation that saves us from fascism. This was Walter Benjamin’s
message, a message that often seems to go unheard, although it is obvious to those who
are outside of the law: fascism is the normal situation. The fact that this has not changed
in the six decades following the Shoah, but rather expanded to secretly structure even
liberal democracies, as Agamben argues, is cause for significant concern. We cannot rid
ourselves of outlawry in the political sphere. To ban outlawry, if such a thing were
logically possible, would only intensify the biopolitical catastrophe because it would
foreclose the law’s difference from itself, its capacity to transform, while to welcome
only outlawry would surely invite chaos. Indeed, there must be law. Yet the solution is
not a foreclosure of the outside of the law. Agamben creates a very compelling sketch of
the problem when outlawry is taken up in biopolitics, but he forgets the challenge that
outlawry poses to sovereignty, missing the deconstructive relation outlawry maintains
with the law. A mimetic switch complicates the biopolitical situation, deconstructing
biopolitics itself and reversing the significance of outlawry to sovereignty and subject.
Sovereignty is exposed to its own annihilation, as Derrida surmises in Rogues, it has
finally undone itself; it has lost all meaning (101). And the subject, exiled from the law,
tastes its unmediated freedom (ipseity), glimpses the law’s mystical authority, and
celebrates the possibility of a new law, if only for a suspended instant.
Outlawry is tricky; it can be two things at once: founder and destroyer, presence and
absence, crime and justice, conservation and transformation. As Hannah Arendt surmises
in the preface to Origins of Totalitarianism, it is as if “progress and doom are two sides
of the same medal” (vii). This is why we say that outlawry is deconstructive. There is
something (im)possible about outlawry; it makes the law at once possible and impossible,
just as it makes justice (which is separate from the law) at once possible and impossible.
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We can see this in the fine line dividing the thought of Benjamin, who took his own life
to thwart confinement in the camps, and Carl Schmitt, the Nazi jurist. Where Benjamin
identifies a sphere of human action that takes place outside of the law in order to
overthrow the political order, Schmitt’s ‘state of exception’ harnesses outlawry in order
to preserve state power. The problem is thus not outlawry, but rather the conserving
relation of sovereignty to outlawry, and the abuse of power when life becomes the object
of sovereignty as such. What is needed is not less outlawry, but an ethical relation of
outlawry to the political that opens up possibilities for justice, that transforms rather than
conserves, and that affirms life in all of its diversity, instead of making life the object of
calculation. In other words, what is needed are political concepts that would permit a
deconstructive, rather than empowering and conserving operation of outlawry in the
political sphere, an ethics of outlawry that opens the political to alterity.
Thus whether we are referring to the singular subject, or the people as an anarchic demos,
a relation to outlawry need not result in sheer abjection and subordination. Instead,
outlawry can be a source of political vitality, another kind of biopolitics entirely, one that
affirms life rather than infusing life with death. One can act politically from a place
outside of what the law permits, that is, not as subjects but as those who have been
excluded from the law. This is why we can affiliate the outlaw with such vulnerable
figures as the werewolf, exile, or concentration camp inmate, but also the politically
transformative crowds that stormed the Bastille, or that overthrew the Apartheid regime
in South Africa. The law can be challenged from a place of exclusion or
disenfranchisement after all, even if we usually understand political agency as proper to
the subject. Indeed, outlawry as deconstruction provides a structure that makes it possible
to live with the contradictions between a politics of the subject and a politics of
difference. For when we view the law as always already undergoing its own
deconstruction, the difference between subject and abject, law and outside of the law is
suspended. We might think of this in temporal terms, as Derrida does: time is “out of
joint” and we persist in a perpetual undecidability in which is it impossible to know
which is which, law or outlawry, subject or abject. Alternatively, we might conceptualize
this undecidability via the spatial and biological metaphors proposed by Deleuze and
Guattari: we are at once molar territories and molecular constellations. Our relationship
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to the law and its outside is under constant negotiation as our psychic and social realities
shift, and as we disperse and aggregate in our changing identities.
We thus might enjoy a politics of identity and a politics of difference simultaneously. For
the subject, who depends on the law for coherence and agency, but who is vulnerable in
this very dependence, outlawry institutes a threshold of revision. We live with an aporia
whereby the subject is hailed into its becoming by the law, and the law is performatively
brought into being by the subject. Since the law depends on outlawry as the limit from
which it presents itself, both law and subject undergo constant alteration: as law and
outlawry exchange places, the subject is simultaneously becoming and unbecoming,
consenting to and resisting its subjection. The relation between subject and law is thus a
living, dynamic relation; it cannot stagnate in a biopolitical death, even when one is
literally killed by the law, because when the subject is stripped of its coherence and
agency, the law is, in that very instant, rendered unintelligible.
Outlawry offers no neat solution to the crises of modernity. There is no requirement or
guarantee that an action outside of the law be ethical, even when the actor intends it to be.
Outlawry is risky because it is a politics of openings and transformations whose
outcomes are not predetermined; even as we strive for justice we risk injustice; as
political actors we risk that we will become what we least want to become, that the fascist
will sneak up on us and take our place, an imposter. To deter this risk, outlawry demands
our vigilance as ethical political actors, our perpetual critique of the present, and our
openness to transformation from the outside. It is in the context of such critique and
openness to the transformation of our own identities, as subjects and as a demos, that
outlawry can lead to justice.
Such an ethical politics of outlawry revises the law by the other and for the Other. The
‘subject’ of politics is constituted by difference itself, and thus a post-human subject of
politics is possible. Rather than the singular identity of the subject as a political actor who
votes or participates in a politics of representation, the politics of outlawry is that of a
multiplicity that acts to transform society on the basis of who or what the law excludes.
Or, to be more precise, it is both a politics of identity and inclusion, and a politics of
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difference and exclusion at once, for a politics of outlawry exists by maintaining, rather
than resolving, its contradictions.
The political, as such, is not constituted by inclusion in a majority, but rather by
differences inherent in the plurality; democracy is comprised not through the sovereign
will of a majority, but through the dissolution of the majority into its minorities.
Democracy is a verb, not a noun, a process, not a constative political body. It is what
Derrida refers to as the democracy-to-come and Deleuze and Guattari term ‘becomingdemocratic.’ We might think of this as a ‘revolutionary democracy:’ a democracy in
which the inside is under constant revision and deconstruction by the outside, a poetic
revolution whose political concepts remain under irreducible negotiation. An ethical
outlaw politics is thus a politics of transformation and revolution, not of conservation. It
does not build on the past or culminate some trajectory of progress. Ethical political
action occurs at the threshold between centre and periphery, subject and non-subject,
singular and general, law and outlawry.
We cannot grasp blindly onto outlawry as that otherness that will save us from ourselves.
The dangers of outlawry are very real, as we have witnessed through the injustices of the
twentieth century, from the Shoah to Guantánamo Bay. Outlawry, when it is deployed to
conserve the law, is tied to totalitarianism, even in the context of so-called democracy.
Yet we cannot rid ourselves of outlawry without realizing the very worst of our fears.
Outlawry is necessary to the very presence of the law; moreover, it is the deconstructive
force that allows the law to persist in its difference from itself, to transform and to open
itself to alterity. Outlawry marks the fault line between justice and injustice; to walk it we
must remain politically vigilant and self-critical; we must be willing to become
something other than ourselves. In “Force of Law,” Derrida writes that there is no justice
without the experience of aporia. Outlawry must be manifested as the aporia of the law,
not its rationalization, if we are to have justice. According to Derrida: “Justice is an
experience of the impossible: a will, a desire, a demand for justice” (244). Outlawry is
just such a call for the impossible. It turns the inside out and the outside in; its difference
demands change; its becomings herald the future.
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Endnotes

1

There were vast populations of outlaws living in the forests and countryside in England and other
Northern European countries throughout the Middle Ages. In his analysis of the “Early Registers of English
Outlaws” Ralf Pugh reports that in the late 1300 and early 1400s well over a thousand people were
outlawed every year, with the numbers adding up on account of the long-term nature of the sentence. Pugh
estimates that: “If England's population was about 2.25 million, the proportion of people created outlaws
was 12 per thousand in 1398-99 and 7 per thousand in 1409-10. If, further, we assume that many outlawries
remained for long or permanently un-reversed, the total outlaw population could have approached [a] "vast
multitude"…(323)
2

Traces of outlawry in archaic Frankish law can be found in Frankish law books such as the Lex Salica and
Lex Ripuaria, in the phrases wargus sit ('he shall be a wolf'), and wargus esto (become a wolf). See also
Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of the ancient Germanic legal framework known as Friedlosegkeit that
excluded wrongdoers from the community as men who were ‘without peace’ (friedlos) and consequently
became wolf-men (wargus) (Homo Sacer 104-105). See also Mary Gerstein’s discussion of outlawry in
Norse societies (131).
3

Cited in Rummel, Rudolf. Death by Government. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994, 86.

4

In Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt writes:
For then a criminal offense become the best opportunity to regain some kind of human equality,
even if it be as a recognized exception to the norm. The one important fact is that this exception is
provided for by law. As a criminal even a stateless person will not be treated worse than another
criminal, that is, he will be treated like everybody else. Only as an offender against the law can he
gain protection from it. As long as his trial and his sentence last, he will be safe from that arbitrary
police rule against which there are no lawyers and no appeal. The same man who was in jail
yesterday because of his mere presence in this world, who had no rights whatever and lived under
threat of deportation, or who was dispatched without sentence and without trial to some kind of
internment because he has tried to work and make a living, may become almost a full-fledged
citizen because of a little theft. Even if he is penniless hew can now get a lawyer, complain about
his jailers, and he will be listened to respectfully. He is no [286] longer the scum of the earth but
important enough to be informed of all the details of the law under which he will be tried. He has
become a respectable person. 287

5

This appears to be an intentional misuse of the idiom ‘beyond the pale’ which means, colloquially,
‘beyond the standards of decency.’ It is derived from an obsolete definition of pale (from the Latin palus)
as a stake or pointed piece of wood (i.e. impaled), and refers to an area that is fenced in and safe. An early
meaning of ‘beyond the pale’ is to be outside of a boundary. A pale is also a jurisdiction under a particular
authority; often held by one nation in another country. By implication, anything outside their control was
uncivilised. Notably, the phrase ‘beyond the pale’ also refers to restricted areas created to enclose certain
groups for political reasons, such as the ‘Pale of Settlement’ created by Catherine the Great in 1791 that
restricted Jews to the western border region of Russia. As a concession, some Jews were allowed to live
‘beyond the pale.’ Other notable political pales include the Pale of Dublin in Ireland and the Pale of Calais
in France.
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6

Laws outlawing indigenous peoples in both the US and Canada persisted until quite recently. Traces of
this exclusion remain in inordinately high criminalization rates as Native people tread the line between
being outlaws and populations who, like Arendt’s refugees, enjoy the ‘rights’ of criminals. In the US,
Indigenous people were not considered human until the 1879 Standing Bear Trial and in Canada they did
not have citizenship rights until 1956, nor the right to vote until 1960. In Newfoundland, one could
casually kill ‘Indians’ without culpability until the colony joined Canada in 1949. A negative politics of
outlawry, one that guarantees the law by excluding some people from legal protections, has thus long coexisted with democratic governance as the very premise of colonial sovereignty
Another example is Canada’s War Measures Act of 1914, which the gave the federal Cabinet the power to
govern by decree in the case of “real or apprehended” “war, invasion or insurrection.” The Act limited the
freedom of Canadians during both world wars, and was used to detain in camps German, Ukrainian and
Slavic Canadians in WWI and Japanese Canadians during WWII. In October and November 1970, it was
applied to declare a state of "apprehended insurrection" in Québec and institute emergency regulations in
response to two kidnappings by the Front de Libération du Québec. In 1988 The War Measures Act was
replaced by the Emergencies Act, which has more limited powers. See The Emergencies Act. Government
of Canada Depository Services Program. Web. Accessed March 10, 2010. http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca
7

Wood directs readers to Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (Hiedegger et Les Modernes) for a neo liberal
critique of post-structuralism, Bourdieu for Neo-Marxist critique, Habermas (The Philosophical Discourses
of Modernity) from the perspective of critical theory, and Nancy Harstock (“Foucault and Power: A Theory
for Women”) for a feminist viewpoint (96-97, and notes 3, 5, 19)
8

Benjamin’s letter to Schmitt reads as follows:
Esteemed Professor Schmitt,
You will receive any day now from the publisher my book The Origin of the German Mourning
Play. With these lines I would like not merely to announce its arrival, but also to express my joy at
being able to send it to you, at the suggestion of Mr. Albert Salomon. You will very quickly
recognize how much my book is indebted to you for its presentation of the doctrine of sovereignty
in the seventeenth century. Perhaps I may also say, in addition, that I have also derived from your
later works, especially the "Diktatur," a confirmation of my modes of research in the philosophy
of art from yours in the philosophy of the state. If the reading of my book allows this feeling to
emerge in an intelligible fashion, then the purpose of my sending it to you will be achieved.
With my expression of special admiration,
Your very humble Walter Benjamin

Dated December 1930, cited in Samuel Weber’s “Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl
Schmitt” p.5. Original Source: Gesammelte Schriften. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980, 1: 3.8871
9

Schmitt makes this claim in a series of letters to Hansjörg Veisel in 1973 (Viesel, 1988 cited in
Bredekamp 1999 and Agamben 2005).
10

This is not to suggest an affinity between Catholicism and Nazism but merely Schmitt’s particular
interpretation of Catholic doctrine. Muller writes: “Schmitt was an authoritarian Catholic, with occasional

180

forays into totalitarianism, who—at least at certain points in his life—put his faith in the Biblical figure of
the Katechon who holds off the Anti-Christ” (461).
11

In contrast the English and French understandings of the term violence is derived from the Latin
violentia, meaning “vehemence, impetuosity” and violentus, or “vehement, forcible.” Where the German
clearly associates Gewalt with law and justice, in French and English violence is commonly related to
illegal, unjustified, or extreme uses of force. Likewise, in contradiction to Benjamin’s association between
Greek mythology and lawmaking violence, in Classic Greek, as in French and English, violence is
associated with physical force, but not legislative power. The Greek term is bia, meaning bodily strength,
force.
12

In Limited Inc. Derrida writes:
As opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the performative does not have
its referent … outside of itself or, in any event before and in front of itself. It does not describe
something that exists outside of language and prior to it. It produces or transforms a situation, it
effects; and even if it can be said that a constative utterance also effectuates something and always
transforms a situation, it cannot be maintained that that constitutes its internal structure, its
manifest function or destination, as in the case of the performative. (13)

13

Derrida writes that: “A decision can only come to being in a space that exceeds the calculable program
that would destroy all responsibility by transforming it into a programmable effect of determinate causes.
There can be no moral or political responsibility without this trial and this passage by way of the
undecidable. Even if a decision seems to take only a second and not to be preceded by any deliberation it is
structured by this experience and experiment of the undecidable” (LI 116).
14

Butler makes this statement in the film Judith Butler: Philosophe en Tout Genre, by Paule Zajdermann.
ATRE France et Associés, 2006.
15

This might be understood along the lines of Monique Wittig’s argument in “The Straight Mind” when she
writes that lesbians are not women, because ‘woman’ connotes subservience to ‘man’ in the rules of
heterosexual discourse.
16

Conservative because the law is suspended in order to preserve it, rather than to overthrow it.

17

Agamben claims that in modernity, we have all become outlaws of this second type, which he terms
homo sacer. See chapter One for a discussion on Benjamin and Schmitt, and chapter three for an analysis
of Agamben’s concept of Homo Sacer.
18

On Ressentiment and the subject Nietzsche writes:
A quantum of power is nothing more than the drive, will, effect. But language seduces common
people to add subject, or substratum, a “being” behind the doing, effecting, becoming. This
doubles the doing, as a cause and its effect. Ressentiment exploits this to uphold the belief that the
strong one is free to be weak, and thus the bird of prey should be held accountable for not
choosing to be a lamb. From this the powerless say, let us be different from the evil ones, let us be
good. “As if the weakness of the weak… [is] something chosen, a deed, a merit. This kind of
human needs the belief in a neutral subject with free choice, out of an instinct of self-preservation,
self-affirmation, in which every lie tends to hallow itself. It is perhaps for this reason that the
subject…has until now been the best article of faith on earth, because it made possible for the
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majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, that sublime self-deception of
interpreting weakness itself as freedom, of interpreting their being such-and-such as a merit.”
(Geneology of Morals 13.20)
19

De Montagne’s citation reads as follows: “Lawes are now maintained in credit not because they are just,
but because they are lawes. It is the mystical foundation of their authority; they have none
other…whosoever obeyeth them because they are just, obeyes them not justly the way that he ought.” Cited
in “Force of Law” 239-240.
20

This was discussed at length in Chapter One.

21

Magnus finds that Benhabib’s earlier critique still holds for Butler’s more recent (1997) The Psychic Life
of Power and Excitable Speech, and that in fact, the diminished agency of the subject becomes more
pronounced as Butler reduces subjectivity to the discursive effects of interpellation and naming. However,
she argues that Butler’s 2003 Kritik der ethischen Gewalt resolves these issues to a large extent through the
intersubjective recognition of the interpellated subject (82).
22

Historically, in British common law, refusal to appear before the law was grounds to be proclaimed an
outlaw. This follows an earlier Anglo Saxon law that proclaimed as outlaws those who would not pay
blood money to the family of a murdered person – literally refusing the guilt/debt.
23

In Powers of Horror, Kristeva writes that the abject includes: “The traitor, the liar, the criminal with a
good conscience, the shameless rapist, the killer who claims he is a savior…Any crime, because it draws
attention to the fragility of the law, is abject, but premeditated crime, cunning murder, hypocritical revenge
are even more so because they heighten the display of such fragility” (4).
24

In Psychic Life of Power Butler writes that:
If conditions of power are to persist, they must be reiterated; the subject is precisely the site of
such reiteration, a repetition that is never merely mechanical. As the appearance of power shifts
from the condition of the subject to its effects, the conditions of power (prior and external) assume
a present and futural form. But power assumes this present character through a reversal of its own
direction, one that performs a break with what has come before and dissimulates as a selfinaugurating agency. The reiteration of power not only temporalizes the conditions of
subordination but also shows these conditions to be, not static structures, but rather
temporalized—active and productive. (16)

25

According to Butler in Psychic Life of Power: “Significantly, Freud identifies heightened conscience and
self-beratement as one sign of melancholia, the condition of uncompleted grief…Melancholia rifts the
subject, marking a limit to what it can accommodate. Because the subject does not, cannot, reflect on that
loss, that loss marks the limit of reflexivity, that which exceeds (and conditions) its circuitry. Understood
as forclosure, that loss inaugurates the subject and threatens it with dissolution” (23).
26

Coincidentally, in archaic European traditions, hanging was the proper mode of execution for outlaws.
The Germanic and Norse terms for werewolf, Wargus and Vargr are linked to the Germanic “strangle”
(wergh via wargaz). Strangling was not just a means of execution or murder; it was the proper mode of
sacrifice to Odin, as well as the proper mode of killing the outlaw, on the gallows, or Varghr Tree (Gerstein
141-144).
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27

In antiquity, banning was instituted only in special cases, for crimes that were deemed beyond
compensation or retribution. Such crimes not only called the ‘humanity’ of the perpetrator into question,
they also threatened sovereignty and community cohesion. For instance, corpse desecration, cannibalism,
cowardice, oath breaking, bail breaking, and treason were all crimes that were taken up through the ban
rather than models of justice based on guilt and retribution.
28

In the ontology of the ban, not only are werewolves held in a liminal relation to the law, they are
mediators between the worlds of the living and the dead, between matter and spirit. Their relatives are the
berserkers and young warriors who channeled the spirits of bears or wolves in battle (Gerstein 155-156),
and the mystical hounds that guard passage to the land of the dead.
29

When I refer to the article “La Bête et le Souverain” (LBLS) published in La Démocratie à Venir, edited
by Marie-Louise Mallet, the translations are my own. This article is an excerpt from Derrida’s Seminar La
Bête et le Souverain which was not available in English when I wrote the first draft of this chapter. When I
refer to the text by its English title The Beast and the Sovereign (BS), I am citing Geoffrey Bennington’s
translation of the Seminar.
30

According to Douglas Harper’s Online Etymology Dictionary ban is derived from the proto-European
base bha- "to speak" (which becomes the Greek phanai, and Latin fari "to say” and Armenian ban, or
"word"). ) In Old English and French Ban refers to a public proclamation, in Old Norse (banna) it means
to curse or prohibit. A second Old French meaning refers to outlawry and banishment. All of these
originate from the proto germanic bannan, meaning proclaim, command, forbid, or the same word in Old
High German, meaning to command under threat of punishment. In contemporary German this is bannen,
curse, expel, banish. In Old Irish bann is “law.” A second meaning in Serbo-Croatian and Persian refers to
rulers themselves as the Ban, and is linked to pati, the Sanskrit word for “guard” or “protect.”
31

In Leviathon, Hobbes writes” “This is the foundation of that right of punishing, which is exercised in
every common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely in laying down
theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it
was not given but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him by naturall Law) as entire,
as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warr of everyone against his neighbour” (Cited in Agamben, HS
106, his emphasis)..
32

Agamben uses Italy for an example:
It is well known that since the practice of executive legislation by law-decrees has become the rule
in Italy. Not only have emergency decrees been issued in moments of political crisis, thus
circumventing the constitutional principle that the rights of the citizens can be limited only by
law…but law-decrees now constitute the normal form of legislation to such a decree that they
have been described as “bills strengthened by guaranteed emergency” (Fresa 1981, 1520). This
means that the democratic principle of the separation of powers has today collapsed and that the
executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power. Parliament is no
longer the sovereign legislative body that holds the exclusive power to bind the citizens by means
of the law: it is limited to ratifying the decrees issued by the executive power. In a technical sense,
the Italian Republic is no longer parliamentary but executive. And it is significant that though this
transformation of the constitutional order (which is today underway to varying decrees in all the
Western democracies) is perfectly well known to jurists and politicians, it has remained entirely
unnoticed by the citizens. And at the very moment when it would like to give lessons in
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democracy to different traditions and cultures, the political culture of the west does not realize that
it has entirely lost its canon. SE 8
33

As Horst Bredekamp points out in “From Walter Benjamin to Carl Schmitt, via Thomas Hobbes”
Benjamin’s eighth thesis is a response to Schmitt that turns Schmitt’s own concept of history against him:
“Benjamin's conception of the shock like liberation acquires the character of a Last Judgment of Fascism”
(264).
34

See Lyotard’s “differend” and Spivak’s concept of the “subaltern.” The differend is the name Lyotard
gives to the silencing of a player in a language game, a term he borrows from Wittgenstein, and elaborates
in The Postmodern Condition. In Lyotard’s language game theory, the language games of particular
discourses are based on rules that reify their own validity (10). In the Differend Lyotard suggests that when
a player in a language game is silenced, she lacks access to articulate her truth or reality, trapped in the
silence of an impossibility of phrasing an injustice. In other words, in the differend, there are no agreed
upon procedures for what is other to the law to be presented in the domain of discourse. In Critique of
Postcolonial Reason Gayatri Spivak draws on the concept of the differend to elaborate her theory of the
subaltern as characterized by silence, a silence that emerges not through a lack of utterance on her part, but
by the apparent unrecognizability of this speech, and the inability within hegemonic mechanisms of power
to hear it. As Spivak argues, the subaltern may not only be speaking, but over the generations engaging in
continuous counterhegemonic insurgency. But the insurgency is outside of the cultural academic or
institutional modes through which power flows, so that her insurgency consistency fails.
35

Derrida cites Book I, Chapter 2 of the Social Contract “The First Societies” by Rousseau. The citation I
have included is derived from the translation of the Social Contract by G. D. H. Cole. Derrida cites the
French original in his article. Rousseau writes: “It is then, according to Grotius, doubtful whether the
human race belongs to a hundred men, or that hundred men to the human race: and, throughout his book, he
seems to incline to the former alternative, which is also the view of Hobbes. On this showing, the human
species is divided into so many herds of cattle, each with its ruler, who keeps guard over them for the
purpose of devouring them.”
36

Rousseau continues: “As a shepherd is of a nature superior to that of his flock, the shepherds of men, i.e.,
their rulers, are of a nature superior to that of the peoples under them. Thus, Philo tells us, the Emperor
Caligula reasoned, concluding equally well either that kings were gods, or that men were beasts” (Ibid.)
37

In “La bête et le souverain” Derrida writes:
The question is all the more obscure and necessary that the minimum feature that one must
recognize in the position of sovereignty… which we have stressed in the last years around
Schmitt, is a certain power to make, but also to suspend the law. It is the exceptional right to
move above the law, the right to lawlessness, if I may say so, which carries the risk of placing the
person of the sovereign above the human, granting him the omnipotence of God … and, at the
same time because of the arbitrary suspension or rupture of right, it makes the sovereign resemble
the most brutal beast which does not respect anything any more, despises the law, lies outlawed at
the outskirts, with the laws variations.” (»La question est d’autant plus obscure et nécessaire que
le trait minimal qu’on doive reconnaître dans la position de souveraineté, a ce stade a peine
préliminaire, c’est, nous y avons insiste les années dernières autour de Schmitt, un certain pouvoir
de donner, de faire mais aussi de suspendre la loi ; c’est le droit exceptionnel de se placer audessus du droit, le droit au non-droit, si je puis dire, ce qui a la fois risque de porter le souverain
humain au-dessus de l’humain, vers la toute-puissance divine (qui aura d’ailleurs le plus souvent
fonde le principe de souveraineté dans son origine sacrée et théologique) et a la fois, a cause de
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cette arbitraire suspension ou rupture du droit, risque justement de faire ressembler le souverain
à la bête la plus brutale qui ne respecte plus rien, méprise la loi, se situe d’entrée de jeu hors la
loi, a l’écart de la loi. ») (445)
38

The US and its allies accused Iraq of possessing weapons of mass destruction, and for colluding with the
terrorist group El Quada, for which no evidence was ever found. However, Hussein perpetrated numerous
crimes against humanity in Iraq’s war with Iran, and against the Kurdish people living in northern Iraq.
39

In “The Animal that Therefore I am (More to Follow)” Derrida writes:
Beyond the edge of the so-called human, beyond it but by no means on a single opposing side,
rather than “the Animal” or “Animal Life” there is already a heterogeneous multiplicity of the
living, or, more precisely (since to say the living” is already to say too much or not enough) a
multiplicity of organizations of relations between living and dead, relations of organizations or
lack of organization among realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate my means of the
figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or death. These relations are at once close and
abyssal; they can never be totally objectified. They do not leave room for any simple exteriority of
one term with respect to another. (399)

40

Derrida continues: “One cannot speak—moreover it has never been done of the bêtise or bestiality of an
animal. It would be an anthropomorphic projection of something that remains reserved to man, as the single
assurance finally, and the single risk, of what is “proper to man.” One can ask why the ultimate fallback of
what is proper to man, if there is such a thing, a property that could never in any case be attributed to the
animal or to God, thus comes to be named bêtise or bestiality.” Ibid 408-409
41

Indeed, borders are part of what constitutes the concept of sovereignty, which is geo-territorial as well as
being onto-theological.
42

In their article "Animals in Captivity" in Grzimek's Encyclopedia of Mammals, Herre and Rhors show
that wolves are community oriented animals, who prioritize the young and nursing mothers at the feeding
site, and are particularly social compared to domestic dogs, who as individuals in a hierarchy, are far less
likely to share their dinner. Wolf packs include heterogeneous members with complex modes of
communication and different individual behaviours and roles: some are fierce fighters, others have well
developed alertness and powers of observation, and together they cooperate to ensure pack survival. Dogs,
in contrast are more homogenous and less communicative, tending predominantly to be neither aggressive
nor particularly alert. Both wolf packs and dogs operate in accordance with a hierarchy, but these
hierarchies are realized in very different ways. For wolves, the hierarchy is always shifting, with members
swiftly and frequently changing position within power relations. Dogs, on the other hand, establish long
term hierarchies to which they submit over the long term, their behaviour more similar to young than to
adult wolves.
43

Bredekamp argues that Hobbes was likewise a key influence on Benjamin: “While Benjamin himself
does not quote Hobbes, there can be no doubt that his fundamental theses are based on the latter's definition
of the political. Thus it has been surmised that the image of the Leviathan should be viewed as a secret
antithesis to the emptiness of the allegory. At the beginning of Benjamin's "Kritik der Gewalt," where he
deals with Spinoza, Hobbes is likewise present between the lines” (254).
44

George Schwab species in his introduction to Political Theology that: “It is not surprising …that
[Schmitt] returned again and again in his writings to Thomas Hobbe’s “mutual relation between Protection
and Obedience,” and shared with Hobbe’s the belief that autoritas, non veritas facit legem. The one who
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has authority can demand obedience—and it is not always the legitimate sovereign who possesses this
authority. In was this belief in the need to support the legally constituted authority that led Schmitt to
participate in the Nazi adventure between 1933 and 1936 (xiii).
45

From the translation of “The lamb and the Wolf” included as a preface to Rogues.

46

According to Derrida:
…the word rogue, as an adjective or substantive…refers in everyday language, in the language of
the law, and in great works of literature…to beggars and homeless vagabonds of various kinds but
also, and for this same reason, to all sorts of riffraff, villains, and unprincipled outlaws….From
there the meaning gets extended, in Shakespeare as well as in Darwin, to all nonhuman living
things, that is to plants and animals whose behaviour appears deviant or perverse….the
qualification rogue calls for a marking or branding classification that sets something apart. A mark
of infamy discriminates by means of a first banishing or exclusion that then leads to a bringing
before the law.” (R 93-94)

47

In Rogues, Derrida writes: “This sovereignty is a circularity, indeed a sphericity. Sovereignty is round; it
is a rounding off. This circular or spherical rotation, the turn of the re-turn upon the self, can take either the
alternating form of the by turns, the in turn, or the each in turn…or else the form of an identity between the
origin and the conclusion, the cause and the end or aim, the driving (motric463)e) cause and the final
cause” (13).
48 ‘

Passive’ and ‘passionate’ share an etymological link to the Latin passivus "capable of feeling or
suffering," from stem of the Latin pati "to suffer, endure." Also related to Greek Pathos "suffering, feeling,
emotion."
49

Derrida elaborates on this ambiguity in “The animal that therefore I am:” “One can ask why the ultimate
fallback of what is proper to man, if there is such a thing, a property that could never in any case be
attributed to the animal or to God, thus comes to be named bêtise or bestiality” (408-409).
50

In a paper exploring the place of animals in Levinasian theories of friendship, Lisa Guenther argues that
Levinas does not elsewhere take the question of the ethical response of animals seriously. Citing his
discussion of animal faces in “Paradox of Morality” (“The human face is completely different and only
afterwards do we discover the face of an animal. I don't know if a snake has a face…” Levinas 171-2)
Guenther shows that while ethics might be extended to animals, Levinas does not see animals as capable of
ethical responsibility because they cannot speak or respond to the face of the Other (217).
51

Both Levinas and Guenther refer to Bobby as a witness of the prisoner’s humanity. In the “Name of the
Dog” Levinas writes “For him, there was no doubt we were men” (49). Guenther does not challenge this
interpretation. She argues that “Bobby’s genius was to bear witness to the human at a time when other
human beings regularly failed to do so” (217).
52
53

The use of the masculine pronoun here is intentional.

For a comparison of the ethics of Kant and Levinas see Catherine Chalier’s “What Ought I to Do?”:
Morality in Kant and Levinas. Trans. J. M. Todd. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2002.
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For a discussion on the link between the Shoah and Enlightenment thought see Zygmunt Bauman’s
Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity, 1989. For discussion on Kantian ethics and modern
instrumental rationalism see Zygmunt Bauman. Modernity and Ambivalence, Cambridge: Polity, 1991; and
Victor J. Seidler, Recovering the Self: Morality and Social Theory, London: Routledge, 1995.
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The use of the masculine pronoun is intentional: for Levinas the feminine is secondary and the subject
and other are male. The feminine is alterity, but she is not the Other. See Stella Sandford’s The Metaphysics
of Love. London: Continuum, 2000, and her analysis of Levinas portrayal of the feminine as what is preethical, but what opens the ethical sphere.
56

Scholars such as Robert Bernasconi, Drucilla Cornell, and Simon Critchley are well known for
associating deconstruction with a Levinasian ethics of alterity, characterized by a “responsibility to the
Other.” See for instance Bernasconi, Robert. “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Ethics.”
Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida. Ed. J. Sallis. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1987.
See also Bernasconi’s “The Trace of Levinas in Derrida.” 1985. Derrida and Différance. Ed. D. Wood and
R. Bernasconi. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1988. Cornell, Drucilla. The Philosophy of the Limit. New
York: Routledge, 1992. Critchley, Simon. The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992; expanded 2nd ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1999. For a discussion on the
incompatibility of deconstruction and Levinasian ethics see Martin Hägglund “The Necessity Of
Discrimination Disjoining Derrida and Levinas.” Diacritics 34.1: 40–71
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See chapter 1 for an extended discussion on Derrida’s distinction between justice and law. In “Force of
Law” Derrida writes:
Paradoxically, it is because of this overflowing of the performative, because of this always
excessive advance of interpretation, because of this structural urgency and precipitation of justice
that the latter has no horizon of expectation (regulative or messianic). But for this very reason it
has perhaps an avenir, precisely [justement], a to-come [à-venir] that one will have to [qu’il
faudra] rigorously distinguish from the future. The future loses the openness, the coming of the
other (who comes), without which there is no justice; and the future can always reproduce the
present, announce itself or present itself as a future present in the modified form of the present.
Justice remains to come, it remains by coming [la justice reste à-venir], it has to come [elle a àvenir] it is to come, the to-come [elle est à-venir], it deploys the very dimension of events
irreducibly to come. It will always have it, this à-venir, and it will always have had it. Perhaps this
is why justice, insofar as it is not only a [256] juridical or political concept, opens up to the avenir
the transformation, the recasting or refounding [la fondation] of law and politics. 256-257
58

For an in depth discussion of these difficulties see Critchley’s “Five Problems in Levinas’ View of
Politics and the Sketch of a Solution to Them.” In this article, Critchley argues that the following five
political problems compromise Levinas’ ethics: fraternity, monotheism, androcentrism, the family, and
Israel.
59

For more detailed discussion of Levinas and the feminine, see Tina Chanter’s anthology Feminist
Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas. University Park PA: Pennsylvania State UP. 2001. 1-27. Chanter
corrects Beauvoir, who misses the radical implications of Levinas’ disruption of the same, reiterates the
expectation that women to conform to masculine models (3). For Chanter, Levinas’ view of the feminine
may be problematic, but it also does have a radical potential.
60

Critchley comments on Levinas’ racism in the following citation:
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What about those whom, in a careless and ill-advised remark on ‘the yellow peril,’ Levinas
subsumes under the category of the Asiatic, the Chinese, and even the Russians insofar as they
submit themselves to the ‘paganism’ of communism? What about those outside of the influence
of the Bible and the Greeks? What about those who simply dance, in Levinas’ frankly racist aside
in a 1991 interview. I quote, ‘I often say, although it is a dangerous thing to say publicly, that
humanity consists of the Bible and the Greeks. All the rest can be translated: all the rest – all the
exotic – is dance.’ (175-6)
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This interview was conducted by Lieven De Cauterm on Monday, Apr. 05, 2004 in conjunction with The
Brussels Tribunal, which Derrida was too ill to attend. The tribunal, which ran from April 14 through 17,
was an inquiry into the “New Imperial Order,” and more particularly into the “Project for A New American
Century” (PNAC), the neo-conservative think tank of the Bush administration. For the entire interview, see
the Indymedia.be archive (2000-2005) at http://archive.indymedia.be/news/2004/04/83123.html. Some
small translation errors have been corrected in my citation of the interview.
62

Gabriele Schwab points to the scholarly affinity Deleuze shares with Derrida in her introduction to
Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis (7). She elaborates on Derrida’s opposing position to Deleuze and
Guattari’s anti-psychoanalysis project, citing his remark that: “I resisted the way he [Deleuze] attacked
psychoanalysis because I thought it would help the resistance to psychoanalysis, and I didn’t want to help.”
According to Schwab, he made this comment at the conference “Derrida/Deleuze: Psychoanalysis, Politics,
Territoriality” and followed it with an anecdote in he conducts a “play between self and other” with
Deleuze that is “based on a mutual recognition of resistance to fully engage the differences in their
positions, especially towards psychoanalysis” (3). Schwab cites Derrida’s telling of the story: “I remember
once, the only moment I discussed this with Deleuze was …just after he published the Anti-Oedipus…both
of us were on the jury of a thesis at Nanterre…I took Deleuze back to Paris. I was driving. It was brief. I
said: do you knows Anti-Oedipus? ‘No, I don’t!’ he replied. And that was all. Then we arrived in Paris”
(3).
63

Here Deleuze is comparing himself to Michel Foucault in an interview with Paul Rabinow. The a quote is
excerpted from Deleuze’s response to the following question: “You yourself seem to have a much more
fluid vision of the social world than Foucault. People underlined his use of architectural metaphors,
diametrically opposed to your "fluidity." In Deleuze, Gilles. "Foucault and the Prison." Interview by Paul
Rabinow, with Keith Gandal. In Barry Smart. Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments, Volume 3. London:
Routledge, 1994. Original Source: Deleuze, Gilles. "The Intellectual and Politics: Foucault and the
Prison." Interview by Paul Rabinow, with Keith Gandal. History of the Present 2 (Spring 1986): 1-2, 2021.
64

Deleuze and Guattari write: “We can be thrown into a becoming by anything at all, by the most
unexpected, most insignificant of things. You don’t deviate from the majority unless there is a little detail
that starts to swell and carries you off” (TP 292).
65

Philosophers from Aristotle to Heidegger have argued that the human animal becomes a thinking,
speaking, political subject by negating his or her animality. For Aristotle, animals, lacking logos, are
without ethics and thus incapable of crime. The Cartesian animal is likewise bereft of reason, a mere
machine, a sentiment echoed in Heidegger’s characterization of animal poverty in “world” in relation to
man, as beings who are trapped in their mere existence, bereft of the capacity to conceptualize their being
in the world. Psychoanalytic theorists likewise require a suppression of animality – in this case represented
by the drives of the Id – for healthy ego development. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari argue,
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psychoanalytic theorists “killed becoming-animal” (TP 286). They treat childhood identification with
animals as normal, but pathologize such identifications in adults as masochistic or fetishistic.
66

In What is Philosophy Deleuze and Guattari write that: “The immense relative deterritorialization of
world capitalism needs to be reterritorialized on the modern national state, which finds an outcome in
democracy, the new society of “brothers,” the capitalist version of the society of friends” (98).
67

This differs from the marxist concept of a ‘permanent revolution,’ because it does not relate to transfers
of power from one class to another. It would be interesting, however, to compare the concept of
revolutionary democracy developed here with Trotsky’s version of the permanent revolution in particular,
which thinks marxism outside of advanced capitalism.
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